Law 108-003 Economic Foundations of Legal Studies

 

Class Time:1:30 pm - 2:45 pm

TR Arlington 1 221

Professor Alex Tabarrok

Office: Carow Hall, Office Hours: MWF: 10-11:30, 2-4.� I also have an office in the Mercatus Center on the 4th floor of the law school building, office number 433F.� I will be there most day�s before class.

Tel. 703-993-2314

Email: Tabarrok@gmu.edu

Web Page: http://mason.gmu.edu/~atabarro/

 

 

Office Hours:� Feel free to drop by any time or call for an appointment.� Email is the best way to contact me.� All students should periodically check their GMU email account for important information.

 

����� This course will introduce you to the basic tools and techniques of Microeconomics with special attention to those aspects most useful for legal research.� There are two texts in the class.� Pindyck and Rubinfeld's Microeconomics, (most recent edition) and Entrepreneurial Economics: Bright Ideas from the Dismal Science (edited by myself).� There are also a handful of readings that are available online from www.jstor.org from a university computer or home computer using GMU as a proxy.

 

����������� Your grade will be computed from the following work:

 

Midterm: 50%

Final: 50%

 

The grading scale is as follows:

����������������������������������������������� �����������������������

A+: 90%+

A:�� 85-89%�

A-:� 80-84%

B:�� 70-79%

C:�� 60-69%

D:�� 50-59%

F:��� 50% -

 

����������� Plus-Minuses for B through D grades, where allowed by university policy, will occur at the upper and lower 2.5% level.� For example, 70-72.49 will be B-, 72.5-77.49 B, 77.5-79.9 B+ and so forth.

 

Warning:� Attendance in this class is vital.� The book is to be used as a guide to the lectures not vice-versa.�

 

The final exam will be as scheduled by the university, DEC 10 - 12:00 PM.��������

Brief Course Outline

 

Approximate Guide to the Course

Lecture

Topic

Reference Material

1

Review of mathematics, supply and demand, tax incidence

PR 2

2

Tax incidence, elasticities, back of the envelope calculations

PR 2

3

Foundations of Demand � indifference curves, budget constraints, marginal rate of substitution

PR 3

4

Marginal rate of substitution, applications � cash grant versus subsidy, housing vouchers.

PR 4

5

Income and substitution effect, gas tax with rebate, labor supply, guaranteed minimum income

PR 4, 511-514

6

Marginal cost, profit maximization and supply curves, competitive equilibrium and minimization of total cost

PR 8

7

Applications of the Competitive Model, rent controls, gasoline controls, sales tax

PR 9

8

Approximate time of exam 1.

 

9

Shortage of human organs

PR 9, EE 6, 7

10

Taxation and Product Characteristics, minimum wage

Barzel

11

Airline regulation and deregulation, price supports, acreage restrictions

PR 9

12

Import Quotas and Tariffs

PR 9, handout

13

How is Paris Fed?

 

14

Monopoly

PR 10

15

Patents and patent reform

EE 13

16

Price Discrimination

PR 11, Ayres & Siegelman

17

Price Discrimination

PR 11

18

Property Rights

Libecap, Anderson & Tollison

19

Property Rights

Anderson & Hill, Frey & Buhofer

20

Externalities, Coase Theorem

PR 18.1, 18.2

Coase

21

Coase Theorem and Marriage

Landsburg, Peters

22

Asymmetric Information

PR 17, Akerlof

23

Signaling. Principal-Agent Model

PR 17, Lindsay

24

Na�ve and sophisticated voting

Notes

25

Genetic Insurance,� Time-Consistent Insurance

EE 3,4

26

Property Rights applied to urban transit

EE 14

 


Papers to be read

 

Ayres, I., and P. Siegelman. 1995. Race and Gender Discrimination in Bargaining for a New Car. American Economic Review 85 (3):304-21.

 

Libecap, G. D. 1989. Contracting for the unitization of oil fields. In Contracting for Property Rights, 93-114. Cambridge, MA.: Cambridge University Press.

 

Anderson, G. M., and R. D. Tollison. 1985. Life in the Gulag: A Property Rights Perspective. Cato Journal 5 (1):295-304.

 

Anderson, T. L., and P. J. Hill. 1990. The Race for Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics 33 (1):177-97.

 

Frey, B. S., and H. Buhofer. 1988. Prisoners and Property Rights. Journal of Law and Economics XXXI:19-46.

 

Coase, R. 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3 (1): 1-44. (shorter online version here)

 

Landsburg, S. E. 1997. The marriage contract. Slate (www.slate.com). Sept. 11, 1997.

 

Peters, E.H. 1986. Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting. American Economic Review 76 (3): 437-454.

 

Akerlof, George A. 1970. The Market for �Lemons�: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 84 (3): 488-500.

 

Barzel, Yoram. 1976. An Alternative Approach to the Analysis of Taxation. Journal of Political Economy 84(6): 1177-1197.

 

Lindsay, Cotton M. 1976. A Theory of Government Enterprise. Journal of Political Economy 84(5):1061-1077.