
Islamic Revivalism and State Failure in Kyrgyzstan

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Many are quick to see Islamic revivalism as a threat, but close examination suggests that the turn to Muslim institutions can be a way of coping with an increasingly ineffective central state. The author uses survey data from Kyrgyzstan to assess competing theories of Islamic revivalism from Rashid, Cohen, Chaudet, Huntington, Kepel, and Khalid.

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ON December 1, 1989, during a state visit to the Vatican, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev announced that all Soviet citizens had the “right to satisfy their spiritual needs.”¹ This declaration allowed the Kyrgyz, for the first time in seven decades, to explore differing religious identities, including differing Muslim identities. Islam is now central to Kyrgyz identity, but the Islamic revivalism in post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan is diverse, and the degree to which Kyrgyz gravitate to Muslim institutions in their daily lives varies.

The sudden collapse of the Soviet media and societal restrictions and the rapid development of international communications and networks offer a rare opportunity to assess which, if any, trans-national causalities are shaping Kyrgyzstan’s Islamic revival. However, the leading theories—Islam as a response to encroaching Western culture, Islam as a response to encroaching secularism, and Islam as a manifestation of nationalism—fail to explain Kyrgyzstan’s Islamic revival.

Survey research and field interviews suggest that the cause of the Islamic revival in Kyrgyzstan is local rather than trans-national; it is, to a large degree, a product of the failing Kyrgyz state. Among Kyrgyz Muslims, as is the case with adherents of many religions, shared religious norms facilitate community activism. In Kyrgyzstan this pertains particularly to the growth of Islamic charities. The importance of these charities is heightened by the unmet welfare needs at the local level. The heightened importance of these mutual assistance groups raises the profile of Islam, thereby attracting more believers and greater involvement and dedication on the part of com-

munity members. This iterative causal relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.

Complementing the focus on causality, this article challenges the reified conceptualization of Islam that characterizes many recent social science analyses of social mobilization in Muslim societies. Although I identify three emerging trends in Kyrgyz Islam—(1) the muftiate, or traditional Islam, (2) conservative or reformist Islam, and (3) Hizb ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation), or political Islam—these groups and their memberships overlap, and the identity of one organization is, to a real degree, defined relative to the identities of the others.

Investigating the blurred and mutually formative borders among these groups complicates the causal story. At the same time, recognizing the complexity of religious identity safeguards against missing the forest for the trees. Much of the recent literature on Islam in Central Asia has focused on radical Islam.² Although this focus is understandable, given current geopolitical concerns, it nevertheless generates analysis that, but for a small portion of the population, offers little insight into Islamic revivalism. In contrast, by not selecting on a dependent variable and instead investigating Islam broadly, the resulting causal explanations better reflect processes of religious revivalism.

This article by necessity intersects with questions of social science methodology and, specifically, the challenges comparative political scientists face when studying autocratic polities. While the discussion employs familiar social science methods, it also illustrates that diverse methodological approaches are necessary if accurate measures are to be obtained when researching state and society variation in authoritarian states. That is, while the study draws in part on public perceptions of Islam gleaned from survey data, it equally draws from in-depth interviews and focus groups with social activists, state bureaucrats, and the intellectual and clerical leaders of Islam in Kyrgyzstan. These techniques are mutually informative and, I hope, add further weight to the “new consensus” in comparative politics that sees micro-level anthropological field research as not only consistent with but critical to sound statistical analysis and theory building.³

The article is organized in three parts. The first details variations in Kyrgyz Islamic identity. The second explores the causal hypotheses put forward in both the broad comparative politics and the region-specific Central Asia literatures as explanations of identity formation and Islamic revivalism. Finally, the third part combines survey analysis of 1,000 Kyrgyz respondents with directed interviews and focus groups of religious and political elites




Figure 1. Islamic Revival in Kyrgyzstan

to assess the degree to which these hypotheses aid our understanding of Kyrgyzstan’s Islamic revival.⁴ The data presented suggest that Kyrgyzstan’s Islamic revival has its roots in local communities rather than in Islam’s perceived anti-colonial, anti-Western, or anti-secular orientation. If so, this revival, far from posing a threat, may well present a partial solution to Central Asia’s increasingly ineffective autocratic governance.

Kyrgyzstan’s Islamic Revivalism and Pluralism

In a November 1996 poll commissioned by the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 55.3 percent of ethnic Kyrgyz and 87.1 percent of ethnic Uzbeks surveyed self-identified as Muslim.⁵ As illustrated in Figure 2, the number of Kyrgyz citizens self-identifying as Muslim dramatically increased in the decade since 1996. In a poll that colleagues and I commissioned in May 2007, 97.5 percent of ethnic Kyrgyz and 99.1 percent of ethnic Uzbeks reported that they were Muslim.⁶

Kyrgyzstan’s two largest ethnic groups (according to the 1999 census, ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks represent 65 and 14 percent of the population, respectively) clearly and increasingly identify with Islam. What is less clear is the role Islamic identity plays in everyday life and the diverse ways Islamic identity is perceived.

To assess the role Islam plays in daily life and, more specifically, variations in individual connectedness to Islamic institutions, we asked respondents in our 2007 survey:

1. To what degree do you trust your local mosque?
2. Have you ever donated time or money to a religious charity?

These questions offer measures of connectedness without essentializing religiosity. That is, they do not reduce




Figure 2. **Changing Perceptions of Islamic Identity in Kyrgyzstan, 1996 and 2007** (percent)




Figure 4. **Patterns of Time and Money Donation to Religious Charities** (% of respondents who donate to religious charities)

Islamic identity to ritualistic manifestations of piety, frequency of mosque attendance, compliance with Islamic law (*sharia*), or observance of the five daily prayers. Although other scholars highlight mosque attendance and *sharia* compliance, these measures were inappropriate for a society that only recently has had the opportunity to reconnect with the free practice of Islam.⁷ Moreover, as Dale Eickelman and James Piscatori observe, ritualistic practices may be inappropriate in any context given that Islam, like any religion, is “subject to constant modification and change.”⁸

A second benefit the measures offer is that they capture individual orientations toward both formal and informal Islamic institutions—mosque and charities, respectively. These related institutions serve different but complementary roles. The neighborhood mosque provides spiritual guidance, while Islamic charities advance the social welfare of local communities. Each plays a central role in Kyrgyzstan’s Islamic revival. As Figures 3 and 4 illustrate, however, individual perceptions of these institutions vary. Thus, while slightly more than 80 percent of respondents trust their local mosques, just under one quarter reported that they had donated time or money to Islamic charities.

Before turning to explanations for this variation, we need an overview of the three most prominent tendencies within Kyrgyz Islam: the muftiate, reformists, and Hizb




Figure 3. **Perceptions of Local Mosques** (percent)

ut-Tahrir (HT). “Tendencies,” admittedly, is an imprecise term. The boundaries between the muftiate, reformists, and HT, however, are equally imprecise.

The Muftiate. The Kyrgyz Islamic organization that has enjoyed the longest-enduring and most uninterrupted history is the muftiate. President Kurmanbek Bakiev describes the muftiate as representing the “true essence of Islam, its tolerance and peaceableness,” and sees the muftiate’s role as critical in informing Kyrgyz Muslims that “true Islam has nothing to do with religious extremist movements.”⁹ The true essence Bakiev is referring to is Hanafi Islam, one of the four schools of Sunni Islam, and notable for its tolerance of diverse “theological, philosophical, and mystical positions.”¹⁰

Also central to the muftiate’s perceived moderate nature is its long history as the official Soviet institution representing Islam. The muftiate comfortably coexisted with Soviet secular elites, and it is not unreasonable for the region’s current political leaders to expect—if not demand—that it maintain amicable relations with the central state. Although *de jure* autonomous from the secular leadership, the muftiate operates both in name and in function much as did its Soviet predecessor. Together with the Kyrgyz Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the muftiate continues to dispense much-sought-after *hajj* exit visas, thereby enabling the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. And the muftiate continues to educate the clerical elite and draft weekly sermons with an eye to state interests.

Some things have changed, however. Although the muftiate claims oversight over all clergy in Kyrgyzstan, imams routinely ignore its directives. In May 2008, for example, the muftiate attempted to test Kyrgyzstan’s approximately 2,000 imams’ knowledge of the Koran and Islamic law. Revealingly, only half of them agreed to take the muftiate’s “attestation” exam.¹¹

Publicly eschewing the muftiate's seal of approval is perhaps understandable, given that an increasing number of Kyrgyzstan's Muslims find fault with the muftiate. The most prominent religious family in the Fergana Valley, the Kamalovs, freely dismisses the muftiate in interviews and sermons.¹² Abdyshukur Narmatov, the popular rector of the Islamic University in Bishkek, openly feuds with the muftiate and with Murataly Dzhumanov, the country's head mufti. Dzhumanov has repeatedly dismissed Narmatov from his post, only to subsequently rehire the rector to appease student protestors.¹³

Islamic University students are not the only ones who question Dzhumanov's oversight. In December 2006 hundreds of Muslims gathered outside the mufti's office to protest Dzhumanov's controversial decision to follow the Russian muftiate's lead as to when to celebrate the holiday of Kurban Ait (Id al-Adha), rather than, as urged by Kyrgyzstan's former mufti, Sadykzhan Kamalov, to celebrate at the same time as the rest of the Muslim world.¹⁴

The Kamalovs and Reformist Islam. In December 2006, twenty-two of Kyrgyzstan's Muslim elites issued a statement publicly faulting Mufti Dzhumanov, for "losing respect among the people" and for "splitting the country's Muslims into two camps."¹⁵ Although the clerics did not explicitly define the split, their characterization of the mufti—"many think that he adopted a different religion"—indicates growing dissatisfaction with a religious leader perceived as having a tenuous comprehension of Islam.¹⁶

Members of the Kamalov family in Kyrgyzstan's southern Fergana Valley region are perhaps the loudest voices accusing Dzhumanov of incompetence. The Kamalovs, often mistakenly portrayed as followers of Saudi-based Wahhabism, are sympathetic to Salafism; that is, an Islam purified of distorting Soviet accretions. Salafis believe that, other than the Koran, only the *sunna* "as recorded in the authentic sayings (*hadiths*) by the *salaf*," the prophet's contemporaries, provide accurate religious guidance.¹⁷

Sadykzhan Kamalov, the unofficial leader of reformist Islam in the Fergana Valley, does not expressly embrace the label "Salafi." He is quick, though, to criticize the rituals, the "birth and death rites and the shrine worship," that he believes distract Kyrgyz from the true meaning of Islam, from the Islam "that has existed for 1,400 years." His nephew Ravshod Kamalov, now imam of the Al-Sarakhsiy mosque in Kara Suu, takes this critique one step further. Imam Kamalov believes that the muftiate encourages "distorted practices," so that morally suspect clergy

can collect fees in return for administering life-cycle rites, with the muftiate, in turn, extracting its own cut.¹⁸ If the muftiate's May 2008 attempt to test the clergy's religious knowledge is any indication, Kamalov's views are widely shared. Imams, particularly imams in southern Kyrgyzstan, generally ignored the muftiate's attestation attempt. The mufti, for his part, publicly denounced Kyrgyzstan's southern imams for their "poor exam results."¹⁹

It is tempting, in light of the public rift between the southern clergy and the northern muftiate, to conclude that Kyrgyzstan's Islamic community is deeply divided. But it is worth emphasizing that those who freely levy criticisms of moral corruption on the one side and charges of ignorance on the other are the same religious elite who emphasize that the divide is inconsequential.

Here the unfortunate death of Muhammadrafik Kamalov in August 2006 is instructive. Muhammadrafik (Ravshod Kamalov's father and Sadykzhan Kamalov's brother) died in the course of what the Kyrgyz state describes as a botched anti-terrorism operation. In the days immediately following Kamalov's death, anonymous government sources informed the press that the deceased imam was a Wahhabi shot while attempting to spirit two Islamic militants across the border into Uzbekistan.

The official state press rejected this account, and Sadykzhan Kamalov, when queried about the conflicting accounts of his brother's death, responded with an instructive anecdote:

A heated dispute erupted between two prominent imams at a tea house. Each imam accused the other of being a Wahhabi. A third, younger imam, who had been quiet to this point, turned to his colleagues and asked: "What is a Wahhabi?" The two elder imams looked at the third in silence, for neither could explain what the insult Wahhabi truly meant.²⁰

What is equally instructive is the fact that Mufti Dzhumanov not only attended Kamalov's funeral but offered the invocation, suggesting to the approximately 5,000 mourners in attendance that the divide between the muftiate and the reformers was, at least temporarily, forgotten.²¹

Hizb ut-Tahrir and Political Islam. Immediately prior to Dzhumanov's invocation, Ayub Khan Mashrabov, a prominent Hizb ut-Tahrir spokesman in southern Kyrgyzstan, addressed the somber gathering. Mashrabov's presence posed an uncomfortable irony both for the muftiate and the muftiate's *de facto* partner, the Kyrgyz state. The Bishkek political elite often cite the presence of HT



Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbek men pray during a gathering of Hizb ut-Tahrir, or the Party of Liberation, in the village of Kara Suu outside southern city of Osh, some 700 km (437 miles) southeast of the capital Bishkek, Uzbekistan, on March 4, 2005. (AP Photo/Ivan Sekretarev)

members at local mosques as proof that one or another imam has “turned Wahhabi.” Here at Kamalov’s funeral, however, was a prominent HT activist standing alongside Kyrgyzstan’s head mufti, offering the audience the curious tableau of “official” Islam and an organization that has as its central goal the overthrow of officialdom.²²

HT’s stated mission is to replace secular Central Asian governments with a Muslim caliphate uniting all believers. The call for a caliphate has won HT outlaw status in Kyrgyzstan, a status HT embraces. Repression of HT members, Mashrabov explains, exposes the moral shortcomings of the country’s secular elite. The Kyrgyz state’s response to HT, however, has been inconsistent. For example, in December 2006, an HT relief mission to help earthquake victims in Naryn, a city in north-central Kyrgyzstan, succeeded in its humanitarian aims but failed

in its publicity goals; police only temporarily detained the HT volunteers. In Uzbekistan, Mashrabov speculates, HT activists would have been jailed and beaten.²³

Hizb ut-Tahrir may be more successful than Mashrabov estimates. Well known in southern Kyrgyzstan for at least a decade, it is now increasingly present in the Kyrgyz north. Over the course of the past three years, residents of Ak Terek, a village on the shore of Lake Issyk Kol in northeastern Kyrgyzstan, have joined HT en masse in response to the party’s organizing of much-welcome mutual aid associations.

Moreover, the villagers make no effort to hide their HT sympathies. The first local residents I spoke with—two teenagers at a water pump—thought nothing odd about my inquiry and directed me to an HT leader’s house. I spent the balance of the afternoon going house to house,

drinking tea and hearing matter-of-fact accounts of how the local imam and a large portion of the village had turned to HT over the past few years.

What was particularly striking about these conversations was the reason why people joined HT. The attraction lay not in the anti-Western and anti-Semitic ideology often cited in Western accounts of the party, but rather in HT's ability to mobilize residents to provide services the local Ak Terek government could not. The party helped organize the repair of the irrigation system for the village's apricot groves and, similar to HT's activities throughout southern Kyrgyzstan, partnered with other charities to help residents meet basic welfare needs

Ak Terek is unusual in that it is a northern city with a marked HT presence. What drew Ak Terek's residents to HT, though, was not unusual; I heard similar accounts in other northern cities, including Kara Kol and Bishkek. And the seeming disconnect between HT's leaders, people like Mashrabov who are fluent in HT's anti-Semitic and anti-Western propaganda, and the everyday practice of religion and meaning of religious community, is indicative of Kyrgyzstan's Islamic revivalism more broadly. Elites, whether from the muftiate, the reformers, or Hizb ut-Tahrir, do stake out clear positions. But their positions are not mutually exclusive and, moreover, often fall to the side at the local level, be it at an imam's funeral or fixing irrigation canals.

Explaining Kyrgyzstan's Islamic Variation

Few theories of Islamic revivalism would expect these carefully articulated positions to fall to the side. Current studies of Central Asian Islam suggest that revivalism is either (1) a manifestation of increasing tensions between Western and traditional cultures, (2) a response to the secularization of politics, or (3) an attempt to create a post-colonial and distinctly nationalist identity. I explore each of these hypotheses below and conclude with an alternative causality: that Islamic revivalism is a local response to failing autocratic rule.

Islamic Revivalism as a Response to Western Values and Culture. Culture-clash hypotheses figure prominently in both the academic and popular press.²⁴ These hypotheses, despite their many detractors, are not without empirical foundation.²⁵ Islamist groups themselves invoke clash arguments in their attempts at social mobilization. Hizb ut-Tahrir, the would-be standard bearer of Islamist radicalism in Central Asia, concludes that a "clash of civilizations is an inevitable matter" and promises that the party

will "open the eyes of faithful Muslims to the destructive aspects of Yankee activities."²⁶

HT, admittedly, represents only one tendency within Kyrgyzstan's broader Islamic revivalism. Critically though, HT is not alone in its Muslim versus non-Muslim formulation. Ravshon Kamalov's Friday prayer that I attended, for example, concluded with the injunction to "keep fighting the enemies of Islam the world over." My research colleague, Alisher Saipov, ribbed at the time that Kamalov's imperative was for the benefit of an unanticipated Western scholar perhaps in search of a Wahhabi mosque.²⁷

Other scholars, however, find little humor in such statements, and, instead, urge us to interpret injunctions to battle at face value. Ariel Cohen concluded in an October 2003 congressional briefing that HT's message resonates far beyond its "5,000–10,000 hard-core supporters" in Central Asia and "poses a direct challenge to the Western model."²⁸ Didier Chaudet sees in Central Asia new "Al-Qaeda" groups that rally support by focusing on a 'Far Enemy' (most of the time the US, more broadly speaking the Great Powers) that needs to be fought as fiercely.²⁹

And while less alarmist than Cohen or Chaudet, Ahmed Rashid nevertheless sees a yawning divide between Central Asia and the West: "There is a palpable cultural vacuum at the heart of Central Asia, which cannot be filled by consumerism or imitations of Western culture."³⁰ What "Western culture" ultimately means in these clash hypotheses is not always clear. Some scholars stress gender roles as central to the clash.³¹ Others highlight the different perceptions of family in Muslim and non-Muslim cultures.³² Still others note a basket of differing views on sexual behavior, gender roles, alcohol, race, and the death penalty.³³ The central thesis that unites all these approaches, regardless of the specific value under discussion, is that Islamic revivalism is a response to what Muslims perceive as Westerners' excessive moral laxity.

Islamic Revivalism as Response to Secular Governments.

A Western value frequently cited in the clash hypothesis is secularism. Samuel Huntington writes: "Western ideas of individualism, liberalism, constitutionalism, human rights, equality, liberty, the rule of law, democracy, free markets, the separation of church and state, often have little resonance in Islamic . . . cultures."³⁴ Gilles Kepel similarly emphasizes Hamas's portrayal of the "vices of the secular [Palestinian] bourgeoisie, whose Western morals . . . were denounced as an effect of 'Jewish depravity'" in explaining that Islamist party's spike in popularity in

the late 1980s.³⁵ It is worth noting, however, particularly in the post-Soviet context, that one need not be Western or democratic to be secular. Islam Karimov, president of infamously autocratic Uzbekistan, fumed in 1998: “Islamists must be shot in the forehead! If necessary, I’ll shoot them myself.”³⁶

Karimov is not the only Central Asian leader to perceive an Islamist threat. In May 2001 then-Kyrgyz president Askar Akaev warned that radicals were trying “to extend the geographic range of Islam, and even to set up a state—an Islamic caliphate.”³⁷ Former Kyrgyz prime minister Nikolai Tanaev concluded in 2004: “A few years ago Hizb-ut-Tahrir was only a religious organization, but two years ago it became extremist and has a goal of overthrowing a political regime.”³⁸ In 2006, Kyrgyz Prosecutor-General Kambaraly Kongantiyev warned that Islamists “openly advocate setting up an Islamic caliphate in the Fergana Valley and overthrowing the secular regime.”³⁹ And in January 2009 the Tajik Supreme Court moved to ban Salafism, concluding that conservative Islam was a threat to national security.⁴⁰

Given the intersection of secularism and Central Asian autocracy, and given that it is secular autocracies that Central Asia’s Islamist groups oppose, there is good reason to explore anti-secular explanations of Islamic revivalism independently of anti-Western explanations. In fact, some scholars go so far as to argue that Islamist groups, in their struggle against secular autocrats, exhibit many of the same values as Western liberals. Bjørn Olav Utvik, for example, writes:

Many Islamist movements are involved in a bitter struggle for the establishment of democratic rules in a region dominated by authoritarian regimes, and increasingly they move towards a principled defense of popular sovereignty and political pluralism legitimated by references to the holy scriptures of Islam.⁴¹

Although one may question Utvik’s finding that Islamist movements are champions of political pluralism, the idea that Islamic revivalism broadly may be a response to secular autocracy as much as to secular Western democracy is worth investigating.

Islamic Revivalism as Nationalism. In Utvik’s formulation, Islamic revivalism is both an outcome to be explained and a variable that itself gives rise to new democracy-oriented identities. Adeb Khalid similarly sees Islamic revivalism as occupying a middle point in a three-stage causal chain; only in Khalid’s analysis, Islamic revivalism ultimately assists in producing nationalist rather than

democratic identities. Moreover, whereas Utvik emphasizes the central role of the “holy scriptures of Islam,” Khalid sees religion, paradoxically, as assisting new and expressly secular identities. Writing of the post-Soviet Uzbek case, he explains:

Islam today is widely understood in Uzbekistan in ways that are profoundly secular. . . . Islam, nation, and tradition coexist happily in Uzbekistan. A “return” to Islam today is widely seen as a way of reclaiming the national cultural patrimony and of decolonization, but little more.⁴²

Religion, in Khalid’s analysis, is instrumental; Islamic revival is prompted by a desire to part with a colonial past and forge, in its place, a new nationalist and secular identity. The “mandatory homage to the Great Russian people” is replaced with new histories that document the horrors of the purges and collectivization, and symbols of Russian rule are replaced with “religious commodities.”⁴³ Khalid’s depiction of Uzbek Islamic revivalism is jarring; he writes, for example, of a new, post-Soviet Uzbek dining on pork and admiring recently acquired Islamic trinkets that “share shelf space with foreign liquor and tobacco.”⁴⁴ But it is this dissonance that, for Khalid, proves the point. Khalid’s pork-eating, whisky-drinking, Marlboro-smoking Uzbek surely exists. How representative, though, is this Uzbek of Islamic revivalism? Our surveys suggest that Khalid’s interlocutor may be more the exception than the rule.

Islam as Local Response to Ineffective Autocratic Rule.

A fourth causality of Islamic revivalism sees the proliferation of new religious groupings neither as a vehicle for nationalism nor as anti-secularism or anti-Westernism, but rather as a response to an autocratic regime that has been ineffective in its efforts to control religion and to provide basic public goods such as healthcare, education, and pensions. The Kyrgyz muftiate, the institution tasked with furthering the government’s vision of Islam, is internally divided and externally faulted for its multiple missteps. As for the provision of basic public goods, the Kyrgyz government at the beginning of the twenty-first century cannot even provide what Lenin delivered at the beginning of the twentieth century: electricity on a regular and predictable basis.⁴⁵

To compensate for the state’s failure, a diverse collection of Islamic organizations and institutions—local mosques, Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Kamalovs’ various religious and business groupings in Osh and Kara Suu, and even the Diyanat, the Turkish government’s spiritual board—are stepping in and providing the food, shelter, and education that the central government cannot.

Others have identified a similar causal link between state weakness and Islamic revivalism. Kathleen Collins, for example, finds:

Islamism is likely to emerge as a major source of opposition when two conditions are present: when a state is characterized by significant political and economic uncertainty and when Islamist ideologues offer a counterideology to failed democracy and nationalism.⁴⁶

Collins’s analysis of political Islam in Central Asia and the Caucasus, although innovative in that it moves beyond theories of Islam’s incompatibility with the West or with secularism, nevertheless does raise questions of conceptualization and interpretation. Collins finds a “vast array of Islamist movements” emergent in the region, whereas I have urged care in distinguishing between the rhetoric of religious elites and the beliefs of those who constitute the movement of Islamic revivalism broadly.⁴⁷

Ultimately, I build on Collins’s valuable insight that local variables may shape variations in Islamic identity but find, rather than Islamism, community-oriented Islamic activism. More specifically, I find an iterative cycle of *Islamic* revivalism where: (1) Muslim values lead to deepening interpersonal trust, (2) deepening trust encourages capital (both social and literal) aggregation, (3) capital aggregation yields effective Islamic charities and businesses, and (4) these effective charities and businesses win local admiration and thereby encourage the further spread of Islamic identities. In short, shared norms yield social and economic capital, and this growing capital, in turn, helps the further expansion of Islamic norms.

This causality is by no means unique to the Kyrgyz case or to Islam. Robert Putnam, for example, writes of religion in America: “The social ties embodied in religious communities are at least as important as religious beliefs per se in accounting for volunteerism and philanthropy. Connectedness, not merely faith, is responsible for the beneficence of church people.”⁴⁸

Critically, although the social capital argument may be familiar in the U.S. context, this causality has been largely overlooked in studies of Islamic revivalism. To the extent that empirics support this causality, however, Central Asians—and Central Asia’s partners—have considerable grounds for optimism. The institutions and organizations of Islamic revivalism, rather than posing a threat to Western or secular values, may prove capable partners in mobilizing local populations to provide what central governments cannot.

Table 1

Perceptions of Local Mosques and Donations to Religious Charities (in percent)

	Local mosque	Donate to religious charity
Yes		75.66
No		24.34
Very untrustworthy	1.46	
Untrustworthy	8.11	
Trustworthy	59.04	
Very trustworthy	23.67	
Do not know	7.71	

Investigating Hypotheses of Islamic Variation

The preceding discussion generates the following propositions:

1. If, as scholars like Rashid, Cohen, and Chaudet argue, Islamic revivalism is a response to Western values, then respondents who identify more closely with Islamic institutions should express greater animosity toward Western institutions.

2. If, as Huntington and Kepel find, Islamic revivalism is motivated by an opposition to secularism, then respondents who identify more closely with Islamic institutions should express greater animosity toward secular governments

3. If, as Khalid finds, Islamic revivalism represents “a way of reclaiming the national cultural patrimony and of decolonization,” then those who most closely identify with Islam should express greater animosity toward institutional legacies of the colonial heritage—for example, the Russian media.

4. Last, if Islamic revivalism is part of an iterative cycle where shared religious norms assist in the formation of charitable organizations that, in turn, assist local populations when central states cannot, then the respondents most engaged with charitable organizations should be the most disillusioned with their national leaders.

Data from a May–June 2007 nationwide survey of 1,000 Kyrgyz respondents were used to investigate these propositions. The survey was conducted by BRiF, a Kazakhstan-based polling agency that Beth Kolko (University of Washington) and I commissioned to conduct surveys as part of a multiyear study of new information-communication technologies in Central Asia.⁴⁹ Respondents

Table 2

Perceptions of English-Language Media, Russian Papers, National Officeholders, and Neighbors (in percent)

	English-language media	Russian papers	National officeholders*	Neighbors
Very untrustworthy	4.39	3.06	14.49	0.80
Untrustworthy	15.43	13.56	36.84	11.97
Trustworthy	20.74	41.22	40.96	65.43
Very trustworthy	4.65	9.57	4.12	19.02
Do not know	54.79	32.58	3.59	2.79

*Perceptions of national officeholders were measured by degree of satisfaction rather than trust.

Table 3

Regression Illustrating Relationships between Trust in Local Mosque and Donations to Religious Charities and Perceptions of the West, Colonial Legacies, Secular Political Elites, and Neighbors

	(1) Trust in local mosque		(2) Donate to religious charity	
Eng Dummy2	-0.586	(0.448)	0.578	(0.604)
Eng Dummy3	-0.681	(0.436)	0.434	(0.595)
Eng Dummy4	0.923	(0.563)	1.969**	(0.663)
Eng Dummy5	-0.388	(0.416)	0.795	(0.570)
Rus Dummy2	-0.719	(0.568)	-0.184	(0.650)
Rus Dummy3	-0.646	(0.536)	0.0697	(0.611)
Rus Dummy4	0.0173	(0.582)	0.534	(0.658)
Rus Dummy5	-0.784	(0.544)	-0.0595	(0.622)
Sat Nat Office	0.170	(0.101)	-0.411***	(0.116)
Neighbors	0.800***	(0.156)	-0.181	(0.169)
_cons			-0.393	(0.930)
cut1				
_cons	-2.451**	(0.842)		
cut2				
_cons	-0.466	(0.801)		
cut3				
_cons	2.958***	(0.811)		
N	655		655	

Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

were selected according to the random-route method. In addition to the two questions measuring variations in Islamic institution connectedness, respondents were asked to report the degree to which they (1) trusted the

Table 4

Discrete Change in Probability of Degree of Trust in Mosque and Donations to Religious Charities

	Change	Trust in local mosque				Donate to religious charity
		VU	U	T	VT	Yes
Tr Neighbors	1→4	-0.03	-0.23	-0.06	0.35	
Sat Nat Office	1→4					-0.25
Eng Dummy 4	0→1					0.45

Note: 1 → 4 is a change from "1—very untrustworthy/very unsatisfied" to "4—very trustworthy/very satisfied." The 0 → 1 change from the dummy variable, Eng Dummy4 represents a change from the reference category, Eng Dummy1, "English-language media are very untrustworthy," to Eng Dummy4, "English-language media are very trustworthy." VU, U, T, and VT stand for very untrustworthy, untrustworthy, trustworthy, and very trustworthy, respectively.

English-language media, (2) were satisfied with national government officials, (3) trusted the Russian-language media, and (4) trusted their neighbors. Responses were recorded on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (very untrustworthy/very unsatisfied) through 4 (very trustworthy/very satisfied). Tables 1 and 2 summarize variations in perceptions along these measures.

Regression analysis was used to assess whether perceptions of the English-language media, Russian newspapers, national officeholders, or neighbors helped account for the variance in reported trust in local mosques or donations to religious charities. Given the high percentage of "do not know" responses to the English-language media and Russian newspaper questions, and the possibility that these responses were substantively significant, English media and Russian newspaper were recoded as a series of dummy variables with the pattern: Eng/Rus Dummy1—

“very untrustworthy”; Dummy2 “untrustworthy”; Dummy3—“trustworthy”; Dummy4—“very trustworthy”; and Dummy5—“do not know.” The reference category for the English media and Russian newspaper dummy variables was Dummy1—“very untrustworthy.”⁵⁰ An ordinal logistic regression was performed in analyzing predictors of “trust in mosque” and a logistic regression in analyzing the binary variable, “donate time or money to religious charities.”

Last, regressions were performed using the full population of ethnic Kyrgyz and ethnic Uzbeks (655 respondents) and including only ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks who self-identified as Muslim (641 respondents). Limiting the population to only Muslims had no effect on the pattern of statistically significant results. The findings summarized in Table 3 were obtained using the full sample of Muslim and non-Muslim ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks. Table 4 summarizes predicted probability changes for statistically significant variables.

The regressions provide further insight into why ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbeks gravitate toward their local mosques and religious charities. Specifically, three of the four predictor variables analyzed yielded statistically significant results, while one variable, trust in Russian newspapers, exhibited no significant causal relationship with either trust in the mosque or donations to religious charities. These results and their implications for broader theories of Islamic revivalism are considered below.

English-Language Media and Anti-Western Values Theories. The English-language variable was statistically significant, but in a direction opposite to that anticipated by clash-of-civilizations theories. The probability of donating to religious charities increased by 0.45 percent for respondents who viewed the English-language media as very trustworthy, compared with respondents who reported that the English-language media were very untrustworthy, holding all other variables at their means.⁵¹ Granted, the English language may not be an adequate proxy for the West. Alastair Pennycook, however, argues that it is: “If we want to consider seriously the notion of a ‘clash of civilizations’ . . . we might consider these as ‘Islam’ and ‘English’ (rather than Christianity).”⁵²

Similarly, Ratnawati Mohd-Asraf writes: “English is also seen by many as being the embodiment and carrier of Judeo-Christian cultural values, and that of Western civilization, and conjures various images—positive as well as negative—to the myriad people that use it.”⁵³ Critically, these findings are predicated on an assumption that discernable civilizations exist, an assumption

challenged by scholars like Edward Said and Clifford Geertz, and finding little support in our survey of Kyrgyz public opinion.⁵⁴


Russian-Language Newspapers and Nationalist Theories. Islam-as-nationalism causalities would similarly predict a negative relationship between perceptions of Russian-language newspapers and respondent identification with Islamic institutions. Here too, as with the English-media proxy, one might question whether language, in this case Russian, is an appropriate measure of identity. Those who formulate the Islam-as-nationalism thesis draw this connection. Khalid, for example, writes:

New sects and religious groups (such as Ahli hadis, Ahli Qur’on, and a host of local offshoots), many of them with no previous record in Central Asia, have appeared. *This was accompanied by great interest in the Arabic script and attempts to replace Russian loan words with Arabic or Persian terms.* Many texts, hitherto taboo, appeared in print again, and the *Qur’an* was translated into Uzbek for the first time in 1992 [emphasis added].⁵⁵

Despite the proposed relationship between language and national identity, survey analysis in the Kyrgyz case does not find any significant causal relationship between the Russian language and Islam. This negative finding is not what we would anticipate if, as Khalid argues, “a ‘return’ to Islam today is widely seen as a way of reclaiming the national cultural patrimony and of decolonization, but little more.”⁵⁶

Secular National Officeholders. In contrast to perceptions of the Russian media, respondents’ views of national officeholders did prove to be a statistically significant predictor of their donations to religious charities. The predicted probability of donating time or money to religious organizations was 0.25 lower for respondents who were very satisfied with national officeholders than for respondents who reported that they were very unsatisfied, holding all other variables at their means. Does this mean, however, that Islam and secularism are incompatible?

Of the two measures used to assess variations in connectedness to Islamic institutions, it is worth noting that it was Islamic charities and not mosques that exhibited a causal relationship with secular elites. Stated differently, local mosques were not focal points for those most untrusting of national government rule. Muslim clergy, just like the clergy of any religion, can provide a language and ideology of political opposition. Islamist opposition, however, is not what Kyrgyz are seeking from their imams. Rather, the link between the failing autocratic state and



Muslim men leave a lunchtime service at the main mosque in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, October 17, 2000. (AP Photo/Misha Japaridze)

Islam runs through religious charities, through the organizations that meet citizens' social welfare needs. In contrast to what Collins finds, Kyrgyz public opinion suggests that it is not "Islamism" that "is likely to emerge as a major source of opposition when . . . a state is characterized by significant political and economic uncertainty," but rather, it is Islamic charity that is likely to emerge.

These charities are both formal and informal. At the formal, institutionalized level, Muslim parochial schools figure prominently in ethnic Kyrgyz and Uzbek daily lives. The Imam Bakyt school in the southern Kyrgyz city of Osh, for example, educates young women who cannot afford to pay tuition at Osh State University. And while theology and Arabic language are a central part of the Imam Bakyt curriculum, the school also emphasizes secular subjects. The school's director has requested an English-language ESL teacher from Peace Corps Kyrgyzstan for the past three years, but

lamentations that his requests have yet to be approved.⁵⁷

In Nookat, a town 29 miles southwest of Osh, the Imam ut-Termizii boys' madrassa functions in much the same way as the Osh school. Here too religious education is central, but secular subjects also figure prominently. The day I attended students were conducting a "street law" simulation as part of an American Bar Association program to teach Kyrgyz youth to understand their legal rights and how to safely and civilly defend them when interacting with the police.⁵⁸ These two schools are illustrative of a broader trend across Kyrgyzstan—the state-run educational system is collapsing, and in its place, local Islamic societies and schools are assuming an increasingly central role. Kyrgyzstan now has fifty madrassas registered with the muftiate.⁵⁹ The actual number of neighborhood madrassas is probably considerably higher, given that many parochial schools do not register with the muftiate.⁶⁰ The attraction of these schools, however, is not only the educational opportunities they offer, but also the social welfare services they provide. Students in a focus group at the Osh Theological College confided—after their dean left the room—that the college's provision of three daily meals and, if needed, a dorm room figured prominently in their higher education choices. Room and board at the college allowed parents to focus their scarce resources on younger siblings.⁶¹

These formal institutions are complemented by a web of informal, neighborhood-level Islamic *jamiyats* (organizations). Funding for the *jamiyats* comes in part from local elites. Sadikzhan Kamalov and his associates at the International Center for Islamic Cooperation, for example, act as a financial and organizational clearing house for Islamic charities throughout Osh. Equally if not more important, though, are the financial and time contributions ordinary citizens make to the *jamiyats*.

These organizations and the critical role they play have thus far received little attention in the scholarly literature on Islam in Central Asia. They proved critical, though, in caring for the Andijan refugees, Uzbek citizens who crossed to the Kyrgyz side of the Fergana Valley following the Karimov government's repression of protests in May 2005. With the Kyrgyz government either unable or—wary of further souring already tense relations with its Uzbek neighbor—unwilling to assist the refugees, it was the Kyrgyz *jamiyats* that helped them find shelter, food, and work.⁶²

Islamic Revivalism and Trust in One's Neighbors.

The extent to which respondents expressed trust in their neighbors also proved statistically significant, although in this case the relationship ran toward local mosques rather

than charities. This result, much like Putnam's finding of a causal relationship between religion and community interpersonal "connectedness" in the U.S. case, suggests that in Kyrgyzstan too, religion and interpersonal trust are positively linked. It might seem odd that a similar statistically significant relationship does not exist between trust and donations to Islamic charities. As the preceding discussion illustrates, though, charitable donations are prompted first and foremost by government failure—failure to provide for the Andijan refugees, to provide education, to provide basic welfare. Where the failure is most acute, donations are most forthcoming. Shared Islamic norms provide the social capital for charitable organizations to emerge, but it is perceptions of state failure that most immediately prompt people to give.

Conclusion

The Kyrgyz case offers an ideal arena to assess competing theories of Islamic revivalism. Seven decades of Soviet control led to the near complete isolation of Kyrgyz citizens from the world Muslim community. With the collapse of Soviet rule in 1991, some of them began to travel abroad, meet outside scholars, and explore the diverse debates that shaped Islamic discourse in the twentieth century. And just as Kyrgyz were exploring their religious identities anew, so were social scientists reconsidering the possible interrelationships between Islam and politics.

Some scholars found in the Soviet demise proof of democracy's sure ascent. Others, however, warned of new threats, of a rising China and an anti-Western Islam. China indeed is rising, but it has proven more a partner than a problem for the major powers. In contrast, Islam continues to capture the imagination. Islamist ideologues press for the destruction of Israel, achieved destruction in Afghanistan, and carried out devastating bombings in New York, London, Madrid, and Bali. In short, Islamist groups are a threat.

Equally threatening, however, is anticipating an Islamist threat where no such threat exists. To a real degree, this is what scholars of Central Asian Islamic revivalism have done, focusing on the rhetoric of a small, anti-Western, anti-Russian, and anti-secular Islamist elite, while overlooking the totality of the role Islam plays in Central Asian society. This article demonstrates that when scholars expand their field of view to the broader polity, the image of Islam that emerges is a constructive and familiar one. Central Asians are drawn to Islam for the same reasons people the world over are drawn to religion; Islam provides spiritual insight and a sense of

communal connectedness. This latter quality of Islam, its ability to connect Central Asians at the local level, is cause for hope.

Four of the five Central Asian states—Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan—are still struggling to meet the basic needs of their populations. Prompted by this state failure, Islamic charities have increasingly stepped in to deliver what central governments cannot. Religion provides the shared norms, the social capital, critical for the functioning and growth of these local charities. This form of Islamic revivalism should be embraced rather than feared.

Notes

1. Clyde Haberman, "The Kremlin and the Vatican; Gorbachev Visits Pope at Vatican; Ties Are Forged," *New York Times* (December 2, 1989): A1.

2. See, e.g., Kathleen Collins, "Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements: Evidence from Central Asia and the Caucasus," *World Politics* 60, no. 1 (2008): 64–96; Martha Brill Olcott, "The Roots of Radical Islam in Central Asia," Carnegie Paper no. 77, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, January 2007; Vitalii Viacheslavovich Naumkin, *Radical Islam in Central Asia: Between Pen and Rifle* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005); Zeyno Baran, "Radical Islamists in Central Asia," in *Current Trends in Islamist Ideology*, ed. Hillel Fradkin, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Hudson Institute, 2005), at www.futureofmuslimworld.com/research/detail/radical-islamists-in-central-asia.

3. Charles King, "The Micropolitics of Social Violence," *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (2004): 447.

4. Countrywide survey of 1,000 Kyrgyz conducted in May and June 2007 as part of National Science Foundation-funded project "The Effect of the Internet on Central Asian Society"; author interviews in Bishkek, Osh, Dzhalsal-Abad, Kara-Kol, Ak-Terek, and Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyzstan, May–June 2007.

5. A total of 812 ethnic Kyrgyz and 210 ethnic Uzbeks were polled in the 1996 survey.

6. A total of 645 ethnic Kyrgyz and 107 ethnic Uzbeks were polled in the 2007 survey.

7. For examples and explanations of the mosque-attendance approach to religiosity, see Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Growth in Islamic Fundamentalism: The Case of Palestine," *Sociological Analysis* 50, no. 3 (autumn 1989): 291–98; Mark Tessler, "Islam and Democracy in the Middle East: The Impact of Religious Orientations on Attitudes Toward Democracy in Four Arab Countries," *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 3 (April 2002): 337–54.

8. Dale F. Eickelman and James P. Piscatori, *Muslim Politics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004); Robert W. Hefner, "Public Islam and the Problem of Democratization," *Sociology of Religion* 62, no. 4 (winter 2001): 493.

9. "Kyrgyz Leader Urges More Explanatory Work on Islam," *Kabar* (July 6, 2006), via LexisNexis.

10. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 113. See also T. Jeremy Gunn, "Shaping an Islamic Identity: Religion, Islamism, and the State in Central Asia," *Sociology of Religion* 64, no. 3 (autumn 2003): 389–410.

11. "Koran Test Reveals Kyrgyz Imams with 'Extremist' Links," *Kyrgyz Television 1* (May 21, 2008), www.lexisnexis.com. Of those who did take the exam, 982 ultimately passed.

12. Author interview with Ravshan and Sadykzhan Kamalov, Kara Suu (May 25) and Osh (May 26), 2007.

13. Sultan Jumagulov, "Studentam vernuli rektora: Aksiskii sindrom porazil religioznie ucherezhdenie Kyrgyzstana" (Students Return Rector: Protests Affect Religious Education in Kyrgyzstan) (Institute for War and Peace Reporting, November 5, 2002), http://iwpr.net/?p=rca&s=f&o=162578&apc_state=hruirca2002.

14. Sadykzhan Kamalov interview.
15. "Kyrgyz Muslims to Stage Demos to Demand Clerics' Resignation," *Kabar* (December 12, 2006), via LexisNexis.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Quintan Wiktorowicz, "The Salafi Movement in Jordan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 32, no. 2 (2000): 219.
18. Kamalov interviews.
19. "Koran Test Reveals Kyrgyz Imams with 'Extremist' Links."
20. Kamalov interviews.
21. *Imam Kamalov Funeral* video (Kara Suu, Kyrgyzstan, August 7, 2006).
22. Tokon Mamytov, Deputy Director of the Kyrgyz National Security Service, June 2004, issued a statement typical of this "guilt by association" tactic: "Hizb ut-Tahrir has been carrying out propaganda work with servicemen, policemen, members of non-government organizations and journalists to try to win them over. . . . Most of their meetings with local residents take place in mosques." See "Kyrgyz Prime Minister Warns of Threat of Extremism," *Interfax* (June 28, 2004).
23. Interview with Ayub Khan Mashrabov, Kara Suu (May 25, 2007).
24. Examples include Samuel P Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); Paul Johnson, "The Biggest Threat We Face," *National Review* 58, no. 15 (August 28, 2006): 18; Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," *Atlantic* 266, no. 3 (September 1990): 47.
25. For critiques of the clash thesis, see Clifford Geertz, "Which Way to Mecca?" *New York Review of Books* 50, no. 10 (June 12, 2003); Edward W. Said, "The Clash of Ignorance," *The Nation* (October 22, 2001); Eickelman and Piscatori, *Muslim Politics*.
26. Hizb ut-Tahrir, *The Inevitability of the Clash of Civilisation* (London: Al-Khilafah, 2002), www.khilafah.com/images/images/PDF/Books/clashcivi.pdf; "Anti-U.S. Leaflets Distributed in Kyrgyz Capital," *Agence France-Presse* (January 31, 2002).
27. Alisher Saipov lamentably was shot and killed not far from his office in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, in October 2007. His assailants have not been identified. Alisher's good humor, unrivaled expertise, and friendship are deeply missed.
28. Ariel Cohen, "Terrorism Extremism and Regional Stability in Central Asia," statement to the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia (October 29, 2003).
29. Didier Chaudet, "Islamist Terrorism in Greater Central Asia: The 'Al-Qaedaization' of Uzbek Jihadism," *Russie.Nei. Visions* 35, no. <?> (December 2008): 6.
30. Ahmed Rashid, "The New Struggle in Central Asia," *World Policy Journal* 17, no. 4 (winter 2000): 33.
31. Irshad Manji, "To Fix Islam, Start from the Inside," *Newsweek* (December 31, 2008); Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, "The True Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Policy*, no. 135 (March): 62; David S. Landes and Richard A. Landes, "Girl Power," *New Republic* 225, no. 15 (October 8, 2001): 20–22.
32. Quintan Wiktorowicz and Suha Taji Farouki, "Islamic NGOs and Muslim Politics: A Case from Jordan," *Third World Quarterly* 21, no. 4 (August 2000): 685–699.
33. Ali A. Mazrui, "Islam and the United States: Streams of Convergence, Strands of Divergence," *Third World Quarterly* 25, no. 5 (2004).
34. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 40.
35. Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trial of Political Islam* (London: Tauris, 2006), 154.
36. "President Karimov Says He Will Shoot Islamic Fundamentalists," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (May 5, 1998).
37. "Kyrgyz President Pledges to Fight Religious Extremism, Praises CIS," *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (May 1, 2001).
38. Kadyr Toktogulov, "Kyrgyz Prime Minister Urges Stronger Fight Against Religious Extremism," AP (June 28, 2004).
39. "Kyrgyz Prosecutor Warns of Links Between Terrorism, Crime," ITAR-TASS (November 21, 2005).
40. Farangis Najibullah, "Salafi Ban Reflects Tajik Officials' Growing Fear," *RFE/RL Feature* (January 9, 2009).
41. Bjørn Olav Utvik, "The Modernizing Force of Islamism," in *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe*, ed. John L. Esposito and François Burgat (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2003), p. 65.
42. Adeb Khalid, "A Secular Islam: Nation, State, and Religion in Uzbekistan," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 35, no. 4 (2003): 586.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 584, 587; Peyrouse similarly sees an "instrumental use of Islam" in Central Asian elites' attempts at post-Soviet nation building. See Sébastien Peyrouse, "Islam in Central Asia: National Specificities and Postsoviet Globalization," *Religion, State and Society* 35, no. 3 (2007): 245.
44. Khalid, "Secular Islam," pp. 584, 586.
45. "Electricity Blackouts Are Back in City," *Times of Central Asia* (December 24, 2008).
46. Collins, "Ideas, Networks, and Islamist Movements," p. 72.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
48. Robert D. Putnam, *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000), p. 67.
49. "The Effect of the Internet on Society: Incorporating Central Asia into the Global Perspective" (National Science Foundation Award 0326101, September 2003–August 2008). BRiF's Web site is www.brif.kz.
50. I have not included the comparatively few "do not know" responses to the other questions. In regressions where these responses are included, the same pattern of statistically significant results.
51. "Very untrustworthy" is the reference category for the English-language media dummies.
52. Sohail Karmani and Alastair Pennycook, "Islam, English, and 9/11," *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education* 4, no. 2 (2005): 158.
53. Ratnawati Mohd-Asraf, "English and Islam: A Clash of Civilizations?" *Journal of Language, Identity, and Education* 4, no. 2 (April 2005): 104.
54. Said, "Clash of Ignorance"; Geertz, "Which Way to Mecca?"
55. Khalid, "Secular Islam," p. 584.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 586.
57. Author interview, Imam Bakyt School, Osh, Kyrgyzstan, May 27, 2007.
58. Author interview with Imam at-Termezii, Nookat, May 25, 2007.
59. "Islam Faces Hurdles in Bishkek," *Times of Central Asia* (January 29, 2008).
60. Interview with Toigonbek Zakirovich Kalmatov, Director Kyrgyz State Agency for Religious Affairs, Bishkek, May 22, 2007.
61. Osh State Theological Faculty, Osh, May 27, 2007. The college is affiliated with Osh State University. It is financed, however, by Diyanat (the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religion) and by local donations.
62. Meetings with Uzbek refugees and Kyrgyz *jamiyat* members in Osh and Kara Suu, May–June 2007. Names withheld for security considerations.

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