

CodeXt: Automatic Extraction of Obfuscated Attack Code from Memory Dump

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


Where Innovation Is Tradition

Oct. 12-14, 2014

Problem

- Need to automate upon detection in memory
 - Avoid substantial manual effort
 - Automatically recover malcode
 - Extract/unpack/recover attack code
 - Memory dump, transient artifacts




Existing Tools

- Only work with known boundaries
 - Typically designed for full binaries
 - e.g., PE files
 - Things get nasty without given boundaries
 - Or are arbitrary byte streams
- Don't generically handle
 - Malformed, Misaligned
 - Obfuscated, Armored


Solution: CodeXt

- Discovers executable code within memory dump
 - Upon realtime detection
- Extracts packed or obfuscated malware
 - First to generically handle Incremental and Shikata-ga-nai



Solution: CodeXt

- Framework built upon S2E
 - Selective means QEMU vs KLEE (LLVM)
 - Decision made per basic block




CodeXt Output

- Instruction Trace of executed instructions
 - Grouping of fragments into chunks
 - Reveals original and unpacked malcode
 - Assisted by a translation trace
- Data Trace of memory writes
 - Intelligent memory update clustering
 - Multi-layer snapshots
- Call Trace of system calls
 - With CPU context

Problems + Challenges + Solutions

Handling Byte Streams



- S2E expects well structured binaries
 - We wrap the binary for execution



- S2E uses basic block granularity
 - Our modified QEMU translation returns more info
 - We leverage translation and execution hooks to verify


Recognizing Code

- Avoiding the Halting Problem
 - No infinite loops
 - Caps on executed instructions
 - Different types: target, non-target, system
- False cognates
 - Illegal first instructions
 - False jumps into suffix
- Many substrings
 - Matched code fragment: ends on system call, EAX within range



Dealing with Code Fragments

- Fragmentation
 - Clustering into Chunks, adjacency, execution trace
- Density
 - Usage: Executed/Range
 - Overlay: Unique executed/Range over snapshots
- Enclosure
 - Continuous executable bytes adjacent to end



Defeating Obfuscation


- FPU instructions, fnstenv
 - Added small change to QEMU to comply
- Intra-basic block self-modification
 - We know address range of each translated block
 - During execution we track writes
 - If any write is to same block we retranslate block
- Emulator detection
 - Tested for a set of obscure instructions used as canaries

Results


Experiments

- Hidden code search
 - 1KB to 100KB buffers, 40B to 80B shellcodes
 - Filled with either null, live-capture, or random bytes
 - Varied assistance data: EIP, EAX, both, neither
- Accuracy
 - De-obfuscation, Anti-emulation detection
 - Various packers mentioned in previous research
 - In-shop: Junk code insertion, Ranged xor, Incremental
- Symbolic Branching


Multi-Layered Encoders



Incremental Encoder



Symbolic Conditionals



Conclusion

- Emulation is heavy-weight, but
 - Accurate and enables anti-anti-sandbox techniques
 - OS independent
- Symbolic analysis engine opens avenues
 - Taint propagation and analysis
 - Fuller branch exploration and pruning heuristics
- CodeXt
 - Accurately pinpoints and models even highly obfuscated code in adverse conditions.

Current/Future Development

- Full binary (ELF/PE) support
 - Modeling unmodified executables
 - Without source code
- Data and code based taint analysis
 - Can mark any input
 - e.g., all network socket reads
 - Follow not only by data, but instruction influence

Thank you for your time

- Any questions?

Post-talk, please feel free to contact us

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