
Rong Rong 荣蓉
Assistant
Professor of Economics,
John B. Goddard School
of Business & Economics
Weber
State University
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I am an Assistant Professor of Economics
at Weber
State University. I am an experimentalist and applied
micro-economist by training. My current research focuses on the
economic
applications of social networks.
Previously, I studied economics at Shanghai
Jiaotong University for
four years, during which I worked as a research assistant in the Smith
Experimental Economics Research Center (SEERC),
the first laboratory for experimental economics in China founded by
Nobel Laureate Dr. Vernon Smith. I
received my PhD training at Interdisciplinary Center for Economics
Science at George
Mason University.
In additional to my scholarship, I enjoy
Chinese seal
carving,
a traditional art that callenges both dexterity and understanding of
spatial relationships. I also enjoy exploring nature's beauty through hiking or
scuba
diving.
Research
Fields:
|
Teaching
Fields: |
Applied
Social Network Theory,
Experimental Statistics and Methods,
Applied Microeconomic Theory,
Behavioral Economics |
Microeconomics
Theory, Game Theory,
Experimental Economics, Behavioral Economics,
Social Network Theory, Social
Network Analysis
Econometrics, Mathematical Economics, |
Dissertation
Research:
Title:
Endogenous Network Formation: Experiments and Methods
Committee: Daniel
Houser (advisor), Tyler Cowen, Carlos
Ramirez, Robert Axtell
Job Market
Paper: "Growing Stars: A Laboratory Analysis of
Network Formation", with Daniel Houser.
Summary:
The
acquisition and dispersion of information, a critical aspect of
economic decisions, can occur through a network of agents (Jackson,
2009). Empirical and theoretical findings suggest that an efficient
information dispersion network takes the form of a star: small numbers
of agents gather information and distribute it to a large group.
Despite these findings, controlled tests of this theory failed to find
evidence of the emergence of such networks with an exception of Goeree
et al (2008), which reports frequent star network formation with ex
ante heterogeneous agents and perfect information. Empirical evidence
suggests that these conditions may not always be feasible in natural
environments (Feick and Price, 1987; Conley and Udry, 2010). Complement
to earlier experimental research, we study institutional conditions
under which star networks emerge in the presence of ex ante homogeneous
agents. We find that investment limits and the
“right-of-first-refusal,” both of which regularly coexist with star
networks in natural environments, have a surprisingly strong ability to
promote the formation of star networks with ex ante homogeneous agents.
Using a cluster analysis, we trace the large positive effects of these
institutions to the impact they have on individuals’ behavioral rules.
In particular, we find that these institutions encourage individual
rationality as well as positive habits, which then lead to the frequent
and stable emergence of star networks. Our results may have important
implications for environments characterized by ex ante homogeneous
agents, e.g., those found in technology, marketing and agricultural
sectors.
Publications:
China Bashing: Does Trade Drive the 'Bad'
News about China in the U.S.?,
with Carlos Ramirez, Review of International Economics, Vol. 20, Issue
2, pp. 350-363, 2012,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9396.2012.01026.x/pdf
Research
in Progress:
Cluster Analysis for Social Network Data,
with Daniel Houser
Money or Friends: Social Identity and Truth
Telling in Social Networks, with Daniel Houser
Risk Attitudes and Job Contact Networks:
Theory and Simulation, with Daniel Houser
Extreme
Paternalism: Theory and Lab Experiment on Strategic Information
Transmission with Bans and Requirements, with Robin Hanson
I’ll Be There: A Natural Field Experiment on Keeping and Breaking
Promises, with Jared Barton