Journal #4
Ways of Knowing
Spring 2005
Erin Peters
Rene Descartes and Thomas Kuhn were both highly innovative philosophers and both had a significant influence on the philosophy of science. Descartes’ way of knowing is based on experience, and relies on deductive reasoning to lead to the development of ideas. Kuhn helped bring the philosophy of science closer to the history of science. Using his idea of paradigm, Kuhn might say that Descartes caused a paradigm shift in a broad, historical sense, but his ideas of how paradigms come about are in conflict with Descartes particular types of philosophy.
Looking at the publication Discourse on method, Descartes’ way of knowing is very different from the ways of knowing that precede it. When Descartes was young, the most prevalent way of knowing was through authority. Although he was eager to learn, Descartes found himself “so overcome by so many doubts and errors” (Descartes, 7) that he felt that he learned nothing from the authorities. He developed a way to begin with foundational knowledge by doubting everything until he reached the bottom line that the person who doubts exists. From that foundation, he built a criteria based on “clarity” and “distinctness” from which ideas could be built, leading to new truths (Descartes, 25). Scientists who were subsequent to Descartes followed his pattern of building knowledge by doubting everything and accepting only ideas that would hold true beyond any doubt. According to a general definition by Thomas Kuhn, Descartes’ work could be considered a paradigm shift. The function of a paradigm is to supply the framework from which puzzles can be solved and to provide the tools for their solution (Kuhn, 10). Descartes provided a new framework from which people could solve puzzles such as physics and math, and use his criteria for truths in order to validate the new ideas. Descartes’ ideas lead many scientists to place less emphasis on authority and more emphasis on evidence.
Upon closer scrutiny, I believe Kuhn would disagree with Descartes on several of his principles. Kuhn’s idea of paradigm is based on exemplars, consensus on excellent examples of scientific research. Exemplars are not rules that govern science; rather they are used to compare new research in terms of similarities. Because exemplars depend on interpretation, there can be no discrete rules that describe a particular science. According to Kuhn, there are no rules to decide the importance of certain puzzles or priority of the various solutions for a puzzle. Descartes believed that there were objective truths which could be reached as long as rigor was part of the doubting process. This process of thinking would lead to singular truths, because rigor would lead each person to the same knowledge. Kuhn’s idea of paradigm does not require such a systematic development of ideas. Instead, his idea of paradigm shift includes ideas from various realms, all of which could fit the same paradigm. Absolute truths are not required for a paradigm to exist. Paradigms often cannot explain anomalies, and scientists tend to ignore them until they lead to crisis (Kuhn, 63). Descartes’ way of knowing would never lead to an anomaly because it would be rejected under the required rigor.
Descartes’ process of thinking also began with the simplest ideas and built up to the more complex idea, without a need for validation by authority. Descartes recommends that any knowledge which depended on authority be disregarded until it can be deduced as true. Kuhn would disagree with two functions of his process. First, Kuhn would not agree that people can produce paradigms independently. Paradigms must be based on consensus which is built by trying to solve puzzles in order to validate or clarify the paradigm. Scientists who have credibility agree that the paradigm has value or the paradigm will cease to exist, being replaced by a paradigm on which scientists can attempt more puzzles. The idea that exemplars help to distinguish a paradigm leads to the idea that there is some authority guiding scientific knowledge, but not in a strict sense. Second, Kuhn would not agree that ideas under rigor will lead to truths. When Kuhn discusses changes in paradigms, he denies that there is any inference that a change in paradigm will get an idea closer to truth (Kuhn, 171).
In Kuhn’s work regarding incommensurability, he contrasts the empirical view that the quality of a theory is judged by how well it fits the established rules of method. The evaluation of a paradigm does not result in permanent rules because new scientific knowledge is judged by perceptions of exemplars, which are subjective. Paradigms are not permanent because they can change in a crisis. The assessment of theories has no standard measure (Kuhn, 103). Descartes argues that all branches of science would lead to the same knowledge because by avoiding precipitate conclusions and preconceptions, scientists could direct their thoughts to the same objective truth. Descartes refers to this concept in Discourse, “. . . since there is only one truth about each thing.” (Descartes, 17). Kuhn, on the other hand, rules out certain comparisons of paradigms because they cannot be measured point by point for the purpose of evaluation.
Kuhn would also disagree with Descartes’ idea about how knowledge is assembled. Kuhn sees knowledge as periods of normal science where current paradigms are reinforced to the puzzles that scientists solve. When a puzzle is solved that does not align with the paradigm, it either is explained away, is saved for later measurement with better technology, or it leads to a crisis. When a crisis occurs, the paradigm goes under revision so that more puzzles can align with the paradigm. This method of learning is not progressive in a traditional sense. It does not “build on the shoulders of giants”; rather it tears down a part of knowledge so that it can be explained in other ways. Descartes thinks that knowledge is constructed piece by piece, making sure that it is beyond doubt at all times. He mentions in Discourse that he realized that the more elegant cities are those which are built from scratch, not continually renovated (Descartes, 11). Kuhn sees the accumulation of knowledge as normal science punctuated with revolutions which usually tears down some of the established knowledge. Descartes see the accumulation of knowledge as gradual building on prior understandings.
Overall, looking historically at Descartes work and the influence it had on other scientists, Kuhn may agree that a paradigm shift has taken place in a general sense. Descartes did change the way scientists think after he presented his ideas. However, Kuhn would disagree with Descartes’ understanding of how knowledge is acquired, and how it is accumulated, Descartes believes that there are singular truths that can be understood by means of doubt and rigor, while Kuhn believes that knowledge is relative and must be agreed upon by consensus. Descartes see the accumulation of knowledge as progressively building, with one idea leading to another. Kuhn sees the accumulation of knowledge as the gradual progress of ideas during a normal science period while revolutions can destroy or reorganize what has already been established.
References
Descartes, Rene (1637). Discourse on method and related writings. Penguin Classics.
Kuhn,
Thomas (1976). The structure of
scientific revolutions.