Alex Tabarrok's Forthcoming or Published Papers
Where possible I have provided a link to a PDF
file, preferably to the final journal version. In some cases
direct linking was not possible and it may take a click or two.
If
there is no link or you have any problems reading the PDF email me and I can either email you
an electronic copy or snail mail a hardcopy.
Papers in academic journals are first, chapters
in books and other publications
are below.
Comment: (with Dan Klein). The heart of this paper is an
analysis of the written comments that physicians made to the
"consistency argument" (see the paper). We provide all the
comments here as Word documents. The responses are split into
three categories; the comments of
challengers
who disputed the consistency argument, the comments
of liberalizers who agreed with the consistency argument, and final comments on
the survey made by both
challengers and liberalizers. In the text these are denoted as
the
"g", "c" and "f" comments respectively.
ABSTRACT: The amended
Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act
requires efficacy certification for a drug’s initial uses (“on-label”),
but
does not require certification before physicians may prescribe the drug
for
subsequent uses (“off-label”). Does it
make sense to require FDA efficacy certification for new drugs but not
for new
uses of old drugs? Using a sequential
online survey we carried on a “virtual conversation” with some 500
physicians. The survey asked whether
efficacy requirements should be imposed on off-label uses; almost all
physicians said no. It asked whether the
efficacy requirements for initial uses should be dropped,
and most physicians said no. We then asked
respondents whether opposing
efficacy requirements in one case but not the other involved an
inconsistency. In response, we received
hundreds of written commentaries. We
organize
and discuss these commentaries with an eye to understanding how the
medical
market certifies off-label drug uses and how this compares to FDA
certification. Does off-label medicine
suggest that efficacy
requirements should be placed on new uses of old drugs?
Does it suggest that efficacy requirements on
new drugs should be lifted?
Comment (with Eric Helland)
ABSTRACT: We
take advantage of the fortuitous randomization of trial outcome to
provide a
novel strategy to identify the deterrent effect exclusive of
incapacitation. We compare the
post-sentencing criminal activity of criminals who were convicted of a
strikeable offense with those who were tried for a strikeable offense
but
convicted of a non-strikeable offense.
As a robustness check, we also make this comparison in states without
three strikes laws. The identification
strategy lets us estimate the deterrent effect non-parametrically using
data
solely from the three-strikes era. We
find that California’s
three strike legislation significantly reduces felony arrest rates
among the
class of criminals with two strikes by 17-20 percent.
Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok. 2007. Does
Three Strikes Deter: A Non-Parametric Investigation. Journal of Human
Resources
XLII (2): 309-330.
In their paper “Members First: The Ethics of Donating Organs and
Tissues to Groups,” Timothy Murphy and Robert Veatch question the
ethical underpinnings of LifeSharers, a grass-roots effort to increase
the supply of organs by giving organ donors preferred access to
organs Tabarrok and Undis respond.
.
Tabarrok, A. and David Undis. 2006. Missing
the Mark. Cambridge Quarterly
Journal of HealthCare Ethics. 15(4):450-456.
ABSTRACT:
In a series of influential papers,
Lester Brickman (2003a, 2003b, 2004) has argued that the income and
effective
hourly rate of tort lawyers using contingent fees has increased by
1400% since
1960 and that the market for contingent fee lawyers is uncompetitive as
evidenced by lack of price advertising and uniform pricing across
practitioners,
cases and time. He also argues that
contingent
fee lawyers use “contingent-fee math” to build up additional costs and
fees. I critically examine Brickman’s
calculations
and compare contingent fees in the market for lawyers with contingent
fees,
usually called tips, in the market for waiters.
Tabarrok, A. 2005. The Problem of Contingent Fees for
Waiters. The Green
Bag. Summer 2005: 377-381.
Comment (with Amanda Agan)
ABSTRACT: “Private
governments” such as homeowners
associations and condominium cooperatives provide all manner of
collective
consumption goods, from road maintenance, trash collection, and snow
removal to
transportation, policing, and medical care. These organizations were
practically unheard of in 1960, but today some 54.6 million people in
the United States
live in various neighborhood associations. Using data
from Northern Virginia we show houses in HOAs are
worth, on average, more than 5
percent more than similar houses in the same neighborhood but outside
of HOAs.
Given those large advantages, it is not surprising that HOAs are
growing
rapidly. Implications for the future are discussed.
Agan, A. and A. Tabarrok. 2005. What are Private Governments Worth? Regulation. 28 (3: Fall): 14-17.
Comment: (with Jon Klick)
ABSTRACT: We argue that changes in the terror alert level set by
the Department of Homeland Security provide a shock to police presence
in the Mall area of Washington, D.C. Using daily crime data during the
period the terror alert system has been in place, we show that crime
drops significantly, both statistically and economically, in the Mall
area relative to the other areas of Washington DC.
This
provides strong evidence of the causal effect of police on crime and
suggests a research strategy that can be used in other cities.
Klick, J. and A. Tabarrok. 2005. Using Terror Alert Levels to
Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime.
Journal of Law and Economics. 48(1): 267-280.
Comment: (with Eric Helland)
ABSTRACT: After being arrested and booked, most felony defendants are
released to await trial. On the day of the trial, a substantial
percentage fail to appear. If the failure to appear is not quickly
explained, warrants are issued and two quite different systems of
pursuit and rearrest are put into action. Public police have the
primary responsibility for pursuing and rearresting defendants who were
released on their own recognizance or on cash or government bail.
Defendants who made bail by borrowing from a bond dealer, however, must
worry about an entirely different pursuer. When a defendant who
has borrowed money skips trial, the bond dealer forfeits the bond
unless
the fugitive is soon returned. As a result, bond dealers have an
incentive to monitor their charges and ensure that they do not
skip. When a defendant does skip, bond dealers hire bail
enforcement agents, more colloquially known as bounty hunters, to
pursue
and return the defendants to custody. We compare the
effectiveness
of these two different systems by examining failure to appear rates,
fugitive rates and capture rates of felony defendants who fall under
the
respective systems. We apply propensity score and matching
techniques.
Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok. 2004. The
Fugitive: Evidence on Public versus Private Law Enforcement from Bail
Jumping. Journal of Law and
Economics XLVII (1): 83-122.
Comment: (with Eric Helland). Working paper version in Word
format here.
ABSTRACT: We reexamine Mustard and Lott’s controversial study on
the affect of “shall-issue” gun laws on crime using an empirical
standard error function randomly generated from “placebo” laws. We find
that the effect of shall-issue laws on crime is much less
well-estimated than the Mustard and Lott (1997) and Lott (2000) results
suggest. We also find, however, that the cross equation restrictions
implied by the Lott-Mustard theory are supported. A boomlet has
occurred in recent years in the use of quasi-natural experiments to
answer important questions of public policy. The intuitive power of
this approach, however, has sometimes diverted attention from the
statistical assumptions that must be made, particularly regarding
standard errors. Failing to take into account serial correlation and
grouped data can dramatically reduce standard errors suggesting greater
certainty in effects than is actually the case. We find that the
placebo law technique (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan 2002) is a
useful addition to the econometrician’s toolkit.
Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok. 2004. Using Placebo Laws to
Test “More Guns, Less Crime”. Advances
in Economic Analysis & Policy 4 (1): Article 1.
http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/vol4/iss1/art
Comment: (with Eric Helland)
ABSTRACT: Although flat fees are common for divorces, wills and trusts
and probate, lawyers in personal injury cases generally are paid by
contingency fee or at an hourly rate. Arguments have been made
that contingency fees increase low-quality, "frivolous" litigation but
counter-arguments suggest that contingency fees actually limit such
litigation and instead it is hourly-fees that increase low-quality
litigation. Using a difference in differences test and data on a cross
section of states in 1992 we test whether legal quality is lower under
contingency or hourly fees. We also examine medical malpractice
claims in Florida using a time series centered around a law change that
limited contigency fees. We also examine the impact of fee
arrangements on the expected time to settlement. We find that hourly
fees encourage the filing of low-quality suits and increase the time to
settlement (i.e. contingency fees increase legal-quality and decrease
the time to settlement).
Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok. 2003. Contingency
Fees, Settlement Delay and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence
from Two Datasets. Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization 19 (2): 517-542.
ABSTRACT: According to the economic theory of patents, patents
are needed so that pioneer firm have time to recoup their sunk costs of
research and development. The key element in the economic theory is
that
pioneer firms have large, hard to recoup, sunk costs. Yet patents are
not awarded on the basis of a firm's sunk costs. Patent law, in fact,
ignores costs. The disconnect between patent law and patent theory
suggests either that modifying patent law so that it better fits with
patent theory would reduce the costs and inefficiencies associated with
current patent practice or that the standard economic theory of patents
is wrong.
Tabarrok, Alexander. 2002. Patent Theory versus Patent
Law. Contributions to Economic
Analysis & Policy 1 (1),
Article 9. http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/contributions/vol1/iss1/art9
Comment: Working paper version here.
(The above link requires subscription or university access to the JLS).
ABSTRACT: We investigate the impact of the race and income of the jury
pool on trial awards. We find that the average tort award
increases as black and Hispanic county population rates increase and
especially as black and Hispanic county poverty rates increase.
An
increase in the black county-poverty rate of 1 percentage point tends
to
raise the average personal injury tort award by 3 to 10 percent.
An increase in the Hispanic county-poverty rate of 1 percentage point
tends to raise awards by as much as 7 percent although this effect is
less well estimated. These effects imply that forum shopping for
high-poverty minority counties could raise awards by hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Average awards fall with increases in white
(non-black, non-Hispanic) poverty rates in two of our datasets, thus
making these findings even more surprising. Awards increase with
black and Hispanic county-poverty rates even after controlling for a
wide variety of other potential causes.
Helland, Eric. and Alexander Tabarrok. 2003. Race,
Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Datasets.
The Journal of Legal Studies
32 (2): 27-58.
ABSTRACT: Large changes in valuation ratios can be explained by
relatively small changes in the expected dividend growth rate. We
use the Gordon growth model to back out an "expected" dividend growth
rate and we compare this rate with the actual rate of dividend
growth. We cannot reject the hypothesis that our estimated rate
is
a rational expectation of the actual. As a result, a model of
valuation ratios based solely on a handful of fundamentals can easily
explain the variation in the data. In particular, the
historically
high ratios of the late 1990s and today are consistent with rational
expectations about dividend growth. Such expectations, moreover,
appear reasonable in the context of slowly accumlating, long-term
changes in the economy that are reducing output volatility, increasing
the duration of expansions and reducing the duration of
recessions. Contrary to a number of recent analyses, optimism
about the future is not ruled out by the data.
Santoni, G. and A. Tabarrok. 2002. Expected
Dividend
Growth, Valuation Ratios and Rational Optimism. Journal of Financial and
Economic Practice 1 (1): 110-119.
ABSTRACT: We argue that partisan elected judges, have an incentive to
redistribute wealth from out-of-state defendants (non-voters) to
in-state plaintiffs (voters). We first test the hypothesis using
cross-state data. We find a significant partisan effect after
controlling for differences in injuries, state incomes, poverty levels,
selection effects and other factors. One difference which appears
difficult to control for is that each state has its own tort law.
In cases involving citizens of different states, Federal judges decide
disputes using state law. Using these diversity of citizenship cases we
conclude that differences in awards are caused by differences in
electoral systems not by differences in state law.
Helland, E. and A. Tabarrok. 2002. The Effect
of
Electoral Institutions on Tort Awards. American Law and Economics Review
4 (2): 341-370.
ABSTRACT: The neutrality theorem for public goods is proved using a
Dolbear triangle diagram.
Tabarrok, A. forthcoming. A Geometric Proof of the Neutrality
Theorem.
Public Finance/Finances Publiques.
Comments: Mathematica code for most of the calculations in this paper
can be found here. This paper uses the same techniques (but in
one
less dimension) as Would the Borda
Count have Avoided the Civil War? - thus the theory sections
overlap.
ABSTRACT: Different voting systems can lead to different election
outcomes even when voter preferences are held constant. Using the 1992
election as an example, it is shown how the outcome of every positional
vote system can be found. Similarly, every possible cumulative
and
approval vote outcome is shown. Multiple vote systems, like
approval and cumulative voting, have disturbing properties. Using the
1992 election as illustration, it is shown how a
candidate who wins under every positional vote system, who wins every
pairwise vote (i.e. is the Condorcet winner), and who has the most
first
place and least last place votes may nevertheless lose under approval
or
cumulative voting. Similarly, it is shown how a candidate who loses
under every positional system, who loses every pairwise vote (i.e. is
the Condorcet loser), and who has the least first place and most last
place votes may nevertheless win under approval or cumulative voting.
Tabarrok, Alexander. 2001. President Perot, or
Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election. Public
Choice 106 (3-4): 275-297.
(The above is a link to the JSTOR PDF. Email me if you do not have access.)
ABSTRACT: Artists face choices between the pecuniary benefits of
selling to the market and the non-pecuniary benefits of creating to
please their own tastes. We examine how changes in wages, lump sum
income, and capital-labor ratios affect the artist's pursuit of
self-satisfaction versus market sales. Using our model of labor supply
as a guide, we consider the economic forces behind the high/low culture
split, why some artistic media offer greater scope for the avant-garde
than others, why so many artists dislike the market, and how economic
growth and taxation affect the quantity and form of different kinds of
art.
Cowen, Tyler and Alexander Tabarrok. 2000. An
Economic Theory of Avant-Garde and Popular Art, or High and Low
Culture.
Southern Economic Journal
67(2): 232-253.
ABSTRACT: Most American hospital patients are given drugs not approved
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration for the prescribed use. If
off-label prescribing is so widespread and successful, is the FDA's
pre-approval process really necessary?
Tabarrok, A. 2000. Assessing the FDA via the Anomaly of
Off-Label Drug Prescriptions. The
Independent Review V, #1: pp. 25-53.
ABSTRACT: Reports about runaway jury awards have become so common that
it is widely accepted that the US jury system needs to be ‘fixed.’
Proposals to limit the right to a jury trial and increase judicial
discretion over awards implicitly assume that judges decide cases
differently than juries. We show that there are large differences
in mean awards and win rates across juries and judges. But if the
types of cases coming before juries are different from those coming
before judges, mean award and win rates may differ even if judges and
juries would make the same decisions when faced with the same cases. We
find that most of the difference in judge and jury mean awards can be
explained by differences in the sample of cases coming before judges
and
juries. On some dimensions, however, there remain robust and
suggestive differences between judges and juries.
Helland, Eric and Alexander Tabarrok. 2000. Runaway
Judges? Selection effects and the jury? Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization 16 (2): 306-333.
ABSTRACT: Pascal’s wager is initially compelling because “believing” in
God appears to be costless. Believing in the possibility of infinite
utility,
however, implies that the believer is willing to accept any finite cost
to achieve any positive probability, no matter how small, of attaining
infinite utility. "Tabarrok's offer," although costly, should be
compelling to those who accept Pascal's wager.
Tabarrok, A. 2000. Believe in Pascal's Wager? Have
I got a deal for you! Theory and
Decision 48: 123-128.
Comment: The link is to a Mathematica NB file.
ABSTRACT: The Ramsey model of economic growth is a workhorse of
contemporary macro-economics. It's the starting point not only
for
growth theory but also for modern business cycle theory. Ask an
economist how the economy will react to an increase in government
purchases or to a change in the tax rate on capital and the first model
he will reach for in a search for answers is the Ramsey model. In
this paper I briefly explain a simple version of the Ramsey model and
put the model through its paces using Mathematica's extensive numerical
and graphical abilities.
Tabarrok, Alexander. 2000. The Ramsey Model of Economic
Growth. Mathematica in Education and
Research 8: 3-4: 43-51.
Comments: May be minor differences from published version.
ABSTRACT: The costs of rent seeking exceed traditional
measures when opportunity cost is considered. When the quantity of
resources consumed by rent seeking is large, rent seeking draws
consumer
surplus out of alternative resource employments. The costs of rent
seeking differ in partial and general equilibrium frameworks; Tullock
(1989) recognizes this but incorrectly argues that rent seeking costs
are twice as large in general than in partial equilibrium. Other
authors
suggest that rent seeking costs are lower once the opportunity costs of
resources used in rent seeking are considered. We clear up the
confusion
in the current literature.
Cowen, T., and A. Tabarrok. 1999. The Opportunity Costs
of Rent Seeking. Journal of Public
Finance and Public Choice XVII
(2-3):121-27.
Court Politics: The Political Economy of Tort Awards
Comments: In most respects superseded by The Effect of Electoral Institutions on
Tort Awards which reviews the pertinent findings from this paper.
ABSTRACT: We investigate the forces, which explain why trial awards
differ across the U.S. states. In 23 states judges are elected
and
in 10 they are elected via partisan elections. Elections have two
important effects. First, defendants are often out-of-state
non-voters while plaintiffs are typically in-state voters. We
predict, therefore, that elected judges will redistribute wealth from
out-of-state businesses to in-state plaintiffs. Second, the
realities of campaign financing require judges to seek and accept
campaign funding from trial lawyers who uniformly are interested in
larger awards. We hypothesize that these two forces cause awards
to be larger in states where the judiciary is elected rather than
appointed. We also hypothesize that the demand for redistribution
will increase as poverty increases and thus that awards will be larger
in states with greater poverty. Using a sample of over 7000 cases
across 48 of the 50 states we find significant evidence in support of
these hypotheses.
Tabarrok, A., and E. Helland. 1999. Court Politics: The
Political Economy of Tort Awards. Journal
of Law and Economics
XLII,1(April): 157-188.
Comments: Mathematica code for most of the calculations in this paper
can be found here. This paper uses the same techniques (but in
one
more dimension) as President Perot
- thus the theory sections overlap.
ABSTRACT: The election of 1860 was one of the most important and
contentious elections in US history. It was also one of the most
interesting. Four candidates from three different parties battled for
the presidency and all four received a significant number of votes. We
ask whether Lincoln's victory was sound, or was it due to a fluke in
the
electoral system? Did a Lincoln win plausibly represent the will of the
voters or would a different voting system have represented their
preferences more accurately? Would the outcome have been the same had
one or more of the candidates dropped out of the race? These and other
questions are answered using new graphical techniques which let us
assess voter preferences more accurately. Using these techniques, we
are
able to show, in a single figure, the outcome of every positional
voting
system, as well as all possible approval voting outcomes. By comparing
the outcome under plurality rule to the outcomes which would have
occurred under other voting systems, we conclude that Stephen Douglas,
not Lincoln, was plausibly the candidate who best represented the
preferences of the voters.
Tabarrok, Alexander. and Lee Spector. 1999. Would
the Borda Count have Avoided the Civil War? Journal of Theoretical
Politics 11(2): 261-288.
Comments: The link is to a Mathematica NB file. See the material
on voting and mathematica for more complete coverage of the voting
package.
Abstract: Voting seems straightforward but on closer inspection even
simple voting rules have mysterious and odd properties which often
challenge our conception of democracy. Some of these paradoxes
have bothered social scientists for hundreds of years but until
recently
little theory existed which explained why and when paradoxes might be
expected to occur. In his book, "The Geometry of Voting," the
mathematician Donald Saari has shed considerable light on why voting
'paradoxes' occur and how they can be predicted. The package
voting.m uses Mathematica's capabilities to implement many of the
functions described in Saari's book "The Geometry of Voting,"
Springer-Verlag, 1994. The package allows us to experiment with
positional voting systems, pairwise voting, approval voting and
cumulative voting. In this article I will focus on positional and
pairwise voting, other package capabilities are explained at length in
the electronic supplement.
Tabarrok, A. 1998. Voting Theory with Representation
Triangles and Cubes. Mathematica in
Education and Research 7 (3):20-28.
Who Benefits from Progress?
Abstract: Progress is better for some consumers than
for others. We analyze the factors which govern how much a
consumer gains from progress, defined as price declines and the
introduction of new and improved products, and we show how these
factors
vary systematically across different consumer groups. Economic
developments of the 1980s and 1990s have brought increasing
disagreement about the performance of the American and European
economies. Economists typically try to account for these dual and
contrasting perspectives by citing the increasing gap between the wages
of skilled and unskilled labor. We examine differential consumer gains
as another factor which may account for the contrasting perspectives.
Differential consumer gains can also help to explain contrasting
perspectives on the de-socialization of the East European and Soviet
economies.
Tabarrok, Alexander and Tyler Cowen. 1998. Who Benefits
from Progress?, Kyklos 51
(3):379-397.
Comment: Too much public choice takes a correlation as proof of
(special interest) causation. This paper is my attempt at an
historical public choice. My most Rothbardian paper.
ABSTRACT: The public interest arguments for the separation of
commercial and investment banking are weak and appear unable to explain
the passage of the Banking Act. The separation can best be
understood in the context of a bank war between the Morgan and
Rockefeller banking groups. The House of Morgan blended
commercial
and investment banking to a much greater extent than did the
Rockefeller
group. Although separation raised the costs of banking to the
Rockefeller group, it hurt the House of Morgan disproportionately and
gave the Rockefeller group a decisive advantage in their battle with
the
Morgans. The micro-history approach of this paper pinpoints the
specific individuals who were responsible for the Act's provisions
separating commercial and investment banking.
Tabarrok, A. 1998. The Separation of Commercial and
Investment Banking: Morgans Vs Rockefellers. The Quarterly Journal
of Austrian Economics 1 (1):1-18.
A Simple Model of Crime Waves, Riots, and Revolutions
Abstract: Like the title says.
Tabarrok, A. 1997. A Simple Model of Crime Waves, Riots,
and Revolutions. Atlantic Economic
Review 25 (3):274-288
Comment: My most un(der)appreciated paper!
ABSTRACT: Many types of public goods can be produced privately
by profit seeking entrepreneurs using a modified form of assurance
contract, called a dominant assurance contract. I model the dominant
assurance contract as a game and show that the pure strategy
equilibrium
has agents contributing to the public good as a dominant strategy. The
game is also modelled under incomplete information as a Bayesian-Nash
game.
Tabarrok, A. 1998. The Private Provision of Public Goods
Via Dominant Assurance Contracts. Public
Choice 96:345-362.
ABSTRACT: Short reply.
Tabarrok, A. 1996. Genetic Testing and Human Welfare:
Reply to Hall. Journal of Health
Economics 15:381-84.
Irrelevance Propositions Are Irrelevant
Comment: Pascal's Wager applied to new-classical economics.
Abstract: Ricardian equivalence theory and other New-Classical
neutrality results have generated an enormous debate because they
appear
to have strong implications for policy. I argue that irrelevance
propositions are policy irrelevant. If these propositions are
true
then behaving as if they are false has zero costs, but, if they are
false, behaving as if they are true may be very costly. Thus,
even
if we beleive these propositions to be true, we should behave as if
they
were false. In consequence, we should not be overly concerned
with
whether these propositions are in fact true. An interesting
corrolary of the above arguments is that if irrelevance propositions
are
believed to be true much evidence will exist which suggests that they
are false.
Tabarrok, A. 1995. Irrelevance Propositions Are
Irrelevant. Kyklos 48:409-417.
Good Grapes and Bad Lobsters: Applying the Alchian and Allen Theorem
Abstract: We consider the well-known theorem of Alchian and Allen
that adding a per unit charge to the price of two substitute goods
increases the relative consumption of the higher price good. The
current literature misspecifies the conditions under which the theorem
holds. When applying the theorem the fixed cost should be applied
on a per unit basis, rather than in terms of an entry fee for
consumption. We state the necessary conditions for the theorem to
hold when the the consumers are shipped to the goods.
Cowen, T., and A. Tabarrok. 1995. Good Grapes and Bad
Lobsters: Applying the Alchian and Allen Theorem. Economic Inquiry
XXXIII (April):253-56.
ABSTRACT: Medical researchers are rapidly identifying the genetic
causes of many diseases. Genes that increase the risk of contracting
Alzheimer's, colon and breast cancer, Huntington's, cystic fibrosis and
numerous other diseases have been identified. Genetic tests can reveal
an individual's probable health status many years in advance of
sickness. Many fear that this will lead to `genetic discrimination' in
the employment and health insurance markets. Solutions such as consent
laws are impractical and create adverse selection problems. A new form
of insurance, genetic insurance, can eliminate these problems and allow
everyone to be insured.
Tabarrok, A. 1994. Genetic Testing: An Economic and
Contractarian Analysis. Journal of
Health Economics 13:75-91.
ABSTRACT: Like the title says.
Tabarrok, Alexander. 1994. A Survey, Critique, and New
Defense of Term Limits. Cato Journal
14 (2):333-50.
The Public Choice Theory of John C. Calhoun
Comments: One of the best pieces on Calhoun in my humble opinion.
Abstract: Like the title says.
Tabarrok, A., and T. Cowen. 1992. The Public Choice
Theory of John C. Calhoun. Journal
of Institutional and Theoretical
Economics 148 (4):655-74.
Abstract: "Austrian" economists sometimes object that indifference
curves are a poor tool because indifference doesn't exist in the real
world. The premise is questionable but the real issue is, Does
the
use of i. curves results in mistaken economics? Herbener was the
first to try to proof that it does but his argument is faulty.
Tabarrok, A. 1991. The Preferred Tax Type: Comment On
Herbener. Review of Austrian
Economics 5 (2):107-10
Chapters in Books, Other
Nonrefereed Articles
Tabarrok, A. and D. Klein. 2002. FDAReview.org
– an extensive web page on the history and evaluation of the FDA,
equivalent in published form to a monograph or a short book. Peer
reviewed by Sam Peltzman, Henry Miller, founding director of the FDA's
Office of Biotechnology, Paul Rubin and other FDA experts.
Klein, Daniel B. and A. Tabarrok. 2002. Time to End America's Drug Lag.
Consumers' Research Magazine
85 (4): 10-14 (excerpted from
FDAReview.org).
Tabarrok, A. 2002. Market Challenges and Government Failure: Lessons
from the Voluntary City. In The
Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and
Civil Society, ed. D. Beito, P. Gordon, and A. Tabarrok. Ann
Arbor:
University of Michigan Press.
Tabarrok, A.. 2002. The Organ Shortage: A Tragedy of the Commons. In
Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright
Ideas from the Dismal Science, ed. A.
Tabarrok. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tabarrok, A. 2001. The
Blessed Monopolies. Regulation
(Winter): 1-4.
Helland, E., and A. Tabarrok. 2000. Exporting
Tort Awards. Regulation
23 (2):21-26.
Tabarrok, A. 1998. Response to
Reisman on Capitalism. Quarterly
Journal of Austrian Economics 1,
(3): 57-60.
Tabarrok, A. and Cecil Bohanon. 1998. A Better Way to Elect School
Boards. Indiana Policy Review
9, 2: 20-22.
Tabarrok, A. 1997. Death Taxes:
Theory, History, and Ethics. Essays in Political Economy: Ludwig
von
Mises Institute (Auburn University, Auburn, AL, USA). Translated
into Spanish as Impuestos a la herencia: teoría, historia y
ética (Eseade, 2002).
Tabarrok, A. 1997. Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card: Insurance against
bad genes. Contingencies 9
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