As I aim to address one major aspect of the crisis in Darfur, Sudan, my research problem encompasses the intention to pursue genuine insight into one type of power struggle over the region and how this specific conflict has prolonged Darfur’s humanitarian situation.  I am studying international nongovernmental organizations in Darfur because I want to understand the extent to which their efficacy is affected by the Sudanese government, in order to help readers understand how international aid to a region can trigger the evaluation of the ideal of state sovereignty.

        The first reason to support the claim is that the Government of Sudan’s is directly involved in the conflict, due to its army and support of the Janjaweed militia.  A scholarly article by Fake and Funk portrays that in response to rebel attacks, the Sudanese government sponsored the formation of the Janjaweed, which eventually started implementing the same violent tactics on civilians as their opposition groups (49).  The accusations towards the Government of Sudan (GOS) include crimes against humanity as well as the contested issue of genocide in Darfur (49).  An article by Chalk and Kelton in The World and Darfur explains that the government is contradictory in the sense that although it publicizes the success of thousands of internally displaced persons (IDPs) returning back to their villages, the actual conflict between its Sudan Armed Forces and the rebel armies in South Darfur is the major reason for the initial existence of IDPs (122).

        A second reason to support the claim is that the government is uncooperative with INGOs and acts as an obstacle for aid.  Chalk and Kelton continue to highlight that one feature of the GOS is its restriction of transportation of aid workers in Darfur by limiting the use of radios and placing time constraints on permit grants (115).  In a peer-reviewed book, Prunier illustrates how the Janjaweed has resorted to murdering aid workers as they travel on the roads, as well as stealing their vehicles and fuel (160).

        In addition, the bureaucratic nature of the Sudanese government is slowing down humanitarian aid efforts in Darfur (160). In addition to the information I have already collected, I plan to research more sources in order to create an even more multifaceted compilation of information concerning the relationships between the Sudanese government and INGOs in Darfur.  First, I need to find more research pertaining to specific obstacles that the Sudanese government currently presents to INGOs.  These sources will come from statistics provided by the UN and INGOs, information published by the Sudanese government itself, and several scholarly books and journal articles.  This variety of information will supply multiple perspectives regarding my claim, including the contested concept of whether the Sudanese government’s involvement was accidental or intentional.

        Also, I need to find specific examples of how the GOS has affected the efficacy of NGOs in the past, in order to establish patterns or predict future governmental action.  This can be found by researching the past relationship between the Sudanese government and particular NGOs, such as Doctors without Borders and Mercy Corps.

        In addition, the history of the assistance provided by the INGOs in Darfur needs to be covered in the paper.  This will provide a foundation for the nature of the INGOs in the area.  In addition, the positive impact of the GOS on INGOs needs to be researched so that the entirety of the Sudanese government can be evaluated, not only its negative features.

        I also need to research the concept of state sovereignty, which has sparked much recent debate, due to inevitable globalization and international humanitarian assistance.  This is an important topic to explain in the research paper because it is one of the reasons for the Sudanese government to avoid external aid and manipulate the distribution of information about the Darfur crisis.

        The last reason supporting my claim needs to be that there are several other factors that influence the effectiveness of INGOs.  One of these factors is that underfunding within the humanitarian community is a contributing factor to how much aid can be delivered to Darfur.  Another feature in need of research is that there are many remote villages within Darfur that are difficult to reach by normal means of transportation.  Yet another factor concerning this reasons that also needs evidence is that time is a valuable factor that can postpone many relief efforts.  I have read that it takes an INGO an average of 27 weeks to have a staff ready to help in Darfur.  The source containing this information needs to be found and evaluated, so that it can properly support the claim.

        This well-rounded assessment will then help me and the readers judge the extent to which the GOS affects the INGOs, as well as how many of the INGOs’ obstacles (and reasons for disrupted efficacy) can be solely attributed to the government.