From Moorhead Kennedy, et al. The Moral Authority of Government (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2000), pp. 183-188.

The Paradox of Governmental Power

James P. Pfiffner

George Mason University

In the United States, our polity depends crucially upon three pillars: the constitutional system, the virtue of good leaders, and the vigilance of the citizenry.  This essay will review the moral roles and obligations of each of these pillars and conclude that in the end the virtue of the citizenry is the bedrock upon which all else depends; that is, we will get the kind of government that we deserve.

I.  The Moral Role of Government

            In the United States, government plays a moral role in several ways.  The national government embodies our highest collective ideals, as expressed in the preamble to the Constitution: "...to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranqulity, provide for the common defence, promote  the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity...." But in order to fulfill these lofty ideals, the Framers had to create a government that possessed power (moral and material) sufficient to its purposes.  The institutions created by the Articles of Confederation were not strong enough to do the job, and the new governmental structure was intended to overcome that lack.

            As the authors of the Federalist Papers argued, a government capable of securing liberty must necessarily be delegated enough power to be effective.  In Federalist No. 1 Hamilton asserted that "...the vigor of government is essential to the security of liberty...." Government  must raise adequate taxes to support the governmental institutions necessary to protect our national security, create an infrastructure for a thriving economy, provide for those who cannot provide for themselves, and create a safe society.  Government must also be strong enough to protect small businesses and consumers from exploitation by large business enterprises, such as the railroads and large trusts of the late nineteenth century. 

            Our property rights and our right to privacy are not safe without a government strong enough to protect them.  The terrible vision of George Orwell's distopia described in his novel,  1984, has not come to pass in the West, despite the technological tools available.   Ironically, now we need a strong government to be able to protect us from the invasion of our privacy by private enterprises who are capable of amassing huge amounts of personal data (medical, financial, marketing, etc.) and selling it to the highest bidder.  The good news is that the government is not Big Brother; the bad news is that the private sector has some of that potential.

            But in seeking a stronger government, the Framers were also skeptical of a government with too much power.  Thus as Madison said in Federalist No. 21: "...the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself." The Framers intended the "auxiliary precautions"of the separation of powers and checks and balances built into the Constitution to create the necessary self control.  In addition, the first ten amendments to the Constitution, the Bill of Rights, was intended to ensure that the government would not infringe a specific (though not exclusionary) set of individual rights as against the government.  The Supreme Court over the past century has extended these fundamental rights of citizens against state governments as well, through the incorporation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.,

            The Bill of Rights, as imperfect as our implementation of its ideals may be,  is a moral statement about individual freedom and the limits of governmental power.  These limits along with the other checks and balances are intended to keep the government from being captured and used by those who would use governmental power to enforce their own sectarian or narrow moral or religious values.  The First Amendment assures the freedom of citizens to exercise their religion at the same time that it prohibits the establishment of religion through the government.  The moral role of government here is to ensure that no one set of sectarian or narrow definition of morality is imposed by the government on unwilling citizens.   

            Thus the Framers intended to create a government with just the right amount of power to be capable of governing, but not enough to allow the government to oppress its citizens: a very  delicate balance to achieve.

B.  The Obligations of Governmental Officials

            In our system of government, officials (elected and appointed) have a particularly important obligation.  They must discharge their duties conscientiously as well as provide moral leadership in the polity.  Their obligations are special because we the people grant them power over us, whether it is the cop on the beat carrying a gun, an Air Force officer in charge of nuclear missiles, or the welfare official deciding who qualifies for government aid.  It is their obligation to use that power wisely and in the public interest.  They are rightly expected to uphold higher standards than we expect in the business world; their power is delegated from the people, and the stakes are much higher.  As Elliot Richardson argues, the "state"is "only a label for the arrangements by which we the people delegate to some among us responsibility for things that concern us in common."^[1]

            Not only must officials make wise and just decisions, but they must also care for and preserve the institutions of government for the next incumbents, regardless of  political party.  Thus they are responsible for the preservation of our democracy as well as the apparatus of government.  In the zeal of elected officials and political appointees to fulfill the campaign promises they have made, they ought not destroy the infrastructure or institutional memory of the government necessary for the next set of officials to change the direction of public policy.  That is, government officials have fiduciary obligations and guardian roles as well as instrumental duties.

            In light of the power we grant public officials, citizens have a right to expect them to comport themselves above reproach.  If their behavior does not conform to high standards of integrity,  they not only do an immediate injustice in specific matters but also more generally undermine trust in the polity itself, a much more profound loss.

            The fulfilling of this high level of expectations entails a special attitude toward one's position in government.  Those performing the official functions of government have more than a job; they have a public trust.  Their approach to their profession should be considered a calling, not merely a means of earning a living.  The further up the hierarchy a person is, the more we have a right to expect of them.  Positions of authority, as Hugh Heclo argues, should be seen as an office, not merely a job.

Jobholding implies no larger vision beyond the working self and the task at hand.  In a deep sense the concept of office subordinates self to larger normative responsibilities that cannot be captured by a list of job tasks to be performed.  The skills package of a job are not the same thing as the duties of an office.  A job is discharged by performing in accordance with assigned specifications.  An office is discharged by understanding its customary and proper functions.  There is therefore a fiduciary quality in office-holding that is missing from job-holding.  One is expected to understand what is expected of an office in light of the purposes of a large scheme of things.  It is something qualitatively different than 'only doing my job.' ^[2]

            But just as virtue in our governmental leaders is important, the framers knew that would could not always count on such virtue in government officials.  From their knowledge of human experience, from classical history to that of contemporary Europe, they were appropriately skeptical about the innate virtue of people who would be in government.  So they set up a structure of "auxiliary precautions" that could survive bad leaders and thrive under good leaders.

            If we take the presidency for instance,  we see that our system cannot survive without virtuous leaders, but we cannot always count on getting virtuous presidents.  External constraints must act as a safeguard in our search for virtue.  The checks and balances built into the constitution ensure that bad presidents cannot go too far.  Thus if their own character is not virtuous, they are checked by a fixed term of office, by the Congress, by the judiciary, by public opinion, and by a vigorous media.  But these same checks also operate on virtuous presidents.  Good presidents can never go as far as we would like them to, and bad presidents may go further than we want them to.  These limites are inherent in our constitutional arrangements of limited government. 

            These limitations are frustrating when we agree with the president in office, but remember, we Americans can  never seem to  agree on who are the good presidents and who are the bad ones (though history sometimes forges a consensus).  Only Washington, among all presidents, seems to have enjoyed almost universal respect in his own time, and even then the anti-Federalists fought the creation of the new government he would head.  Since  we cannot agree upon policy goals, we must adhere to the rules under which we have agreed to govern ourselves, regardless of which political party is in power.

            The Constitution created a resiliant system, but it depends on the virtue of the people and its leaders.  The presidential office, like the government itself, must be strong, but not too strong.  The preservation of the Republic depends on our finding virtuous leaders.  We can limp along for a while with poor leaders, but only for a while.  When virtue fails, the external checks can save us, but only for a while.  The systems of checks and balances can thwart a bad leader and voters can use elections to throw out a bad leader, but only the people at the ballot can choose a virtuous leader.

C The Moral Obligations of Citizens

            The bedrock upon which the Republic stands is the citizenry, for the highest office in our democratic republic is that of citizen.  The Framers knew that the success of the new Republic would depend upon the citizenry for performance of the essential functions of 1) vigilance in maintaining the liberties guaranteed to them, 2) selecting those to whom they would delegate power, and 3) participating in the shaping of governmental policies. ^[3]

            Madison argued in Federalist No. 51 that "A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government...." He also argued in the 1788 Virginia ratification debate:

But I go on this great republican principle, that the people will have virtue and intelligence to select men of virtue and wisdom.  Is there no virtue among us?  If there be not, we are in a wretched situation.  No theoretical checks — no form of government can render us secure.  To suppose that any form of government will secure liberty or happiness without any virtue in the people, is a chimerical idea.  If there be sufficient virtue and intelligence in the community, it will be exercised in the selection of these men.  So that we do not depend on their virtue, or put confidence in our rulers, but in the people who are to choose them. ^[4]

Clever governmental arrangements cannot guarantee virtue in government.  Virtue must come in the form of wise and virtuous elected public officials, political appointees, and competent and virtuous career civil servants.  But all of these depend on the virtues of an informed citizenry.  Vigilant citizens will ensure that only good leaders are elected.  As Abraham Lincoln said in his first inaugural address, "While the people retain their virtue and vigilance, no administration, by any extreme of wickedness or folly, can very seriously injure the government in the short space of four years." Virtuous elected officials will ensure that good laws are enacted and faithfully executed.  While these ideals are not always achieved, they must be achieved often enough or we will lose our Republic. 

            We, as citizens, have the obligation to make moral choices about the direction of public policy and reflect these moral deliberations at the ballot box and in civic discourse.  The moral content of our civic obligations come not from the content of our policy positions, but in our commitment to participate as citizens in the process of governance.  Our acceptance of the rules of the game, i.e. the Constitutional process, is crucial to the civic health of our polity. 

            We must be careful not to idealize the governmental process too much, for politics is often a dirty business, and we must strive to conduct our part of the process virtuously.  We must also be careful, when we observe the seamy side of politics not to fall into the trap of cynicism.  Attitudes such as, 'they all do it' or 'all politicians are liars and crooks' are irresponsible and harmful.  But uncritical idealism leads too easily to disillusionment and cynicism.  We must be realistic, but not cynical; idealistic, but not utopian.  This takes effort and energy.  It is not easy to gather the necessary information to make informed choices.  Nor is it easy to make the necessary nuanced judgements that are often called for.  Seldom are important issues of public policy black and white; more often they are subtle shades of gray.  But that is our duty as citizens.

            Only with concerted and sustained effort by citizens and public officials will we be able to maintain freedom, liberty, and representative government.  To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin: 'we have a republic... if we can keep it.'

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