Results: Changes to Military Policy

    Non-violent protests by blacks in the military contributed to changes in military policies with respect to segregation. Even if the military might have preferred not to become involved in the "social policy" issues relating to discriminatory practices, non-violent protest put pressure on military leaders to act, because protest was a disciplinary problem that might interfere with the successful prosecution of the War. Over time, the military would come to realize that discrimination was "fatal" to military efficiency, and the military leadership acted, both in the United States and in the theaters of war, to address some of the problems.1

Secretary McCloy
Source: Corbis

    The military recognized that segregation was one of the major sources of dissatisfaction for black members of the military. In 1943, a War Department report noted that among the problems noted on visits by observers to posts and bases, segregation was a recurring theme. The report specifically noted dissatisfaction over segregation in the mess halls and post theaters and on military and civilian transportation. As racial problems mounted, the War Department appointed Assistant Secretary John J. McCloy to chair the Advisory Committee on Negro Troop Policies, later referred to as the McCloy Committee. The committee recommended that the General of the Army, General George C. Marshall, issue direction to the commanders outlining their responsibilities to resolve problems involving inequitable treatment. Marshall subsequently issued instructions to the commanding generals of the Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Army Service Forces.2

General George Marshall

General George Marshall
Source: US Army

    Marshall also called for efforts by commanders to address issues raised by black soldiers. In July of 1943, Adjutant General James A. Ulio issued orders on behalf of Marshall requiring that every soldier have equal access to recreational facilities. Field commanders and Army inspectors still reported confusion about the policy. As a result, the Army issued new direction that prohibited segregation by race, although not segregation by unit, which would lead to the problems at Freeman Field. The new direction applied to post exchanges, military transportation, and on-post. Some of the efforts of the military leadership were at least partially successful; when the Adjutant General issued another order in mid-1943 that military buses provide equal access for blacks and whites, the incidents of disturbances related to bus segregation decreased.3

Henry Stimson

Secretary of War Stimson
Source: State Department

    By 1945, the military was more sensitive to the challenges facing black members of the military, and more sensitive to the power of the media, especially the black press. After the incident at Freeman Field, the McCloy Committee, aware of the negative publicity that the matter was drawing, displaced the authority of the local commander and dealt with the disciplinary issue from the headquarters of the War Department. The Committee concluded that the segregation orders were improper and urged that no new orders be issued. Secretary of War Stimson took the advice of the committee and stated that separation in facilities could not be based on race.4

    As non-violent developed, it put increasing pressure on the military to deal with the issue of segregation directly. When protests against military segregation turned violent, the military was able to explain those protests away as criminal indiscipline or even mutiny. Focusing on punishing the violent protestors gave the military an excuse not to deal with the issues that had led to the protests. The tactics of groups like the Freeman Field officers, on the other hand, were more effective. The military had a much harder time explaining away disciplined, non-violent protest, especially mass protests like the one at Freeman. The protestors had the law, or at least Army regulations, on their side, and they used those regulations to support their claim to equal access to military facilities. The aspects of their protests that made them particularly effective were the same things that would make the non-violent protests of the 1950s and 1960s effective: local leaders who worked to plan the goals of the protest in advance, broad support from the local community, operations undertaken in small groups to prevent being accused of inciting a riot, a commitment to non-violence, legal assistance from sophisticated organizations like the NAACP, and use of the press to get a message out to the public.5

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1 MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965, 39; Kryder, Divided Arsenal, 166 (citing Army Service Force Manual M5, dated October 1944). Full Cites

2 Osur, Separate and Unequal, 38-39; "Memorandum, Acting Civilian Aide to the Secretary of War, for Assistant Secretary of War, August 23, 1943," reprinted in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Military: Basic Documents V, 273, 276-77; "Memorandum, Assistant Secretary of War, for Chief of Staff, July 3, 1943, subject: Negro Troops," reprinted in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Military: Basic Documents V, 267; Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II, 72; "Memorandum, Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Commanding General Army Ground Forces; Commanding General, Army Service Forces, July 3, 1943, subject: Negro Troops," reprinted in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the Military: Basic Documents V, 270. Full Cites

3 "Memorandum, Chief of Staff, for Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Commanding General, Army Ground Forces; Commanding General, Army Service Forces, WDCSA 291.21 (3 Jul 43), subject: Negro Troops," reprinted in MacGregor and Nalty, Blacks in the United States Armed Forces: Basic Documents V, 270; Sandler, Segregated Skies, 68; Nalty, Strength for the Fight, 156-157; Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II, 77; Lee, The U.S. Army in World War II: The Employment of Negro Troops, 396-399; MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940-1965, 45-46; Kryder, Divided Arsenal, 153-154. Full Cites

4 Osur, Blacks in the Army Air Forces During World War II, 119-121; Gropman, The Air Force Integrates, 1945-1964, 25-26; Osur, Separate and Unequal, 55. Full Cites

5 Kryder, Divided Arsenal, 165; Osur, Separate and Unequal, 43; Sandler, Segregated Skies, 128. Full Cites