Author: David A. Kravitz
Title: Extensions of Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) bargaining theory to simple weighted majority games in which players lack alternative minimal winning coalitions.
Source: In R. W. Scholz (Ed.), Current issues in West German decision research (pp. 125-138). Frankfurt, West Germany: P. Lang. 1986.
Abstract:
Komorita and Chertkoff's (1973) Bargaining theory of coalition formation posits
that a player's outcome in a given coalition depends on the value of his best
alternative coalition. If the player has no alternative the theory is unable
to make predictions. In the present paper nine possible extensions of Bargaining
theory to such situations are proposed and evaluated on logical and empirical
grounds. Three of these variations appear superior to the others, but cannot
be distinguished using currently available data.
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