Authors: S. S. Komorita and David A. Kravitz
Title: Effects of prior experience on coalition bargaining
Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 675-686. 1981.
Abstract:
Theory and research in coalition formation suggest that coalition outcomes may
depend on the participants’ prior bargaining experience and on the incentives
(rewards) over which they are bargaining. Komorita’s equal excess model predicts
that coalition outcomes should vary with both of these variables, and the purpose
of this study was to test these predictions. One hundred twenty-six male undergraduates
played three-person multivalued games. All groups played four trials of a test
game either for points that were later converted to prizes (maximum value of
$2), or for money (values of $2, $3, and $4 on each trial). Prior to the test
game, triads in different conditions were exposed to a varying number of coalition
games. There was no significant effect of incentives on either coalition frequencies
or coalition payoffs. Although there was no significant effect of prior experience
on coalition frequencies, there was a large and significant effect on coalition
payoffs: the greater the experience, the greater the deviation of payoffs from
equal splits. Thus, the results of many
coalition experiments may be restricted to naïve bargainers and may not be generalized
to experienced, sophisticated bargainers. Implications for the equal excess
model and for future research are also discussed.
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