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TERESA
HARRIS, PETITIONER v. FORKLIFT SYSTEMS, INC. No. 92-1168
SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES
510 U.S. 17; 114
S. Ct. 367; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7155; 126 L. Ed. 2d
295; 62 U.S.L.W. 4004; 63 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 225; 62 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) P42,623; 93
Cal. Daily Op. Service 8330; 93 Daily Journal DAR
14212; 7 Fla. Law W. Fed. S 655
October 13,
1993, Argued
November 9,
1993, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY:
[**1] ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT.
DISPOSITION: 976
F.2d 733, reversed and remanded.
SYLLABUS:
Petitioner Harris sued her former employer,
respondent Forklift Systems, Inc., claiming that
the conduct of Forklift's president toward her
constituted "abusive work environment"
harassment because of her gender in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Declaring this to be "a close case,"
the District Court found, among other things,
that Forklift's president often insulted Harris
because of her gender and often made her the
target of unwanted sexual innuendos. However, the
court concluded that the comments in question did
not create an abusive environment because they
were not "so severe as to . . . seriously
[**2] affect [Harris'] psychological
well-being" or lead her to "suffer
injury." The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held: To be
actionable as "abusive work
environment" harassment, conduct need not
"seriously affect [an employee's]
psychological well-being" or lead the
plaintiff to "suffer injury." Pp. 3-6.
(a) The
applicable standard, here reaffirmed, is stated
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57:
Title VII is violated when the workplace is
permeated with discriminatory behavior that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a
discriminatorily hostile or abusive working
environment, id., at 64, 67. This standard
requires an objectively hostile or abusive
environment -- one that a reasonable person would
find hostile or abusive -- as well as the
victim's subjective perception that the
environment is abusive. Pp. 3-5.
(b) Whether an
environment is "hostile" or
"abusive" can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances, which may
include the frequency of the discriminatory
conduct; its severity; whether it is physically
threatening or
Ôh)0*0*0*°°Ôhumiliating,
or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it
[**3] unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance. The effect on the employee's
psychological well-being is relevant in
determining whether the plaintiff actually found
the environment abusive. But while psychological
harm, like any other relevant factor, may be
taken into account, no single factor is required.
Pp. 5-6.
(c) Reversal and
remand are required because the District Court's
erroneous application of the incorrect legal
standard may well have influenced its ultimate
conclusion that the work environment was not
intimidating or abusive to Harris, especially
given that the court found this to be a
"close case." P. 6.
976 F.2d 733,
reversed and remanded.
JUDGES:
O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court. SCALIA, J., and GINSBURG, J.,
filed concurring opinions.
OPINIONBY:
O'CONNOR
OPINION: [*18]
[***300] JUSTICE O'CONNOR delivered the opinion
of the Court.
In this case we
consider the definition of a discriminatorily
"abusive work environment" (also known
as a "hostile work [*19] environment")
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
78 Stat. 253, as amended, 42 U.S.C. @ 2000e et
seq. (1988 ed., Supp. III).
I
Teresa Harris
[**4] worked as a manager at Forklift Systems,
Inc., an equipment rental company, from April
1985 until October 1987. Charles Hardy was
Forklift's president.
The Magistrate
found that, throughout Harris' time at Forklift,
Hardy often insulted her because of her gender
and often made her the target of unwanted sexual
innuendos. Hardy told Harris on several
occasions, in the presence of other employees,
"You're a woman, what do you know" and
"We need a man as the rental manager";
at least once, he told her she was "a dumb
ass woman." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-13.
Again in front of others, he suggested that the
two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to
negotiate [Harris'] raise." Id., at A-14.
Hardy occasionally asked Harris and other female
employees to get coins from his front pants
pocket. Ibid. He threw objects on the ground in
front of Harris and other women, and asked them
to pick the objects up. Id., at A-14 to A-15. He
made sexual innuendos about Harris' and other
women's clothing. Id., at A-15.
In mid-August
1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his
conduct. Hardy said he was surprised that Harris
was offended, claimed he was only joking, and
apologized. Id., at A-16. [**5] He also promised
he would stop, and based on this assurance Harris
stayed on the job. Ibid. But in early September,
Hardy began anew: While Harris was arranging a
deal with one of Forklift's customers, he asked
her, again in front of other employees,
"What did you do, promise the guy . . . some
[sex] Saturday night?" Id., at A-17. On
October 1, Harris collected her paycheck and
quit.
Harris then sued
Forklift, claiming that Hardy's conduct had
created an abusive work environment for her
because of her gender. The United States District
Court for the Middle District of Tennessee,
adopting the report and recommendation [*20] of
the Magistrate, found this to be "a close
case," id., at A-31, but held [***301] that
Hardy's conduct did not create an abusive
environment. The court found that some of Hardy's
comments "offended [Harris], and would
offend the reasonable woman," id., at A-33,
but that they were not
"so severe
as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris']
psychological well-being. A reasonable woman
manager under like circumstances would have been
offended by Hardy, but his conduct would not have
risen to the level of interfering with that
person's work performance.
"Neither
[**6] do I believe that [Harris] was subjectively
so offended that she suffered injury . . . .
Although Hardy may at times have genuinely
offended [Harris], I do not believe that he
created a working environment so poisoned as to
be intimidating or abusive to [Harris]."
Id., at A-34 to A-35.
In focusing on
the employee's psychological well-being, the
District Court was following Circuit precedent.
See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d
611, 620 (CA6 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041
(1987). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a brief unpublished
decision.
We granted
certiorari, 507 U.S. (1993), to resolve a
conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct,
to be actionable as "abusive work
environment" harassment (no quid pro quo
harassment issue is present here), must
"seriously affect [an employee's]
psychological well-being" or lead the
plaintiff to "suffer injury." Compare
Rabidue (requiring serious effect on
psychological well-being); Vance v. Southern Bell
Telephone & Telegraph Co., 863 F.2d 1503,
1510 (CA11 1989) (same); and [**7] Downes v. FAA,
775 F.2d 288, 292 (CA Fed. 1985) (same), with
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877-878 (CA9
1991) (rejecting such a requirement).
[*21] II
Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it "an
unlawful employment practice for an employer . .
. to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 42 U.S.C. @ 2000e-2(a)(1).
As we made clear in Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), this language
"is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible'
discrimination. The phrase 'terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment' evinces a congressional
intent 'to strike at the entire spectrum of
disparate treatment of men and women' in
employment," which includes requiring people
to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive
environment. Id., at 64, quoting Los Angeles
Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S.
702, 707, n. 13 (1978) [**8] (some internal
quotation marks omitted). When the workplace is
permeated with "discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult," 477 U.S., at 65, that
is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment,"
id., at 67 (internal brackets and quotation marks
omitted), Title VII is violated.
[***302] This
standard, which we reaffirm today, takes a middle
path between making actionable any conduct that
is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to
cause a tangible psychological injury. As we
pointed out in Meritor, "mere utterance of
an . . . epithet which engenders offensive
feelings in a employee," ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted) does not sufficiently
affect the conditions of employment to implicate
Title VII. Conduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile
or abusive work environment -- an environment
that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive -- is beyond Title VII's purview.
Likewise, if the victim does not subjectively
perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered [**9] the [*22]
conditions of the victim's employment, and there
is no Title VII violation.
But Title VII
comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily
abusive work environment, even one that does not
seriously affect employees' psychological
well-being, can and often will detract from
employees' job performance, discourage employees
from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing in their careers. Moreover, even
without regard to these tangible effects, the
very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so
severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their
race, gender, religion, or national origin
offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace
equality. The appalling conduct alleged in
Meritor, and the reference in that case to
environments "'so heavily polluted with
discrimination as to destroy completely the
emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers,'" supra, at 66, quoting
Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (CA5 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972), merely present
some especially egregious examples of harassment.
[**10] They do not mark the boundary of what is
actionable.
We therefore
believe the District Court erred in relying on
whether the conduct "seriously affected
plaintiff's psychological well-being" or led
her to "suffer injury." Such an inquiry
may needlessly focus the factfinder's attention
on concrete psychological harm, an element Title
VII does not require. Certainly Title VII bars
conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable
person's psychological well-being, but the
statute is not limited to such conduct. So long
as the environment would reasonably be perceived,
and is perceived, as hostile or abusive, Meritor,
supra, at 67, there is no need for it also to be
psychologically injurious.
This is not, and
by its nature cannot be, a mathematically precise
test. We need not answer today all the potential
[*23] questions it raises, nor specifically
address the EEOC's new regulations on this
subject, see 58 Fed. Reg. 51266 (1993) (proposed
29 CFR @@ 1609.1, 1609.2); see also 29 CFR @
1604.11 (1993). But we can say that whether an
environment is "hostile" or
"abusive" can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances. These may
include the frequency [**11] of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a
mere offensive utterance; and whether it
unreasonably interferes [***303] with an
employee's work performance. The effect on the
employee's psychological well-being is, of
course, relevant to determining whether the
plaintiff actually found the environment abusive.
But while psychological harm, like any other
relevant factor, may be taken into account, no
single factor is required.
III
Forklift, while
conceding that a requirement that the conduct
seriously affect psychological well-being is
unfounded, argues that the District Court
nonetheless correctly applied the Meritor
standard. We disagree. Though the District Court
did conclude that the work environment was not
"intimidating or abusive to [Harris],"
App. to Pet. for Cert. A-35, it did so only after
finding that the conduct was not "so severe
as to be expected to seriously affect plaintiff's
psychological well-being," id., at A-34, and
that Harris was not "subjectively so
offended that she suffered injury," ibid.
The District Court's application of these
incorrect standards may well have influenced its
ultimate conclusion, [**12] especially given that
the court found this to be a "close
case," id., at A-31.
We therefore
reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and
remand the case for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
So ordered.
CONCURBY:
SCALIA; GINSBURG
CONCUR: [*24]
JUSTICE SCALIA,
concurring.
Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986), held that
Title VII prohibits sexual harassment that takes
the form of a hostile work environment. The Court
stated that sexual harassment is actionable if it
is "sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to
alter the conditions of [the victim's] employment
and create an abusive work environment.'"
Id., at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d
897, 904 (CA11 1982)). Today's opinion elaborates
that the challenged conduct must be severe or
pervasive enough "to create an objectively
hostile or abusive work environment -- an
environment that a reasonable person would find
hostile or abusive." Ante, at 4.
"Abusive"
(or "hostile," which in this context I
take to mean the same thing) does not seem to me
a very clear standard -- and I do not think
clarity is at all increased [**13] by adding the
adverb "objectively" or by appealing to
a "reasonable person's" notion of what
the vague word means. Today's opinion does list a
number of factors that contribute to abusiveness,
see ante, at 5, but since it neither says how
much of each is necessary (an impossible task)
nor identifies any single factor as
determinative, it thereby adds little certitude.
As a practical matter, today's holding lets
virtually unguided juries decide whether
sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by)
an employer is egregious enough to warrant an
award of damages. One might say that what
constitutes "negligence" (a traditional
jury question) is not much more clear and certain
than what constitutes "abusiveness."
Perhaps so. But the class of plaintiffs seeking
to recover for negligence is limited to those who
have suffered harm, whereas under this statute
[***304] "abusiveness" is to be the
test of whether legal harm has been suffered,
opening more expansive vistas of litigation. Be
that as it may, I know of no alternative to the
course the Court today has taken. One of the
factors mentioned in the Court's nonexhaustive
list -- whether the conduct unreasonably [*25]
interferes with an employee's [**14] work
performance -- would, if it were made an absolute
test, provide greater guidance to juries and
employers. But I see no basis for such a
limitation in the language of the statute.
Accepting Meritor's interpretation of the term
"conditions of employment" as the law,
the test is not whether work has been impaired,
but whether working conditions have been
discriminatorily altered. I know of no test more
faithful to the inherently vague statutory
language than Ô
0*0*0*°°Ô PAGE 13 510 U.S.
17, *25; 114 S. Ct. 367; 1993 U.S. LEXIS 7155,
**14; 126 L. Ed. 2d 295, ***304
the one the
Court today adopts. For these reasons, I join the
opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE
GINSBURG, concurring.
Today the Court
reaffirms the holding of Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986): "[A]
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII
by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work
environment." The critical issue, Title
VII's text indicates, is whether members of one
sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or
conditions of employment to which members of the
other sex are not exposed. See 42 U.S.C. @
2000e-2(a)(1) (declaring that it is unlawful to
discriminate with respect to, inter [**15] alia,
"terms" or "conditions" of
employment). As the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission emphasized, see Brief for United
States and Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission as Amici Curiae 9-14, the
adjudicator's inquiry should center, dominantly,
on whether the discriminatory conduct has
unreasonably interfered with the plaintiff's work
performance. To show such interference, "the
plaintiff need not prove that his or her tangible
productivity has declined as a result of the
harassment." Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co.,
858 F.2d 345, 349 (CA6 1988). It suffices to
prove that a reasonable person subjected to the
discriminatory conduct would find, as the
plaintiff did, that the harassment so altered
working conditions as to "make it more
difficult to do the job." See ibid. Davis
concerned race-based discrimination, but that
difference [*26] does not alter the analysis;
except in the rare case in which a bona fide
occupational qualification is shown, see
Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499
U.S. 187, 200-207 (1991) (construing 42 U.S.C. @
2000e-2(e)(1)), Title [**16] VII declares
discriminatory practices based on race, gender,
religion, or national origin equally unlawful. *
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - -Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
* Indeed, even
under the Court's equal protection jurisprudence,
which requires "an exceedingly persuasive
justification" for a gender-based
classification, Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S.
455, 461 (1981) (internal quotation marks
omitted), it remains an open question whether
"classifications based upon gender are
inherently suspect." See Mississippi Univ.
for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724, and n. 9
(1982).
- - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - -End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - -
The Court's
opinion, which I join, seems to me in harmony
with the view expressed in this concurring
statement.
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