



Authentication for Drone Delivery Through a Novel Way of Using Face Biometrics

Jonathan Sharp
University of South Carolina
Columbia, SC, USA
jpsharp@email.sc.edu

Chuxiong Wu
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA, USA
cwu27@gmu.edu

Qiang Zeng*
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA, USA
qzeng2@gmu.edu

ABSTRACT

Drone delivery, which makes use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver or pick up packages, is an emerging service. To ensure that a package is picked up by a legitimate drone and delivered to the correct user, mutual authentication between drones and users is critical. As delivery drones are expensive and may carry important packages, drones should keep a distance from users until the authentication succeeds. Thus, authentication approaches that require human-drone physical contact cannot be applied. Face recognition does not need human-drone contact. However, it has major limitations: (1) it needs users to enroll their face information, (2) it is vulnerable to attacks, such as 3D-printed masks and adversarial examples, and (3) it only supports a drone to authenticate a user (rather than mutual authentication). We propose a novel way of using face biometrics, without these limitations, and apply it to building an authentication system for drone delivery, named SMILE2AUTH. The evaluation shows that SMILE2AUTH is highly accurate, secure and usable.

CCS CONCEPTS

• Security and privacy → Authentication; • Networks → Mobile and wireless security.

KEYWORDS

Drone Delivery, Authentication, Relay Attacks, Face Biometrics

ACM Reference Format:

Jonathan Sharp, Chuxiong Wu, and Qiang Zeng. 2022. Authentication for Drone Delivery Through a Novel Way of Using Face Biometrics. In *The 28th Annual International Conference On Mobile Computing And Networking (ACM MobiCom '22)*, October 17–21, 2022, Sydney, NSW, Australia. ACM, New York, NY, USA, 14 pages. <https://doi.org/10.1145/3495243.3560550>

1 INTRODUCTION

Drone delivery uses unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to deliver packages. The drone-delivery market is projected to grow to \$39 billion by the year 2030 [49]. Companies, such as UPS[78], Amazon[2], and Walmart[80], are actively deploying the service. For example,

*Also with University of South Carolina.



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ACM ISBN 978-1-4503-9181-8/22/10.
<https://doi.org/10.1145/3495243.3560550>

Table 1: Comparison. Y: true, N: false, ?: unclear.

Technique	P1	P2	P3	P4	P5
Face/gait/speaker recognition	Y	N	N	N	Y
Google (scanning QR code) [72]	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Qualcomm (purchase code) [30]	Y	Y	N	N	Y
Walmart (beacon) [54]	N	Y	Y	N	Y
SoundUAV [57]	N	Y	N	N	Y
Distance bounding [8]	N	Y	Y	?	N
SMILE2AUTH	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y

Amazon's Prime Air is designed "to safely get packages to customers in 30 minutes or less using autonomous aerial vehicles" [2].

The imminent popularity makes drone delivery an attractive attack target. Like the human-based delivery service, drone delivery provides two kinds of services, namely *package pickup* and *package delivery*; both are vulnerable to impersonation attacks. In a package delivery service, an attacker impersonates a legitimate user to take the package; thus, the drone should authenticate the user. In package pickup, an attacker controls a malicious drone impersonating a legitimate drone to steal the user's package; thus, the user should authenticate the delivery drone. In short, mutual user-drone authentication is critical for the emerging service.

Delivery drones are expensive and may carry important packages. Thus, a drone should keep a safe distance from persons until a successful authentication. This constraint makes authentication methods that require human-drone physical contact, such as keypads and fingerprints, inapplicable.

In addition to avoiding human-drone physical contact, we find the following properties highly desirable. **(P1) no need of special user-side hardware;** **(P2) no need of biometric enrollment;** **(P3) mutual user-drone authentication;** **(P4) resilient to attacks;** and **(P5) no compatibility issues** between drones and user devices. As summarized in Table 1, face, gait, or speaker recognition can be used for authentication without involving drone-human contact. However, these methods need to enroll the user's biometric information (**P2: N**), and cannot authenticate drones (**P3: N**). In addition, there are many known attacks to face [19, 70], gait [27, 28], or speaker recognition [42, 87] (**P4: N**).

A Google's patent [72] has the delivery drone authenticate a user by scanning a QR code shown on the user's smartphone. However, it is vulnerable to *vision relay attacks* (**P4: N**), where a malicious drone scans the QR code shown on the user's smartphone and relays it to the attacker's smartphone.¹ Qualcomm [30] proposes an authentication method by having the user's smartphone send a

¹Both vision and radio **relay attacks** are described in detail in Section 2.2.

one-time purchase code or digital token to the drone. But this protocol is vulnerable to *radio relay attacks* (P4: N). Neither of the two patents considers authenticating the drone (P3: N). Walmart [54] proposes a mutual authentication method by leveraging a user-side locker that uses Bluetooth beacon signals to communicate with the drone. However, it needs user-side infrastructure (P1: N) and is also vulnerable to radio relay attacks (P4: N). SoundUAV [57] proposes a method to authenticate a drone by *fingerprinting* its motor noises caused by manufacturing imperfections. As the propellers of a hovering drone generate varying noises (e.g., due to the wind and different package weights) and thus would affect accuracy, SoundUAV has a drone *land*. inside a dock; the lock then collects the motor noises and compares them with the fingerprint, making the drone be easily captured by an attacker. It needs a user-side docking station (P1: N), does not authenticate the user (P3: N), and is vulnerable to audio replay attacks (P4: N).

Distance bounding [8] enables one device to establish an upper bound on its distance to another device, which can be used to verify proximity. However, it requires special hardware [60] that is not widely available (P1: N). The security of distance bounding protocols is being actively studied [5, 11, 50] (P3: ?). As an interoperable ecosystem for distance bounding is not yet available [23], compatibility and interoperability issues (P5: N) between delivery drones and users' devices cannot be ignored.

We present an authentication system for drone delivery, named SMILE2AUTH, which meets all the properties. When the delivery drone hovers keeping a safe distance from the user, the drone and the user's phone both take a short video of the user, who smiles (or make other facial expressions). SMILE2AUTH is built on a novel way of using face biometrics. Specifically, each frame in the two videos is encoded into an embedding of the face, which is a high-dimensional vector. This way, the two videos are converted to two sequences of embeddings. At each point in time, a pair of embeddings from the two sequences is compared to generate a *distance value*. The series of distance values is used to derive features to train a model for mutual authentication. Our hypothesis is that, if the drone and the user's phone have recorded the same smile, the distance values should be consistently low; otherwise, not. Our study of face embeddings and evaluation both validate the hypothesis.

This novel use of face biometrics has extraordinary resilience to attacks (such as 3D-printed masks, adversarial examples, and even an identical twin that attacks the other), and we propose it based on the following insights. First, traditional face recognition based authentication loses information significantly in two aspects. 1) It omits the *realtime* information completely. Essentially, it compares the *current* face information captured during the authentication with a biometric template captured in the *past*. It ignores the information regarding when an emotion starts and how long it lasts. 2) It ignores the *uniqueness* during each authentication. One may smile slightly this time and laugh next time. Consequently, regardless of the victim's facial expressions, as long as an attacker impersonates the template well (e.g., using a 3D-printed mask), the approach can be fooled.

SMILE2AUTH captures the *realtime* information. Each face embedding is annotated with a *timestamp*. A strong attacker (such as an identical twin) who impersonates the user will likely fail, as the average human reaction time is larger than 200ms [31, 36, 52]




Figure 1: Face recognition: (A) Photo, (B) Face Detection, (C) Alignment, (D) Encoding, (E) Verification.

and such a time difference is detected as attacks by our system. Plus, humans are imperfect and thus cannot mimic consistently well at each point in time; the resulting high variance of distance values also indicates attacks. Moreover, SMILE2AUTH makes use of *uniqueness* of each motion, as any unique *details* are observed by both sides (drone and smartphone) and used in comparison. An attacker who ignores the unique details will fail.

Moreover, traditional face recognition based authentication needs users to enroll their face information first, which harms privacy and usability. Plus, it may fail when a user wears sunglasses or heavy makeup [13, 61]. Finally, it only supports the drone to authenticate the user, rather than mutual authentication. In contrast, with SMILE2AUTH, a user's smartphone captures the *ground truth* information about the user's face. To make the authentication decision, the drone's video is compared against the ground truth. Thus, SMILE2AUTH (1) does not need the user to enroll her face biometrics, (2) works well with sunglasses and heavy makeup, and (3) supports mutual authentication (as the two sides exchange the embedding values to conduct the comparison independently).

We build a prototype of SMILE2AUTH and perform a thorough evaluation. The results show that SMILE2AUTH attains a very high accuracy, which keeps 100% when the face-drone distance is up to four meters, different drones and smartphones are examined, frames per second (fps) is as low as 4, and the weather varies. It also works well at night when the drone is equipped with cheap LED lights [3]. We make the following contributions.

- We propose a novel way of using face biometrics, which does not need to enroll the user's biometric information. It has extraordinary resilience to attacks, as it captures the realtimeness and uniqueness of a face making an emotion.
- We apply it to designing a highly usable drone-delivery authentication system SMILE2AUTH. It provides mutual authentication between a drone and a user, and does not depend on any special user-side hardware, such as a lockbox or ultra-wideband (UWB) device for distance bounding.
- We build a prototype of SMILE2AUTH and evaluate it. The evaluation considers a strong adversary, such as a twin, and examines different phones, drones, face-drone distances, weather, frame rates, illuminance levels. The results show that SMILE2AUTH is highly accurate, resilient to attacks, and robust under different environments.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the background. The system overview is presented in Section 3. Section 4 studies face encoding data, and Section 5 describes the design details. We present data collection in Section 6, the evaluation in Section 7, and the usability study in Section 8. The related work is discussed in Section 9. We discuss the limitations in Section 10 and conclude in Section 11.

2 BACKGROUND

2.1 Face Recognition

While this work is different from the traditional face-recognition system, it leverages many advances on this topic. We thus describe face recognition briefly. A typical face-recognition system consists of two phases: *enrollment*, which requires users to enroll their face information, and *verification*, which, given a claimed identity, compares the captured face information against the enrolled template associated with the claimed identity in the following steps.²

Face Detection. A face detector determines where the face is by mapping out structural landmarks of the face. As shown in Figure 1(B), the detector then places a bounding box around the face and crops it from the photo.

Alignment. The cropped face is rotated so that it is aligned consistently. For example, in Figure 1(C), as the face is upside down, it is rotated 180 degrees.

Encoding. As shown in Figure 1(D), a neural network then extracts face features and represents them as a high dimensional vector, called *embedding*, such that the distance between the embeddings of the same face is small.

Verification. As shown in Figure 1(E), the encoding is then compared against the encoding of the enrolled face biometrics by calculating a distance to verify the claimed identity.

We clarify that we do not propose any new face detection and encoding techniques. Instead, we use them in a novel way and apply the idea to authentication.

2.2 Relay Attacks

Much research [12, 58] has demonstrated the insecurity of using certain radio characteristics, such as Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI), BLE beacons, and radio fingerprinting, for verifying proximity. For instance, with reduced-range Bluetooth, even if the communication channel is encrypted, attackers are able to launch *radio relay attacks* (aka *Mafia Fraud Attacks* [16]) without breaking the underlying cryptography. As a concrete example, to compromise Passive Keyless Entry and Start (PKES) systems used in modern cars [24], a car thief relays the radio signals between the key and the car to open and start the car. Radio relay attacks can be made very fast; e.g., 120 ns [24]. Thus, it is difficult to detect relay attacks by detecting the incurred delay [24]. Car thefts applying relay attacks have been reported [77] and are cheap (\$22) [84]. Readers are referred to [12, 58] about the insecurity of naive methods for verifying proximity, such as RSSI, radio fingerprinting, etc.

Like attacks against cars [24], radio relay attacks against drone delivery are also easy to launch [85]. As shown in Figure 2, the malicious drone D' hovers in front of U , who incorrectly considers D' as the delivery drone and starts the authentication procedure (e.g., sending the purchase code [30] or showing the QR code [72]). Then, D' relays the radio, **without knowing the encryption key**, to the attacker A 's phone, which further relays the radio to the delivery drone D hovering near A .

When a one-time QR code is used [72], D' scans the QR code and sends it, over radio, to the phone of A , which shows it to D ; called a *vision relay attack* [85]. It is worth noting that when peer-to-peer

²Another application is *identification*, which does not need a claimed identity.




Figure 2: Relay attack. D (U): legitimate drone (user); D' (A): malicious drone (attacker).

Bluetooth communication is used, but D and U are actually far apart, an attacker needs to launch a radio relay attack to bridge the Bluetooth communication between D and U and initiate the authentication process, and then a vision relay attack is used to relay the QR code. On the other hand, if a backend server is used for the communication between D and U , a radio relay attack is unnecessary since the communication is bridged through the server even when D and U are far away from each other.

To mount relay attacks against drone delivery, an attacker has at least the following ways. (1) Given a popular place, such as a square or plaza, it is not uncommon that multiple persons wait for packages. A nearby attacker thus can exploit the inaccuracy of GPS [32] to launch attacks. Section 3.1 describes a concrete example. (2) As civilian GPS signals are not encrypted, an attacker can use GPS spoofing to mislead a delivery drone. GPS spoofing has been demonstrated on drones [39, 71], and GPS spoofers can be made from inexpensive commercial off-the-shelf components [89]. As delivery drones of a courier company usually have certain models, markings, and path patterns, it is not difficult for an attacker to identify victim delivery drones. If a victim user has a routine for using drone delivery or when a drone gets close to the destination and about to land, it is also easy for an attacker to identify the victim user. (3) If a university or company campus uses Bluetooth beacons for accurate navigation, an attacker can clone or manipulate the signals to mislead drones [37, 41, 86], and thus authentication is critical to impede such attacks.

3 SYSTEM OVERVIEW

3.1 Motivating Example and Observation

To illustrate the importance of authentication for drone delivery, we describe a motivating example. At a Central Park concert with crowds picnicking on the lawn, a user orders a beverage. A delivery drone needs to authenticate the correct recipient among the crowds. Now let's consider that the drone is delivering an expensive bottle of wine, and a cabal of thieves want to steal that bottle. Thus, they launch relay attacks (Section 2.2) to have the thieves' drone deliver a cheap bottle to the unsuspecting recipient while having the legitimate drone deliver the expensive bottle to the thieves. For the prosperity of drone delivery, authentication is needed to defeat such attacks. Even when there are no attacks, there may be multiple drones delivering foods and beverages at the concert,




Figure 3: System design. D : Drone; P : Smartphone; U : User; E_{D_i} : Embedding from drone at timestamp i , E_{P_i} : Embedding from smartphone at timestamp i ; and d_i : Distance between E_{D_i} and E_{P_i}

and thus authentication is important to deliver them to the right recipients.

Having the recipient's smartphone send a one-time purchase code or show a QR code is very usable but insecure, as these approaches are vulnerable to relay attacks. Our observation is that the drone delivery service is different from many conventional services, such as a user authenticates herself at a bank by inputting a PIN or a customer checks out at a grocery store by scanning a QR code. In such conventional scenarios, one party (usually the customer) can trust an entity of the other party (usually the service provider) to conduct authentication, while in our case two entities from the two sides cannot trust each other at the beginning of authentication. This imposes unique challenges on drone-delivery authentication.

3.2 Authentication Approach

We propose a novel way of using face biometrics: two sides (e.g., the delivery drone and the user's smartphone in the drone-delivery application) record short videos containing the user's smile. By turning each frame in the videos into a face embedding,³ the authentication problem is converted into a *dynamic* face embedding comparison problem. It is dynamic as the timestamp of each captured image participates in the authentication process; for example, as the phone's video shows the user starts smiling, the drone's camera is supposed to observe it around the same time.

As shown in Figure 3, at each point in time i , a frame D_i from the video recorded by the drone and a frame P_i from that by the phone constitute a *pair*. Face encoding is used to calculate embeddings E_{D_i} and E_{P_i} , and then a **pairwise distance value**, $pd_i = \mathcal{D}_e(E_{D_i}, E_{P_i})$, is calculated, where $\mathcal{D}_e()$ is the function for calculating the Euclidean distance. This way, the two videos are used to calculate a sequence of pairwise distance values. If the drone indeed records a video of the legitimate user, the pairwise distance values should be consistently small. On the other hand, for example, given a 3D printed mask attack, where the drone records the mask, since the user smiles (recorded by the user's smartphone) while the mask stays the same, the pairwise distance values fluctuate. Other attacks are discussed in Section 3.3.

³Our evaluation (Section 7) shows fps=4 is sufficient.

Our authentication approach uses the user's smartphone as a security token, which we assume is trustworthy and not accessible by the adversary. Stealing the user's password for the drone delivery service account does not suffice for cloning the security token, as long as a second factor (e.g., a one-time PIN sent via a text message or Duo Mobile app) is used and not compromised. A stolen smartphone cannot be simply used for attacking our authentication approach, as the smartphone has to be unlocked to conduct authentication. We consider the following representative procedure, although the details may vary depending on the deployment without changing the core authentication approach.

- (1) User U places an order, e.g., using Amazon's shopping app installed on U 's phone P . Amazon assigns a drone D to fulfill the service.
- (2) Once D arrives at the user-designated location, it hovers and establishes a communication channel, protected by k , with P . Then, D and P run a time-synchronization protocol [29]. Next, P generates a notification to let U know its arrival.
- (3) U then walks to D and unlocks P to confirm that she is near D and ready for a selfie. We assume D has a circle of LED lights around its camera (which is available even on cheap cameras [1]), so it should be trivial for U to identify D 's camera and stand in front of it. As shown in Figure 2, **radio relay attacks** may have been launched and the drone hovering in front of U may be a malicious one; we thus need authentication.
- (4) P and D negotiate a time point to start recording. During the recording, P shows a random countdown; when it reaches 0, the user smiles. The recording lasts T seconds, which is studied as a parameter in the evaluation.
- (5) P and D leverage face encoding to derive two sequences of embeddings and exchange them. P and D then independently decide whether the authentication is a success. Since they calculate based on the same data, it is trivial that they consent. If the authentication succeeds, the package delivery proceeds; otherwise, it goes back to Step 4 until the maximum number of attempts is reached. After authentication, all the videos are deleted.

Regarding the communication channel in Step (2), we assume both P and D can communicate with the courier company's server S ; note both should already have a key-protected channel to communicate with S in order to set up the order (that is, P places the order at S and D accepts the command from S). The authentication merely reuses it. Alternatively, if Bluetooth peer-to-peer communication is used during authentication, the server can first distribute a session key to both P and D when an order is placed; or, P first receives the public key of D via the app, which is used to negotiate a session key. Any of the three ways can be used to establish a key-protected channel. Again, a key-protected communication channel does not exempt authentication, as it only ensures the data is not compromised but cannot guarantee the data is indeed sent from the drone in front of a user.

Handling Multiple Drones and Multiple Persons. If multiple drones hover in front of the user U , it is difficult for U to decide which drone is for her. A color can be randomly picked by the user's phone and is then displayed by both the phone and the drone's LED

lights. When multiple drones display the same matched color and hover in front of U , it is difficult for U to decide which is the correct one even after the authentication succeeds. Note that even with distance bounding [8], the same issue can arise. Nevertheless, trivial measures can be used once authentication succeeds. For example, a drone, which keeps track of the face of the right recipient after the authentication success, reminds the user to face the drone's camera for a few seconds. If it finds the user indeed faces it, the drone then flashes its LED lights around its camera. This way, the user can identify the correct drone from multiple drones.

There may be multiple people from the view of D . After U confirms that she is near D and ready for a selfie in Step 3, D only considers the face of the person standing nearest to the drone from its view. Regarding an attacker trying to rob, it is not a computable problem and can occur regardless of the authentication approach.

Based on the procedure, we can derive assumptions about D and P , which should be equipped with a camera and a navigator (such as GPS) and have certain communication/computation capabilities. Such devices are widely available.

3.3 Threat Model

An adaptive attacker who knows how SMILE2AUTH works may launch various attacks, such as using 3D-printed masks, adversarial examples, and even an identical twin to fool the drone.

Printed photos or adversarial examples. An attacker A may hold a photo of the victim user U or use a physical-world adversarial example, such as glasses [70], to fool the drone D .

Naive mimicry attacks. We assume A has vision of U and thus mimics U 's emotion to launch mimicry attacks.

Perfect 3D-printed mask attacks (aka, twin-based mimicry attacks). Below is how we construct such attacks, where a user attacks herself. During a successful authentication, D and P (belonging to U) have recorded videos V_D and V_P , respectively. Next, U watches the video V_D (or V_P) to launch a mimicry attack by mimicking *herself* in the video, and D records another video V'_D . The starting timestamps in V_P and V'_D are both forced as 0; and then the pair of videos, V_P and V'_D , are considered as the videos taken by P and D due to a *perfect 3D-printed mask attack*. We consider it "perfect" as (1) the attacker effectively wears a "mask" looking exactly the same as U , and (2) unlike a static mask, the "mask" can mimic the emotion. Another way to understand the attack is that an identical twin, acting as the attacker, performs a mimicry attack against the other twin, thus also called a *twin-based mimicry attack*.

To our knowledge, none of the countermeasures for face recognition are resilient to such attacks. Since the perfect 3D-printed mask attacks (aka, twin-based mimicry attack) is much stronger than other attacks, our evaluation is focused on such attacks.

Streaming video attacks. In Figure 2, the attacker A can hold a tablet; D' then records U and relays the live video to the tablet in order to fool D . Such attacks are a variant of attacks using a screen that displays a photo to fool the face recognition system. Admittedly, this is a relay attack designed against our authentication approach; however, effective countermeasures have been proposed. For example, multiple software-based methods [46, 82, 91] can accurately detect whether it is a screen that displays the face. Since




Figure 4: Images (a) and (b) are taken by a drone and a phone at the same place, respectively. Image (c) is the result of applying homography to the two images. So are Images (d), (e) and (f). Images (c) and (f) are not legible, as homography cannot align them well.

this is a separate well-studied problem, our work assumes one of the methods is deployed to defeat such attacks.

Robot-based mimicry attacks. The attacker may use a camera to record U 's emotion and perform computer vision analysis; the live analysis results are then fed into a robot to mimic U , which we call *robot-based mimicry attacks*. There is a latency which involves reaction time due to video analysis, data transmission, planning, and controlling actuators. According to our survey of state-of-the-art robotic techniques, robotic imitation of human is actively studied but still very limited. For example, *NAO*, one of the leading humanoid robots, is frequently used by researchers for imitation; despite its high price (\$9,000 [62]), it has a delay of 200ms to execute a prescribed motion [22]. Another study shows the end-to-end delay from human-to-robot imitation is 1.72 seconds [10], much larger than human-to-human imitation. The large reaction time probably cannot be resolved in the near future. We thus do not consider robot-based attacks in this work.

3.4 Design Choices

Since our approach involves the comparison of two views from a drone and a phone, one may propose to use homography [17] instead, which is a representative technique that aligns images. If two images align well, it indicates that the two images (by drone and phone) are probably taken at the same location, implying an authentication success. It maps the background landmarks of one image to another to align the images. Homography works well in two cases [17]: two images are taken from the same plane with differing angles or the camera rotates around its x -axis. Our scenario does *not* fall in either. As a result, as illustrated in Figure 4, although images are taken at the same place, the homography results are not




Figure 5: Neighbor distances. When the user makes a smile (blue line), compared to the case of no smile (green), the neighbor distance values tend to show a large deviation.

legible, leading to false rejections. Our work thus does not adopt homography for video comparison.

We actually considered comparing houses, landscapes, and even gaits in videos. But we notice that (1) a face contains rich information and is “carried” by a person everywhere, (2) a smile contains dynamic information difficult to manipulate/mimic (even using 3D printing) but easy to make, and (3) thanks to the recent advances in face recognition, the rich information of a face, at each point in time, can be accurately encoded into an embedding that is easy to compare. We thus use a smile for authentication.

4 STUDYING FACE ENCODING DATA

We first study the characteristics of the face encoding data in order to investigate the feasibility of the proposed approach. The study aims to answer the following questions. (1) The term “*face encoding*” may cause a *misconception* that, as long as the images contain the same face, they will have the *same* encoding regardless of the emotion changes. If this is true, a static 3D-printed mask can fool SMILE2AUTH, since our approach is established on the hypothesis that, given the same person, the encoding varies as the emotion changes. (2) How to decide a user has made facial expressions, such as a smile, grimace, or laugh? (3) The drone and the user’s smartphone record videos from different angles. Are the pairwise distance (defined in Section 3.2) values really small despite the different angles? Do the values fluctuate due to attacks?

4.1 Neighbor Distances vs. Smile

To study the first question, that is, given a person, whether the face embedding varies as she smiles, we first analyse the videos taken by a user’s smartphone (note the conclusion also applies to videos taken by the drone). Given N images in a video, their embeddings are represented as E_1, E_2, \dots, E_N .⁴ We then calculate the **neighbor distance** as $nd_i = \mathcal{D}_e(E_i, E_{i+1})$, where $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, N-1\}$ and \mathcal{D}_e is the Euclidean distance.

⁴OpenCV [7] is used as the face detector and FaceNet [66] as the encoder (Section 5.3).




Figure 6: Pairwise distances. When there are no attacks (green line), the pairwise distances stay low with a small deviation.

Figure 5 shows two sequences of neighbor distance values given the same user, who smiles (solid blue line) vs. does not smile (dotted green line). We can observe that when the user smiles, large neighbor distance values and fluctuations are incurred; otherwise, small. Such observations are true in other data instances. This confirms our hypothesis: given the same person, the encoding varies as her emotion varies. This observation is also leveraged to build the emotion-detection component (described in Section 5.1) in order to answer the second question aforementioned.

4.2 Pairwise Distances vs. Attacks

The third question can be converted to the two sub-questions: (a) when a drone and a phone record the same smile, whether the resulting pairwise distance values are really low and have a small deviation; and (b) when there are attacks, whether the resulting pairwise distance values tend to be large and have a large deviation. To study this question, we plot the pairwise distances $\{pd_1, pd_2, \dots, pd_N\}$ under different scenarios: no attacks and perfect 3D-printed mask attack (aka, twin-based mimicry attack). Our studies give very promising results. Figure 6 illustrates that in the case of no attacks, the pairwise distance values keep low and have a small deviation, while in the case of attacks, they show large values and a larger deviation. SMILE2AUTH uses this observation to detect attacks (Section 5.2).

5 SYSTEM DETAILS

The authentication procedure leads to a pair of videos recorded by the drone and the phone. SMILE2AUTH first detects whether the video recorded by the phone contains varied facial expressions. If no, SMILE2AUTH alerts the user to make facial expressions, such as smiling, when she retries. Otherwise, SMILE2AUTH continues to detect whether there is an attack. The authentication is a success only if it passes both the emotion detection (Section 5.1) and the attack detection (Section 5.2).

5.1 Emotion Detection

If a user keeps a neutral face during the video recording but our system does not check it, it would make the attack easier since a static

3D-printed mask may be able to fool such a system. SMILE2AUTH thus first checks whether the video recorded by the phone contains changes in facial expressions. While there is much work on detecting a smile from static images [4, 69, 83], we leverage the observation from Section 4.1 to detect whether a video contains varied facial expressions, so they are not limited to a smile but other facial expressions also work.

We prepare a dataset of 392 data points; half of them contain a “natural smile” (labelled as *positive*) and the other half keep a “neutral face” (labelled as *negative*). Given a data point, we first convert the video into a sequence of neighbor distance values, from which the following statistical features are derived: *minimum*, *maximum*, *difference between minimum and maximum*, *standard deviation*, *average*, *median absolute deviation*, and *median*. These features are proposed based on the discussion in Section 4, as they help distinguish the two types of curves in Figure 5.

70% of the dataset is used for training and the rest for testing. A random forest model is then trained and the test accuracy is 100%. More importantly, we use this smile-detection model to check the large authentication dataset involving 30 participants (see Section 6), and all the data points pass the emotion detection with a success rate of 100%. According to our evaluation, even when the user makes a grimace or laughs, it can pass our emotion detection (trained using smiles). This is aligned with our purpose: SMILE2AUTH should abort the authentication and warn the user only when she has kept a static face during the authentication.

We clarify that the result only means the good usability of SMILE2AUTH, in the sense that all the participants pass the emotion detection at a high rate. To demonstrate the resilience to attacks, we should check the results of attack detection.

5.2 Attack Detection

Given the N pairwise distances $\{pd_1, pd_2, \dots, pd_N\}$ derived from the N pairs of images contained in the videos recorded by the drone and the phone, we use a classifier (SVM, k -NN, or random forest) to give the authentication result. (Note N is determined by the fps and the video-recording duration, which are carefully studied as parameters in Section 7.) Thus, the discussion in Section 4 has inspired us to use the following features: *minimum*, *maximum*, *difference between minimum and maximum*, *standard deviation*, *average*, *median absolute deviation*, and *median*. The same statistical features have been used for emotion detection, which is not surprising, as we use them to distinguish the two types of curves shown in Figure 6. The attack detection results are presented in Section 7.

5.3 Implementation

To build the prototype of SMILE2AUTH, different combinations of the face detector and the face encoding neural networks are tested. We used the toolbox *Deepface* [67] to facilitate the implementation. Deepface is a lightweight framework containing state-of-the-art components for face recognition developed by Google, Facebook, and many others. For the face detector, we have considered OpenCV [7], SSD [45], Dlib [40], and MTCNN [90]; for face encoding we have considered FaceNet[66], Dlib[40], ArcFace[15], VGG-Face [56], DeepFace[74], and DeepID[73]. Each is developed utilizing different features and algorithms and as such generates

Table 2: Authentication accuracy when different face-encoding systems are used. All the testing uses the recommended setting according to our parameter study (Section 7), such as fps=4, video-recording duration=8 seconds, and face-drone distance=4m.

Encoding System	Accuracy
FaceNet	100%
Dlib	99.2%
ArcFace	99.4%
VGG-Face	98.5%
DeepFace	97.1%
DeepID	96.3%



Figure 7: Six devices used in the experiment: a DJI Mavic Zoom drone labeled 1, a DJI Mavic Mini drone labeled 2, a Parrot Anafi Thermal drone labeled 3, and 3 smartphones: an Honor View 10 labeled 4, an iPhone 6s Plus labeled 5, and an HTC One Plus 7 Pro labeled 6

different accuracy results. As we use them as black boxes and our authentication idea does not depend on the internals of these components, we omit the discussion of their details.

In our final design, *OpenCV* [7] is used as the face detector and *FaceNet* [66] as the face encoding system. We choose this combination because of its high accuracy. For example, Table 2 shows the different accuracy values when different encoding systems are used. Note the large-scale evaluation details are presented in Section 7.

Table 2 also shows that the authentication keeps a high accuracy even when some other encoding systems, such as Dlib and ArcFace, are used. It is worth highlighting we did *not* do any fine-tuning or retraining of the face-detection and face-encoding networks but used them **off the shelf** and attained the high accuracy, which reflects how robust our authentication approach is.

6 DATA COLLECTION

This research was conducted under an IRB approval. Figure 7 shows the devices used in our experiment. Two datasets were built: (*Dataset I*) is used to evaluate the accuracy of our system when




Figure 8: Dataset I collection settings. H_f is approximately the user's height, H_d is the hovering height of the drone, D_h is the horizontal distance between the drone and the user, and D is the face-drone distance. For example, when $H_f = 1.7m$, $H_d = 4m$ and D_h is $1.92m$, we have $D = 3m$.




Figure 9: Dataset II(a) collection settings.

there are no attacks (e.g., the drone records a wrong person). (2) *Dataset II* is used to determine the resilience of our system to attacks. We recruited 30 participants: 15 males and 15 females with ages ranging from 18 – 76. We include undergraduates, graduates, faculty members, engineers, and retired people in our experiments.⁵

6.1 Dataset I for Evaluating Accuracy

Figure 8 shows how the data is collected. If a drone and a phone *simultaneously* record the same user's smile, the two videos constitute a *positive* data point (meaning an authentication success). If a drone records the user i while a phone records another user j , the two videos constitute a *negative* data point (meaning an authentication failure). For each face-drone distance (e.g., 4m), 1,260 data points are collected (630 positives 630 negatives).

6.2 Dataset II for Evaluating Resilience to Attacks

6.2.1 Dataset II(a). This dataset is built to test SMILE2AUTH's resilience to naive mimicry attacks. The videos of a randomly selected participant (as a victim) are presented to *another* participant (as an attacker). We allow the participant to repetitively watch the videos of the victim. When the attacker is confident enough, as shown in Figure 9, the victim initiates authentication and the attacker launches the mimicry attack simultaneously. In total, 630

⁵The results presented in Section 7.3 show that when the data of ≥ 17 participants is used for training, the test accuracy reaches 100%. Also note SMILE2AUTH addresses a 1-to-1 verification problem, not a 1-to-n identification problem. Its accuracy does not inherently degrade as the user base grows. The size of 30 participants is comparable with other verification works; for example, ZEBRA [47] (Oakland'14) recruited 20 participants, T2Pair [44] (CCS'20) 20, and Touch-and-guard [81] (UbiComp'16) 12.




Figure 10: ROC curve, EER, AUC.

positive pairs (when a drone and a phone simultaneously record the same user) and 630 negative pairs due to the attacks are collected. (Note based on the accuracy study, we have a set of recommended setting, e.g., regarding the face-drone distance. So the attacks are all launched with the recommended setting.)

This dataset is used for testing SMILE2AUTH's resilience to **perfect 3D-printed mask attacks** (aka, **twin-based mimicry attacks**). A participant watches her own videos, replayed on a tablet placed in front of it, previously recorded by her phone to mimic *herself* to launch the attack. Positive pairs are generated when a drone and a phone simultaneously record a user's face, while negative pairs are generated consisting of a drone's video recording the attack-time face and the phone-recorded video being mimicked. In total, 630 positive pairs and 630 negative pairs are collected.

7 EVALUATION

To evaluate SMILE2AUTH's accuracy, security, reliability, and usability, we designed three different real-world experiments: The first experiment studies the overall accuracy of SMILE2AUTH Section 7.1. The second tests the security of SMILE2AUTH under mimicry attacks Section 7.2. The third Section 7.3 examines the reliability and usability of SMILE2AUTH under different parameters.

7.1 Accuracy

We use False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False Rejection Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER), and Area Under the Curve (AUC) of Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) to measure the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH. FAR is the rate at which our system identifies the attacker as the legitimate user and accepts pairing. For increased security having a lower FAR is crucial. FRR is the rate at which our system identifies the legitimate user as the attack and denies pairing. A lower FRR means higher usability for the end-user. EER is reported when $FAR = FRR$. AUC reflects the effectiveness of the system. We define accuracy as the proportion of correctly classified observations, i. e., $Accuracy = (TP + TN) / (TP + TN + FP + FN)$, where TP is the number of true positives, TN is the number of true negatives, FP is the number of false positives, and FN is the number of false negatives.

We first use *Dataset I* collected under the *recommended setting* to evaluate the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH. The recommended setting




Figure 11: SMILE2AUTH's resilience against Naive and twin-based mimicry attacks

includes the face-drone distance=4m, fps down sampled at 4, video-recording duration=8, the inexpensive drone DJI Mavic 2 Zoom (price \$2,150 on Amazon) is used (each of the parameters is studied in Section 7.3). We employ the very strict Leave-One-Subject-Out (LOSO) method, similar to previous works [21, 43]. To achieve LOSO for our dataset we train the system on all but one participant's data and use that participant's data to test the system. We then compute the average performance by iterating over all participants. This enables us to make sure the system is usable on participants it has not seen during training. As shown in Figure 10 the average EER is 0.0 and AUC is 1.0.

7.2 Mimicry Attacks

7.2.1 Resilience to Naive Mimicry Attacks. This section evaluates SMILE2AUTH's resistance to naive mimicry attacks. *Dataset II(a)* was used to determine the capability of SMILE2AUTH to resist naive mimicry attacks. A naive mimicry attack occurs when one participant tries to mimic a previous participant's dataset without the use of a twin.

We asked participants to mimic another participant's previously recorded datasets. Each participant was shown a portion of another participant's previous dataset at random. The participants performed two rounds of mimicry attacks. In the first round of mimicry attacks, the participants were not allowed to review the previous dataset and had to mimic the live video. In the second round of mimicry attacks, the participants were allowed to memorize the previous dataset and then attempt to mimic the live video.

Naive Mimicry Attacks - Untrained. As shown in Figure 11a SMILE2AUTH can successfully defend against untrained adversarial users using Naive mimicry attacks with 100% detection rate.

Naive Mimicry Attacks - Trained. As shown in Figure 11a SMILE2AUTH can successfully defend against trained adversarial users using Naive mimicry attacks with 100% detection rate.

7.2.2 Resilience to Perfect 3D-printed Mask Attacks. This section evaluates SMILE2AUTH's resistance against 3D printed twin-based mimicry attacks. We use *Dataset II(b)* to determine the resilience of SMILE2AUTH against mimicry attacks.

We asked participants to try and mimic their previously recorded datasets. The strictest form of mimicry attack is where one mimics herself. Each participant was shown a portion of their previous dataset at random. The participants performed two rounds of mimicry attacks. The first round of mimicry attacks the participants

were not allowed to review their previous dataset and had to mimic the live video. The second round of mimicry attacks the participants were allowed to memorize the previous dataset and then attempt to mimic the live video.

Twin-based Mimicry Attacks - Untrained. As shown in Figure 11b, SMILE2AUTH successfully defends against untrained adversaries using twin-based mimicry attacks with 100% detection rate.

Twin-based Mimicry Attacks - Trained. Steps to train the adversarial user can be found in Dataset II. As shown in Figure 11b SMILE2AUTH successfully defends against trained adversaries using twin-based mimicry attacks with 100% detection rate.

7.3 Parameter Study

To study the effects that certain parameters have on our model we design the experiments as such and change the parameter that is to be studied: The participant is 4 meters away from the drone, the drone is a DJI Mavic 2 Zoom with optical zoom of 2x magnification enabled, the participant records using the One Plus 7 Pro front-facing selfie camera.

Classifiers. We train the model with different classifiers SVM, kNN, and RF to determine their effect on system accuracy. To determine the optimal parameters for SVM we tested linear, polynomial, and radial basis function (RBF) kernels. The optimal parameters were set at $c = 20$, $\gamma = 0.1$ and the kernel set to RBF. For kNN, we test the value of k and we select 19 as the optimal parameter. To determine the optimal parameters for RF we test the number of trees, ranging from 50 to 200, and select 60 as the optimal value. Figure 12a shows that all classifiers perform the same at 4m using 8s of videos.

To make SMILE2AUTH more usable for the end-user, we wanted to test different video lengths for emotion change. Figure 12b shows the comparison between 4s, 5s, 6s, 7s, 8s, and 9s of video utilizing Leave-One-Subject-Out training fed to the SVM, kNN and RF models. In almost every test SVM was the least accurate algorithm, RF was the most accurate algorithm, and kNN was in between.

Smartphone Camera Quality. Not everyone is going to have the latest and greatest smartphone so we need to determine how smartphone camera quality is going to affect SMILE2AUTH. To determine the effect of camera quality, we employ the use of 3 different phones. Besides the One Plus 7 Pro with a 16 Megapixel (MP) front camera that was used to collect Dataset I and Dataset II, we use an iPhone 6s Plus with a 5 Megapixel front camera and an Honor View 10 with a 13 MegaPixel front camera. As shown in Figure 12c lowering the quality of the photos reduces the accuracy of our model slightly.

The parameter study illustrates just how robust and secure SMILE2AUTH is. Most parameters do not affect the accuracy of our model. As with most facial recognition models, camera quality has a large part to play in how accurate a model is. Figure 12c demonstrates how selfie camera quality affects accuracy. When the smartphone camera is 5 MegaPixels the accuracy drops to 97.4%. When the smartphone camera quality increases to 13MP the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH increases to 100%.

Drones. The DJI Mavic 2 Zoom was used to collect Dataset I and Dataset II. We collected data with two other drones: a DJI Mavic Mini and a Parrot Anafi Thermal. The DJI Mavic 2 Zoom shot video




Figure 12: Parameter study.

in 4k resolution. The DJI Mavic Mini shot a video in 2.7k resolution. The Parrot Anafi Thermal shot a video in 720p resolution.

Figure 12d shows how switching drones affects the accuracy while keeping the same distance between the user and drone. The DJI Mavic Mini has an accuracy of 86.5%, the Parrot Anafi Thermal drone has an accuracy of 82.1% and the DJI Mavic 2 Zoom has an accuracy of 100%. The drop in accuracy can be explained by two different factors: no optical zoom and camera quality. The Parrot Anafi Thermal and DJI Mavic Mini do not have optical zoom, and the camera quality of these two drones is far below the DJI Mavic 2 Zoom. The DJI Mavic Mini records at 2.7k resolution while the DJI Mavic 2 Zoom records at 4k resolution. We thus recommend a setting similar to the inexpensive drone DJI Mavic 2 Zoom (\$2,150 on Amazon): 2X optical zoom and 4K resolution.

Weather. Weather is constantly changing and to make sure that SMILE2AUTH can perform accurately during different weather conditions we need to collect data when those conditions are present. Data collection occurred over the course of several months during which various weather conditions such as sunny, cloudy, and light rain were present. Figure 12e shows the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH during different weather conditions did not change.

Facial Disturbance. During use users may have an itch on their face or need to readjust their glasses. To determine how a user interacting with their face during recording would affect the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH the participants were encouraged to scratch their face, rub their nose or fix their glasses at random. The results shown in Figure 12f, determine that these facial disturbances did not affect SMILE2AUTH.

Gender. In order to make sure SMILE2AUTH has a robust model we need to determine the effect gender has on our model. After grouping the participants by gender, Figure 12g demonstrates that SMILE2AUTH has a robust model and gender does not affect the accuracy.

Wearing Glasses. Delivery drones need to deliver to everyone regardless of if they have glasses or not. To determine how glasses affect the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH we set that as a parameter. Half of the participants had glasses and half did not. The results shown in Figure 12h, determine that SMILE2AUTH will keep the same accuracy if the user has glasses or not.

Distance between drone and face. We test SMILE2AUTH over different distances. The distance to the participant was changed from 3m-6m at 0.5m intervals. As shown in Figure 12i, the accuracy keeps 100% when the distance is up to 4 m and degrades slowly when it further grows. We chose the distance of 4m as it was the furthest distance that maintained 100% accuracy.

Video length. To study the impact that changing the total length of time for each sample had on our system. We changed the length from 4 seconds to 9 seconds increasing by 1 second per trial. We trained our model on each new time frame and the results are outlined in Figure 12j. As shown in the figure as the length of time increases the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH increases.

Size of training dataset. We vary the size of the training dataset to study its impacts on system performance. The size of the training dataset is defined as the number of participants for training our model. We denote the participants as t , and train SMILE2AUTH with t ($1 \leq t \leq 19$ with a step of 2) and test it against the rest of the participants ($30 - t$). As shown in Figure 12k, the accuracy steadily grows as the number of participants grows; as the number of participants reaches 17, the accuracy already reaches 100%. This shows another advantage of the approach: compared to traditional biometrics-based approaches needing a huge training dataset, a small dataset in our system suffices.

Frames per second (fps). We evaluate the impact of varying the frames captured per second. We vary the generation of frames from 2 fps to 6 fps. As shown in Figure 12l, fps above 4 stays at 100% accuracy. To reduce the storage and memory required we choose to keep the fps at 4 as it is the lowest value maintaining 100% accuracy.

Delivery at night. We evaluate the the impact of light level present during delivery. We vary the illuminance level (using units of lux) from 130 lux to 230 lux. As shown in Figure 12m, a light level above 180 lux maintains 100% accuracy. We achieve 180 lux during night time by equipping the drone with cheap LED lights [3].

View Angle. We then evaluate the impact of the view angle on accuracy. We define a view angle between the face and the drone as 0 degree when the user faces the drone right in front of its camera. During our data collection, the drone hovering around 4m high and the face-drone distance is kept at 4m (keep in mind that the face also has a height). We use FSA-Net [88] to measure the view angle and Figure 12n shows a histogram of the view angles in our dataset (Section 6). The maximum angle in our dataset is 23 degrees, and for all the different view angles the accuracy is 100%. We then have the participants face the drone camera at larger view angles from 24 to 30 degrees, and Figure 12o shows the accuracy degrades




Figure 13: Questionnaire results for usability study.

slightly as the degree increases. Note as a drone can fly freely, it can adjust its angle facing the user to keep the view angle small.

7.4 Authentication Time

The time taken for the authentication process, since the user stands in front of the drone, includes time spent recording videos, time spent on initiating the authentication, time taken for computing and exchanging embeddings, and making the authentication decision. The recommended time spent recording videos is 8s. It takes less than 2s for initiating the authentication, computing and exchanging embeddings, and making the authentication decision. The average total time taken for authentication is 10s.

7.5 Summary

The evaluation shows that SMILE2AUTH is resilient to strong attacks, including the twin-based mimicry attacks (*aka*, perfect 3D-printed mask attacks). The resilience can be attributed to human reaction time, as the average human reaction time is larger than 200ms [31, 36, 52] and such a time difference is detected as attacks by our model.

The parameter study illustrates how robust SMILE2AUTH is when the different parameters are examined, including classifier, camera quality, drone, weather, facial disturbance (e.g., scratching face), gender, glasses, length of time, and the training data size (i.e., the number of participants). As shown by the parameter study results, they barely affect the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH. The reason these parameters do not affect the model is that they affect both videos in the same/similar way. Changes that occur in one video usually occur in the other (except the view angle); thus, the distance values between embeddings keep low.

The parameter study also helps give guidelines for the drone-delivery companies: delivery drone companies should ensure their drones have cameras that are capable of taking videos at 4k resolution with 2X optical zoom. Such a specification can be found on cheap drones, including those beginner drones used in our evaluation. Also, optical zoom lenses can help the drone hover at a larger distance, and they are also widely available on inexpensive drones (\$2,150 on Amazon for a beginner drone DJI Mavic 2 Zoom).

8 USABILITY

In order to understand the usability of SMILE2AUTH, we asked the participants for feedback in the form of a questionnaire. The following questions were adapted from the system usability scale questions[9].

Questions: “On a scale of from 1 to 5, 1 being strongly disagree and 5 being strongly agree. Please rate the following six statements. (1) The authentication method was easy to learn. (2) The authentication method was easy to use. (3) The authentication method was convenient. (4) The authentication method did not make me feel uncomfortable. (5) I am satisfied with the amount of time it took to complete the authentication. (6) Using the system would require help from someone who is technical.”

Figure 13 describes the responses to the 6 statement questionnaire given to participants. We are looking for how easy each authentication was to the individual, how comfortable each individual was with how long it took to authenticate, how convenient each method was, how easy to learn each individual found the authentication methods, how comfortable each individual was using each method, and if the individual felt they would need help to understand how each method was used.

The scores outlined in Figure 13, show that participants find SMILE2AUTH easy to use. They are comfortable with the amount of time it takes to authenticate. Participants find SMILE2AUTH convenient to use and easy to learn. They are comfortable using SMILE2AUTH as an authentication method. Participants find that they do not need much help for using SMILE2AUTH or understanding how SMILE2AUTH works. For those participants that need help learning how to use SMILE2AUTH, we can provide a short tutorial video demonstrating how to use the system. This would clear up any confusion that users may have.

9 RELATED WORK

SMILE2AUTH can be categorized as *correlation-based authentication*. Many well-known systems are proposed in this direction [38, 43, 47, 48, 85]. For example, ZEBRA [47] authenticates a desktop user by comparing the activity sequence inferred from IMU data, collected by the user’s smartwatch, against actual operations on the mouse and keyboard. Along this direction, SMILE2AUTH is proposed for drone delivery, carrying many prominent advantages over existing authentication approaches for drone delivery (see Table 1). G2Auth [85] is a very recent work for drone-delivery authentication, which compares the IMU data on the user smartphone side and the video data on the drone side. Compared to G2Auth, the authentication “gesture” in Smile2Auth is merely a smile, and the accuracy of SMILE2AUTH is higher. Moreover, object tracking of a phone in G2Auth can be affected by the background, while face detection and representation used in Smile2Auth is very mature. Plus, the amount of transmitted data is smaller in SMILE2AUTH, as it only transmits four embedding values per second.

Patents and research works [20, 30, 54, 57, 65] have been devoted to solving the important authentication problem. But secure and usable authentication solutions resilient to relay attacks [25, 34, 55, 79] still lack. For example, a Walmart’s patent [54] proposes to deploy a user-side lockbox, which is installed with a beacon tag and a receiver, to conduct mutual authentication; plus, it is still vulnerable to relay attacks. Many studies are done about UAVs, such as fighting fake video timestamps [75] and audio side channels [6].

Unlike biometrics-based authentication [14, 26, 33, 35, 53, 59, 63, 64, 68, 76], SMILE2AUTH does not need to collect the user biometric

information and has no concern that a user’s face may change over time (e.g., wearing sunglasses or makeup).

10 LIMITATIONS AND DISCUSSION

Some users may have privacy concerns about the drone recording their faces. But note the approach of SMILE2AUTH does not need users to enroll their biometric information and the courier company does not need to store any of the videos for providing the service. On the other hand, if a courier company is evil, it can use its drones to record users regardless of our approach.

SMILE2AUTH works well under various weather conditions during our experiments (Section 7.3). We have not tested very foggy weather yet. However, DJI’s manual, e.g., requires “do not use the aircraft in severe weather conditions including wind speeds exceeding 8 m/s, snow, rain, and fog” [18]. Indeed, if the fog is so heavy, the safety of drones probably becomes an issue [51]; in that case, the delivery should not be conducted in the first place.

Compared to lockbox based authentication, SMILE2AUTH has a limitation that requires the user to be present for package delivery. We regard SMILE2AUTH to be complementary to such approaches for these reasons: (1) SMILE2AUTH does not rely on infrastructure like lockboxes, so SMILE2AUTH helps the deployment of drone delivery in rural areas; (2) depending on the distance of the lockbox, a user may prefer to send/receive a package on her lawn than drive/walk to the lockbox; and (3) unless distance bounding becomes mature and widely deployed, existing lockbox solutions (such as [54]) are still vulnerable to relay attacks.

11 CONCLUSION

Drone delivery is an emerging service with a quickly growing market and thus its authentication is an important research problem. Due to the uniqueness of drone delivery, authentication approaches that require human-drone physical contact or very close proximity are not applicable. We have presented a secure and usable authentication approach, SMILE2AUTH, for drone delivery. It leverages biometric information of faces; however, unlike traditional biometrics-based approaches, it does not need users to enroll their biometric information.

SMILE2AUTH attains an accuracy of 100% using *off-the-shelf* face recognition components (i.e., without any fine-tuning or retraining). The evaluation has considered strong attacks, including *perfect* 3D-printed masks, aka, twin-based mimicry attacks. It is the first face-biometrics-based approach that is resilient to such strong attacks. We studied a variety of parameters, such as *classifier*, *camera quality*, *drone*, *weather*, *video length*, and *number of participants*. The results show that SMILE2AUTH is highly accurate, secure, and robust. We envision that SMILE2AUTH can advance the deployment of drone delivery and thus reduce human contact during the pandemic regarding deliveries that otherwise require signatures. The novel way of using face biometrics may be applied to other scenarios, such as authentication for ride-sharing or mobile robots.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was supported by the US National Science Foundation under grants CNS-1856380, CNS-2016415, CNS-2107093, and CNS-2144669. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers.

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