PRESCRIPTION MEDICATION POLICIES PROMPT
The Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibits discrimination “on the basis of disability.”
Moreover, federal regulations implementing the
On the other hand, as
illustrated by the DeBord and Davis cases described herein,
the application of a neutral rule or policy that applies equally to disabled
and non‑disabled individuals alike does not necessarily discriminate on
the basis of disability. In these
particular situations, the prescription medication policies at issue did not
violate the
MOTIVATION UNRELATED TO
DISABILITY?
In the case of DeBord v.
Board of Education of the Ferguson‑Florissant School District, No. 96‑4280EM
(U.S.C.A. 8th Circuit, 1997), the parents of an 8-year-old child with attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) alleged that the District’s written
policy regarding the administration of
prescription drugs violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The facts of the case were as follows:
Allen
and Debra DeBord’s eight‑year‑old daughter, Kelly, has attention
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). To treat her condition, Kelly's doctor
prescribed one hundred milligrams of sustained release Ritalin when Kelly
arises in the morning, and forty milligrams of the
drug at
Joyce
Dreimeier, the nurse at Kelly's elementary school, refused to give Kelly her
afternoon dose because Kelly's daily intake of Ritalin exceeds the sixty
milligram daily recommendation listed in the PDR.
The
DeBords appealed to the Board of Education, providing a letter from Kelly's
doctor confirming her prescription, some medical information about high dose
use of Ritalin, and an offer to sign a waiver of liability.
The school
board declined to direct administration of Kelly's prescription by the school,
even though Kelly's higher dosage is necessary to treat her effectively, Kelly
suffers no side effects, and no studies show whether higher dosages are
harmful. Instead, the school board offered several alternatives,
including alteration of Kelly's class schedule to permit early dismissal and
home administration of both of Kelly's doses, or administration of Kelly's
afternoon dose at school by one of her parents or someone designated by them.
Unhappy with the school
district's stance, the DeBords filed a claim in federal district court alleging
the school district's refusal violated Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. Section(s) 12131‑12165
(1994).
The federal district court
granted summary judgment to the school district. In so doing, the district
court concluded the school district's refusal was not based on Kelly's
disability, but on the district's policy stemming from concerns about potential
harm to students and liability. The district court also concluded the school
district had attempted to reasonably accommodate the DeBords. The DeBords appealed.
As cited by the federal
appeals court, Title II of the
Furthermore, the court noted
that Title II regulations require a public entity to "make reasonable
modifications in policies when the modifications are necessary to avoid
discrimination on the basis of disability, unless the public entity can
demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the service." 28 C.F.R. 35.130(b)(7)
(1996).
Accordingly, to prove their
There is
no evidence that the school district had disabilities in mind when
formulating or implementing its policy. The DeBords do not question the
truthfulness of the school district's expressed motivations of fear of student
harm and potential liability. Instead, the DeBords say the fears are
invalid.
Whether
or not ill‑founded, however, the school district's fears are unrelated
to disabilities or misperceptions about them. The policy is neutral; it applies
to all students regardless of disability. A student's excess
prescription, not the student's disability, prevents the student from receiving
medication from the school nurse.
Although
Kelly requires Ritalin to treat her disability, it is undisputed that the
reason for Kelly's high dosage is probably her metabolism, not the severity of
her disability. Kelly's own doctor and others stated the amount of Ritalin
needed to treat ADHD is unrelated to the severity of the disorder in any
particular patient.
The federal appeals court,
therefore, rejected the DeBords’ contention that “Kelly was treated
differently than other students@
because of her disability.” In so doing, the court noted that “students
who received their medication at school did not have prescriptions exceeding
the PDR's recommended daily dosage”:
It is
undisputed that the school district did not knowingly administer
prescription drugs to any student, disabled or not, in excess of the PDR's
recommendation. Disparate treatment is not the only way to prove unlawful
discrimination, but the record here offers no other basis to infer the school
board's actions were based on Kelly's disability.
The
DeBords have not tried to show the policy has the effect of discriminating
against the disabled or the severely disabled. On the record here, the school
board's facially neutral policy does not distinguish between those who will
receive their full prescription dose and those who will not on the basis of any
trait that the disabled or severely disabled are less or more likely to possess.
In other words, the DeBords have not shown disabled students are more likely
than nondisabled students to require prescription dosages exceeding the PDR's recommendation.
Citing the legislative intent
of the
There is
no precise reasonableness test, but an accommodation is unreasonable if it
either imposes undue financial or administrative burdens, or requires a
fundamental alteration in the nature of the program. Although the school district has not made
the assertion, adjudication of waiver requests would impose an undue
administrative burden on the school district to verify the safety of an excess
dosage in each individual case.
At this
time, no one knows what the long term effects of high doses of Ritalin might
be. A waiver of liability might not be effective, and statutory immunity might
not apply. These concerns may be speculative, but they are not unreasonable.
Further, in determining whether
the school district had provided a reasonable modification or accommodation,
the federal appeals court found it significant that “the school
district is not preventing Kelly from receiving the medicine she needs for
learning.@
On the contrary, the court found that “[t]he school district offered to
alter Kelly's class schedule to permit home administration of Kelly's medicine,
or to allow Kelly's parents or their designee to administer her medicine at
school. Kelly's parents are able to give Kelly her schooltime dose.” In so doing, the federal appeals court concluded
that “the school district reasonably accommodated Kelly's ADHD as a matter of
law.”
Having found that “the school
district did not discriminate against Kelly on the basis of her disability as a
matter of law,” the federal appeals court affirmed the summary judgment of the
district court rejecting the DeBords’
DISABILITY REASONABLY
ACCOMMODATED?
Similarly, in the case of
(U.S.C.A. 8th Cir. 1998),
Mary and Bobby Davis sued the Francis Howell School District, claiming that “the
district’s refusal to administer to their son Shane his prescribed dose of
Ritalin SR to treat an attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) violates
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. '' 12131 et seq.”
The facts of the case were as follows:
Shane's treating
physician has prescribed a daily dosage of 360 milligrams of Ritalin SR to
control his symptoms of ADHD, up to 120 milligrams of which must be
administered during the school day in one or two doses. The nurse at Shane's
elementary school, Joan Powlishta, had been administering his school time dose
for over a year when she expressed concern to Mrs. Davis that his prescription
might be dangerous or harmful because it far exceeded the recommended maximum
of 60 milligrams in the Physician's Desk Reference (PDR).
Powlishta's
predecessor administered Shane's Ritalin from January until August 1994, when
she was replaced by Powlishta. Powlishta's recollection was that she first
raised her concerns with Mrs. Davis sometime during the 1995‑96 school
year.
After
hearing a news story in March 1996 about a nurse in a nearby school district
who had refused to administer a high dosage of Ritalin prescribed by the same
doctor, Powlishta consulted the district's Nurse Coordinator and its regular
consulting pediatrician about the safety of Shane's prescription; both agreed
with Powlishta that the prescription was excessive.
Although
the Davises provided a second doctor's opinion that the prescribed amount of
Ritalin was not having any harmful effects on Shane, Powlishta notified them on
April 12, 1996 that she would no longer administer his school time dose because
his prescription exceeded the maximum recommended in the PDR, and the Assistant
Superintendent supported her position when the Davises appealed to him.
According
to the district's policy on medication procedures, the school nurse has the
right and obligation to question and verify potentially inappropriate
prescriptions and "to refuse to give any medication that he/she feels does
not meet the criteria established in Board Policy for giving medications."
The school district offered to allow one of the Davises or their
designee to come to the school to administer the medicine, and Mary Davis,
who is a trained nurse, rearranged her work schedule in order to do so or else
arranged for Shane's grandmother to give him his school time dose.
The federal district court
granted summary judgment to the school district on the basis that “the plaintiffs
had not produced evidence that Shane had been discriminated against because of
a disability and that the alternative arrangement was a reasonable
accommodation as a matter of law.”
On appeal, the school
district argued that summary judgment was proper because there was no evidence
that Shane was treated differently on the basis of his disability. In so doing, the district contended that it
“decided to stop administering
Shane's Ritalin because the size of his prescribed dosage conflicted with its
policy of administering medication in conformity with the PDR in order to
protect student health and minimize potential liability.@ Moreover, the district
claimed its policy was nondiscriminatory because it treated disabled and
nondisabled students alike:
Under
the policy many students with disabilities receive Ritalin from the school
nurse in doses below the PDR maximum, and requests by nondisabled students
for the administration of prescriptions in conflict with PDR recommendations
are denied.
In response,
As cited by the federal
appeals court, Title II of the
Citing extensively from the DeBord
opinion described above, the federal appeals court found that “[t]he Davises
have not offered evidence that the school district's action was taken because
of Shane's disability rather than because of its policy and underlying concerns
about student health and potential liability”:
Although
the
As a result, the federal
appeals court determined that summary judgment was properly granted on the
The
[I]ndividual
waiver of an essential eligibility requirement is not required due to
administrative and financial burdens involved... [W]aiver is unreasonable where
case‑by‑case determinations are near‑impossible and would
impose an immense financial and administrative burden.
By
offering an alternative arrangement the district did not prevent Shane from
receiving his medication and reasonably accommodated his disability as a matter
of law.
As noted by the court,
plaintiffs in this particular instance had attempted to “distinguish the DeBord
decision on the ground that the DeBords were seeking to have the school nurse
administer an excess dose for the first time while Shane had previously
received his prescribed dosage for over two years without incident or
complaint.” In
the opinion of the court, “[t]his factual difference is not sufficient to
distinguish this case from DeBord”:
Both
there and here the school districts set forth the same neutral concerns in
support of their refusal to administer medication in excess of the PDR maximum
and the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence that the refusal was actually
based on the students' ADHD.
As a result, the federal
appeals court affirmed the summary judgment of the lower court dismissing