Industrial Organization and Public Policy II (Econ 846-001)
Prof. Alex Tabarrok
Web Page: http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/
If you are on the
Office Hours: T-Thr: 10-12, 2-4
and Perloff’s Modernis the best undergraduate IO book
and Jean Tirole’s The
of Industrial Organization (MIT Press) is the best
graduate book, albeit now quite dated. I recommend
both books, especially if you will write the IO
prelim. Paul Klemperer’s book Auctions:
and Practice is a very nice introduction to the topic
– note, however, that most of the papers in the book are
available online if you want to save some money. Also,
although I will be dipping into all books, some subjects
that I will cover are not covered in either and I do not
follow either book systematically. The books are
recommended - you may choose not to purchase and instead
work from articles and class notes.
You will also be required to make a 15 minute class presentation on the subject of your paper.
IO Paper 35%
My personal grading scale is as follows. Note that sometimes the university does not allow certain grades such as Ds – in which case you will receive the next highest grade below D. Plus-Minuses for B through D grades, where allowed by university policy, will occur at the upper and lower 2.5% level. For example, 70-72.49 will be B-, 72.5-77.49 B, 77.5-79.9 B+ and so forth.
F: 50% -
Disability Policy: If you are a student with a disability and you need academic accommodations, please see me and contact the disability Resource Center (DRC) at 703-993-2474. All academic accommodations must be arranged through that office.
Review of Monopoly
Tirole, chapter 3
CP, chapter 9. 10
Cowling, K., and D. C. Mueller. 1978. The Social Costs of Monopoly Power. The Economic Journal 88 (Dec):727-48.
Varian, H. 1985. Price Discrimination and Social Welfare. American Economic Review 75 (4):870-75.
Adams, W. J., and J. L. Yellen. 1976. Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (3):475-98.
*Bakos, Y., and E. Brynjolfsson. 1999. Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency. Management Science 45:1613-30.
Bakos, Y., and E. Brynjolfsson. 2000. Bundling and Competition on the Internet. Marketing Science 19 (1):
Xavier Gabaix, and David Laibson. 2006. Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information Suppression in Competitive Markets. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121, no. 2. The Quarterly Journal of Economics: 505-540.
*Lott, J. R., and R. D. Roberts. 1991. A Guide to the Pitfalls of Identifying Price Discrimination. Economic Inquiry XXIX (Jan):14-23.
Dana, J. D. J. 1998. Advance-Purchase Discounts and Price Discrimination in Competitive Markets. Journal of Political Economy 106 (2):395-422.
*Levine, M. E. 2002.Price
Without Market Power. Yale
Journal on Regulation 19:1-36.
*U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th District. 2015. Spirit Airlines v. Northwest Airlines
Monopoly, Product Quality and Durability, Coase Conjecture
Tirole, 79-87, 100-104
CP, chapter 15
*Barzel, Y. 1976. An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation. Journal of Political Economy 84 (6):1177-97.
*Bulow, J. I. 1982. Durable Goods Monopolists. Journal of Political Economy 90 (2):314-32.
Coase, R. H. 1972. Durability and Monopoly. Journal of Law and Economics 15 (April):143-49.
Morch von der Fehr, N.-H., and K.-U. Kuhn. 1995. Coase Versus Pacman: Who Eats Whom in the Durable-Goods Monopoly. Journal of Political Economy 103 (4):785-812.
*Masten, S. E., and E. A. Snyder. 1993. United States Versus United Shoe Machinery Corporation: On the Merits. Journal of Law and Economics XXXVI (April):33-70.
*Bulow, J. 1986. An Economic Theory of Planned Obsolesence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 101 (4):729-49.
*Akerlof, G. A. 1970. The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84:488-500.
*Shapiro, C. 1983. Premiums for High Quality Products As Returns to Reputations. Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (4):659-79.
*Waldman, M. 2003. Durable Goods Theory for the Real World Markets. (link requires subscription) Journal of Economic Perspectives 17 (1):131-54.
Johnson, J. P., and M. Waldman. 2003. Leasing, Lemons and Buybacks. Rand Journal of Economics 34 (2):247-65.
Gilligan, T. W. 2003. Lemons and Leases in the Used Business Aircraft Market. Working Paper.
*Bond, E. W. 1982. A Direct Test of the "Lemons" Model: The Market for Used Pickup Trucks. American Economic Review 72 (4):836-40.
*Cawley, J., and T. Philipson. 1999. An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance. American Economic Review 89 (4):827-46.
Hemenway, David. 1990. Propitious Selection. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 105, No. 4. pp. 1063-1069.
Finkelstein, Amy and Kathleen McGarry. 2006. Multiple dimensions of private information: evidence from the long-term care insurance market 2006, American Economic Review September 96(4): 938-958.
CP, chapter 10
Deneckere, R. J., and P. R. McAfee. 1996. Damaged Goods. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy 5 (2):149-74.
Waldman, M. 1996. Durable Goods Pricing When Quality Matters. Journal of Business 69 (Oct):489-510.
---. 1993. A New Perspective On Planned Obsolescence. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108 (1):273-83.
Klemperer, Paul. 2000. Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature. Introductory chapter to The Economic Theory of Auctions, P. Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.). (Also published in Journal of Economic Surveys, 1999, and reprinted in The Current State of Economic Science S. Dahiya (ed.), 1999.)
*Klemperer, Paul. 2003. Why Every Economist Should Learn Some Auction Theory. Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Invited Lectures to 8th World Congress of the Econometric Society, M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen and S. Turnovsky (eds.), Cambridge University Press.
*Klemperer, Paul. 2002. How (Not) to Run Auctions: the European 3G Telecom Auctions European Economic Review 46: 828-845.
Riley, J. G., and W. F. Samuelson. 1981. Optimal Auctions. American Economic Review 71 (3):381-92.
*Milgrom, P. 1989. Auctions and Bidding: A Primer. Journal of Economic Perspectives 3 (3):3-22.
Milgrom, P. R., and R. J. Weber. 1982. A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding. Econometrica 50 (September):1089-1122.
Bulow, J., and P. Klemperer. 1996. Auctions Versus Negotiations. American Economic Review 86 (1):180-94.
*David Lucking-Reiley. 1999. Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet. American Economic Review. 89 (5): 1063-1080.
*Roth, Alvin E. and Axel Ockenfels. 2002. Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the Internet. American Economic Review 92 (4): 1093-1103.
Incentive Schemes, Tournaments, Piece Rates
*Prendergast, C. 1999. The Provision of Incentives in Firms. Journal of Economic Literature XXXVII (1,March):7-63.
Lazear, E. P., and S. Rosen. 1981. Rank Order Tournaments As Optimum Labor Contracts. Journal of Political Economy 89 (5):841-64.
Baker, G. P. 1992. Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement. Journal of Political Economy 100 (3):598-614.
*Holmstrom, B., and P. Milgrom. 1991. Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7 (sp):24-52.
*Lazear, Edward. P. 1996. Performance Pay and Productivity. NBER Working Paper 5672
*Passell, Peter. 1996. Paid by the Widget, and Proud. New York Times (June. 16).
*Prendergast, Canice. 1999. Paying for Performance. The financial Times (Dec. 13).
*King, Ralph T. 1998. Infighting Rises, Productivity Falls, Employees Miss Piecework System. Wall Street Journal (May 20).
Gneezy, U., M. Niederle, and A. Rustichini. 2003. Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics, August 2003, p. 1049-1074.
The Problem with Strong Incentives
*Hart, O. A. Shleifer, and R.W. Vishny. 1997. The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and Application to Prisons. Quarterly Journal of Economics 451: 1127-162.
*Kane, T. J., and D. O. Staiger. 2002. The Promise and Pitfalls of Using Imprecise School Accountability Measures. Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (4):91-114.
*Dranove, D., D. Kessler, M. McClellan, and M. Satterthwaite. 2003. Is More Information Better? The Effects of "Report Cards" On Health Care Providers. Journal of Political Economy 111 (3):555-88.
Behavioral Economics and Incentives
*Dan Pink. TED Talk: The Surprising Science of Motivation.
*Gneezy, Uri, and Aldo Rustichini. 2000. A Fine Is a Price.
The Journal of Legal Studies 29, no. 1 (January 1):
*Amabile, T. M. "Motivation and Creativity: Effects of Motivational Orientation on Creative Writers." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 48, no. 2 (February 1985): 393-399.
Glucksberg, S. (1962). The influence of strength of drive on functional fixedness and perceptual recognition. J. exp. Psychol., 1962, 63, 36-41.
*Li, Jian, Erte Xiao, Daniel Houser, and P. Read Montague. 2009. Neural responses to sanction threats in two-party economic exchange. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, no. 39: 16835-16840.
*Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole. 2003. Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation. Review of Economic Studies 70, no. 3: 489-520. doi:10.1111/1467-937X.00253.
*ARIELY, DAN , URI  GNEEZY, GEORGE  LOEWENSTEIN, and NINA  MAZAR. 2009. Large Stakes and Big Mistakes. The Review of Economic Studies 76 (March): 451-469. doi:10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00534.x.
*Frey, Bruno S., and Margit Osterloh. 2005. Yes, Managers Should Be Paid Like Bureaucrats. Journal of Management Inquiry 14, no. 1 (March 1): 96-111.
*Smallwood, Dennis E. and John Conlisk. 1979. Product Quality in Markets Where Consumers are Imperfectly InformedThe Quarterly Journal of Economics , Vol. 93, No. 1 (Feb., 1979), pp. 1-2.
[Smallwood Conlisk Notes, Mathematica CDF file]
SPIEGLER, R. (2006), The Market for Quacks. Review of Economic Studies, 73: 1113–1131. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2006.00410.x
Laibson, David. 1997. Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(2): 443-477.
Shapiro, Jesse. 2005. Is There a Daily Discount Rate? Evidence from the Food Stamp Nutrition Cycle. 89(2-3), pp. 303-25.
DellaVigna, Stefano, and Ulrike Malmendier. 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym." American Economic Review, 96(3): 694-719.
Management, Productivity and
Patents and Intellectual Property
the Innovation Renaissance. TED Books (e-book).
Machlup, F. 1958. An economic review of the patent system.
Study No. 15 of the subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary United
States Senate, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.,
Barlow, J. P. 1994. The Economy of Ideas. Wired 2 (March):1-15.
Shulman, S. 1999. Owning
Cole, J. H. 2001. Patents and Copyrights: Do the Benefits Exceed the Costs? Journal of Libertarian Studies 15 (4):79-105.
Hunt, R. 1999. Patent
Reform: A Mixed Blessing for the U.S. Economy? Business
Review: Federal Reserve Bank of
Hunt, R. M. 2001. You
Can Patent That? Business Review: Federal Reserve
*Lerner, J. 2002. 150 Years of
Patent Protection. Working Paper.
Arrow, K. J. 1962. Economic
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention. In The
Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and
Social Factors, ed. R. Nelson, 609-25. Princeton:
Klemperer, P. 1990. How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection Be? Rand Journal of Economics 21 (1):113-30.
Bessen, J., and E. Maskin. 1999. Sequential Innovation, Patents, and Imitation. MIT Working Paper 11/99.
Scotchmer, S. 1998. Incentives to
Innovate. In The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law, ed. P. Newman, 273-76.
Merges, R. P., and R. R.
Nelson. 1990. On the Complex Economics of Patent
*Bittlingmayer, G. 1988. Property Rights, Progress, and the Aircraft Patent Agreement. Journal of Law and Economics 31 (April):227-48.
*Hall, B. H., and R. H. Ziedonis. 2001. The Patent Paradox Revisited: An Empirical Study of Patenting in the U.S. Semiconductor Industry, 1979-1995. Rand Journal of Economics 32 (1):101-28.
Boldrin, M., and D. K. Levine. 2003. Perfectly Competitive Innovation. Working Paper.
*Moser, P. 2003. How Do Patent
Laws Influence Innovation? Evidence from
Nineteenth-Century World Fairs. NBER Working Paper
Series 9909. http://www.nber.org/papers/w9909.
*Murray, F. (et al.). 2009. Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Effect of Openness of Innovation. NBER Working Paper 14819. http://www.nber.org/papers/w14819.
*Starr, E., Bishara, N., & Prescott, J. in press. Noncompetes in the US Labor Force. Retrieved from https://sites.google.com/site/starrevan/research
Dourado, E., & Tabarrok, A. 2015. Public choice perspectives on intellectual property. Public Choice, 163(1): 129–151.
Alternatives to Patents
*Tabarrok, A. 2002. Patent Theory Versus Patent Law. Contributions to Economic Analysis and Policy 1 (1). Article 9.
*Kremer, M. 1998. Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 113:1137-67.
Wright, B. D. 1983. The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts. American Economic Review 73 (4):691-707.
*Shavell, S., and van T. Ypersele. 2001. Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics XLIV (2 (pt.1)):525-48.
The Pharmaceutical Market and Regulation
*Lichtenberg, Frank R. and Joel Waldfogel. 2003. Does Misery Love Company? Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan Drug Act. NBER Working Paper 9750.
*Kremer, Michael and Christopher M. Snyder. 2003. Why are Drugs more Profitable than Vaccines? NBER Working Paper 9833.
Hughes, James W., Moore, Michael J., and Edward A. Snyder. 2002. “NAPSTERIZING” PHARMACEUTICALS: ACCESS, INNOVATION, AND CONSUMER WELFARE. NBER Working Paper 9229.
Peltzman, S. 1973. An
of Consumer Protection Legislation: The 1962 Drug Amendments.
Journal of Political Economy 81, no. 5: 1049–91.
Reprinted in Chicago Studies in Political Economy,
edited by George J. Stigler, 303–48. Chicago,
Klein, Daniel and Alexander Tabarrok 2004. Do Off-Label Drug Practices Argue Against FDA Efficacy Requirements? Testing an Argument by Stuctured Conversations with Experts. Working paper.
DiMasi, Joseph A.; Hansen, Ronald W.; Grabowski, Henry G. The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs. Journal of Health Economics v22, n2 (March 2003): 151-85.
IO Theory in other Fields/School Choice and Federalism
Tiebout, C. M. 1956. A Pure Theory of Local Expenditure. Journal of Political Economy 64 (5):416-24. Classic article.
Hoxby, C. M. 2000. Does Competition Among Public Schools Benefit Students and Taxpayers?. American Economic Review 90 (5):1209-38. Important empirical work on Tiebout competition in the context of schooling.
---. 2003. School Choice and School Competition: Evidence from the United States. Swedish Economic Policy Review 10:9-65. Review of competition in education more generally – not directly relevant to Federalism but of interest if you wanted to follow up on some school choice issues.
Qian, Y., and B. R. Weingast. 1997. Federalism As a Commitment to Preserving Market Incentives. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11 (4):83-92.