Authors: S. S. Komorita, Thomas P. Hamilton and David A. Kravitz
Title: Effects of alternatives in coalition bargaining.
Source: Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 116-136. 1984
Abstract:
A critical factor in bargaining and coalition formation is the alternative outcomes
of the bargainers if an agreement cannot be reached. In some situations bargainers
have individual alternatives while in other situations their alternatives must
be negotiated with others. The purpose of this study was to contrast the effects
of one-person and two-person alternatives on coalition outcomes. The second
purpose of the study was to contrast the predictions of four theories of coalition
formation: bargaining theory, equal excess model, Shapley value, and a special
case of equity theory. The results indicate that one-person alternatives enhance
the bargaining strength of the stronger players more than two-person alternatives.
The predictions of the equal excess model and the Shapley value were more accurate
than the predictions of bargaining theory and equity theory. However, the greater
accuracy of the equal excess model and the Shapley value may be restricted to
situations in which the bargainers have one-person rather than two-person alternatives.
back to publications