INDIANA LITTLE LEAGUE LIABLE FOR MOLESTATION BY VOLUNTEERSOUTHPORT LITTLE LEAGUE v. VAUGHAN
No. 49A02-9912-CV-882 (Ind.App. 2000)
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
August 28, 2000[Note: Attached opinion of the court has been edited and citations omitted.]
The Southport Little League (the "Little League") appeals the jury verdict in favor of Steven Vaughan and Rebecca Vaughan individually, and as the parents and natural guardians of M.V. and J.V. (collectively referred to as "the Vaughans"), claiming that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment and judgment on the evidence. We affirm...
The facts most favorable to the verdict reveal that the Little League is an organization which provides youths with the opportunity to play supervised and organized baseball against other youths. The Little League was formed and operates under the by-laws and charters of the Little League International. In addition, the Little League is locally operated and managed by a board of directors. The Little League owns real estate which has been converted to baseball fields for Little League games and practice. Furthermore, the Little League is primarily staffed by volunteers from the local community. Adult volunteers typically become involved through community service and their children's involvement and participation in Little League baseball. In 1992, the Little League did not conduct criminal background checks of its adult volunteers.
Kent Simmerman had been a volunteer for the Little League since 1979. Simmerman originally became involved with the Little League during his children's participation. Simmerman continued to volunteer for the Little League after his children outgrew their eligibility to play. In the spring of 1992, Simmerman retained the positions of equipment manager, vice-president, board member, and member of the executive committee of the board of directors with the Little League. While acting as an official of the Little League, Simmerman was authorized to wear a cap that said "Southport Little League" and a shirt that said "Southport Little League Official."
As the equipment manager, Simmerman was also in charge of fitting youths with baseball uniforms. Simmerman personally fitted youths with baseball uniforms behind locked doors in an equipment shed owned by the Little League which was located near the baseball field. Typically, Simmerman was the only adult present during these fittings. Because Simmerman was on the executive committee of the board of directors, Simmerman had a key to the equipment shed which housed baseball equipment and uniforms.
J.V., age nine and M.V., age eleven, played Little League baseball. Both of the youths met Simmerman through their participation in Little League baseball, and knew that he was a Little League official. In the spring of 1991, M.V., along with four or five other youths, tried on baseball uniforms in the Little League's equipment shed. Simmerman, who was fitting the boys with uniforms, pulled down M.V.'s underwear and viewed M.V.'s genitalia as he was helping M.V. take off his pants. On a separate occasion when M.V. was being fitted with a baseball uniform, Simmerman pulled out the waistband M.V.'s baseball pants and his underwear and looked at his genitalia. Also, in the spring of 1992, Simmerman, dressed as a Little League official, approached M.V., who was at the Little League baseball field watching J.V.'s game, and asked M.V. to accompany him to the equipment shed for aid in retrieving some equipment. Simmerman later molested M.V. in the equipment shed.
In the spring of 1992, J.V., along with other youths, tried on baseball uniforms in the Little League's equipment shed. After J.V. put on a pair of baseball pants, Simmerman pulled out the waistband of the pants along with the waistband of J.V.'s underwear and looked at his genitalia. On a separate occasion in the spring of 1992, Simmerman, dressed as a Little League official, approached J.V. who was at the Little League baseball field watching M.V.'s game, and asked J.V. to accompany him to the equipment shed. Simmerman later molested J.V. in the equipment shed.
Consequently, the State charged Simmerman with two counts of child molesting, Class C felonies. Simmerman later entered a plea of guilty. On June 11, 1993, the Vaughans filed a complaint against the Little League for the wrongful acts on the basis of vicarious liability and negligence.
A jury trial was conducted on the Vaughans' complaint. At the close of the Vaughans' case-in-chief, the Little League moved for judgment on the evidence. The trial court later denied the Little League's motion for judgment on the evidence. The jury returned a verdict in favor of M.V. against the Little League, awarding him $225,000.00 in compensatory damages. The jury also awarded J.V. the sum of $225,000.00 against the Little League. In addition, the jury awarded Steven and Rebecca Vaughan $0.00. On June 17, 1999, the trial court entered the following entry with respect to the damage award:
Judgment is entered in favor of Plaintiffs, Steven and Rebecca Vaughan and against the Defendant, Southport Little League, in the sum of zero dollars ($0.00), and that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff, [M.V.] and against the Defendant, Southport Little League, in the sum of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($225,000); and that judgment be entered in favor of Plaintiff, [J.V.] and against the Defendant, Southport Little League, in the sum of Two Hundred Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($225,000).
Subsequently, the Little League filed a motion to correct errors, a motion which the trial court later denied. This appeal ensued.
Respondeat Superior
Respondeat superior is the applicable tort theory of vicarious liability. The doctrine of respondeat superior creates liability for a principal where it otherwise would not exist. The doctrine has its origin in public policy and justice. According to the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer, who is not liable because of his own acts, can be held liable "for the wrongful acts of his employee which are committed within the scope of employment."
An employee is acting within the scope of his employment when he is acting, at least in part, to further the interests of his employer. Liability will attach where an employee acts partially in self-interest but is still "partially serving his employer's interests." However, simply because an act could not have occurred without access to the employer's facilities does not bring it within the scope of employment.
An employer can be vicariously liable for the criminal acts of an employee. The proper test is whether the employee's actions were at least for a time authorized by his employer. However, if it is determined that none of the employee's acts were authorized, there is no respondeat superior liability. Furthermore, acts for which an employer is not responsible are those done on the employee's own initiative with no intention to perform it as part of or incident to the service for which he is employed. If some of the employee's actions were authorized, the question of whether the unauthorized acts were within the scope of employment is one for the jury. However, if none of the employee's acts were authorized, the matter is a question of law.
The Little League first contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. We disagree.
Genuine Issues of Material Fact Exist
After filing a motion for summary judgment on the claim of respondeat superior, the Little League designated materials to support its argument that the "undisputed facts establish that Simmerman was acting outside of the scope of his capacity at the time he allegedly committed the sexual batteries."
Without providing a synopsis of each item of designated material, we conclude that the evidentiary matter establishes that the Little League did not authorize Simmerman to view the genitalia of M.V. and J.V. for his sexual gratification or sexually molest the two youths.
Therefore, we believe that the Little League established at the summary judgment stage that no genuine issue of material fact existed with regard to the Little League's authorization of Simmerman to view the genitalia of M.V. or J.V. for his sexual gratification or to commit the sexual molestations.
In opposition to the Little League's motion for summary judgment, the Vaughans' designated materials to support their argument that "the nature of Simmerman's assaults were sufficiently associated with his authorized duties so as to preclude the entry of summary judgment in favor of [the Little League]."
Without summarizing each of the Vaughans' designated materials, we conclude that the materials raise the inference that some of Simmerman's acts were authorized by the Little League when he viewed J.V. and M.V.'s genitalia for his sexual gratification and when he sexually molested the two youths.
Because the Vaughans' designated materials raise the inference that some of Simmerman's acts were authorized (such as fitting the youths' uniforms) when he viewed J.V. and M.V.'s genitalia for his sexual gratification and when he sexually molested the youths, we hold that the trial court properly denied the Little League's motion for summary judgment.
The Little League also contends that the trial court erred in denying its motion for judgment on the evidence. We disagree.
Our initial inquiry is to determine whether the question of the scope of Simmerman's employment was one of fact for the jury or was a question of law for the trial court. Therefore, we must examine the factual circumstances of the present case to determine whether at least some of Simmerman's actions were authorized.
Although the parties primarily argued whether or not the Vaughans were entitled to compensation for the sexual molestations of the J.V. and M.V., the Vaughans also presented evidence that Simmerman committed the wrongful acts of viewing J.V. and M.V.'s genitalia for his sexual gratification. Therefore, the present case involves two separate and distinct wrongful acts on the part of Simmerman toward M.V. and J.V. These wrongful acts are: (1) the viewing of J.V. and M.V.'s genitalia for his sexual gratification; and (2) the sexual molestations of J.V. and M.V.
Clearly the Little League did not authorize Simmerman to view M.V. and J.V.'s genitalia for his sexual gratification nor did it authorize Simmerman to sexually molest the two youths. However, we believe that some of Simmerman's actions were authorized, at least for a time, by the Little League.
Viewing of Genitalia
As the equipment manager, Simmerman was the sole individual in charge of fitting youths with baseball uniforms. Simmerman was delegated the duty of distributing baseball uniforms because he approached the President of the Little League and specifically requested that duty. After Simmerman retained the position of equipment manager, he changed the procedure for distributing uniforms to participating youths. The previous equipment manager, Tom Pelham, did not fit the participating youths with uniforms in the equipment shed. Pelham distributed uniforms to the team managers who would then give the youths uniforms to try on at home. However, Simmerman personally fitted the youths with baseball uniforms in the equipment shed owned by the Little League.
Youths in groups of four or five would come into the equipment shed and try on different size uniforms in Simmerman's presence. On many occasions, Simmerman would lock the door of the equipment shed from the inside so that other adults could not gain access to the premises during the fitting of uniforms. Moreover, Simmerman typically was the only adult in the equipment shed when youths were being fitted for uniforms. The Little League was aware of the procedure Simmerman utilized in fitting youths with baseball uniforms. Thus, Simmerman was clearly authorized by the Little League to be the only adult fitting youths with uniforms behind the locked doors of the equipment shed.
During the fitting of uniforms, youths inadvertently would be in different stages of undress as they tried on different uniforms and Simmerman was clearly authorized to assist the youths in dressing and undressing. Furthermore, Simmerman was authorized to measure the youths to ensure that the right size was distributed to a youth. In addition, the Little League authorized Simmerman to obtain information from the youths so that each boy received the jersey for the team he was playing on. Because we have determined that some of Simmerman's acts were authorized by the Little League, we believe that it was within the province of the jury to determine whether the Little League was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for Simmerman's acts of viewing the genitalia of M.V. and J.V for his sexual gratification.
Sexual Molestations
The acts of molestation by Simmerman occurred in the equipment shed of the Little League during a Little League-sponsored baseball game. The equipment shed was not open to the general public and was typically locked when not in use. Only members of the executive committee of the board of directors of the Little League, of which Simmerman was a member, were given master keys to the property owned by the Little League, such as the equipment shed Thus, Simmerman was authorized by the Little League to use the equipment shed.
Furthermore, Simmerman was a long-time volunteer with the Little League. At the time that Simmerman committed the wrongful acts of viewing the youth's genitalia and sexually molesting them, Simmerman occupied high positions of authority in the Little League as vice-president, member of the board of directors, and member of the executive committee of the board of directors. During Little League baseball games and other events, Simmerman typically wore a baseball cap with the caption "Southport Little League" and a shirt with the caption "Southport Little League Official." Youths who participated in Little League baseball were taught to respect adult authority, and it was clear to participating youths that Simmerman held a position of authority with the Little League. When an individual is clothed with authority by an organization in which youths are participating, such as Little League baseball, youths will typically comply with requests or commands of the adult individual in authority. Thus, the Little League, by appointing Simmerman an official, essentially authorized Simmerman to exert his authority over youths who participated in Little League baseball.
It is clear that Simmerman's position with the Little League gave him the means to lure M.V. and J.V. into the equipment shed so that he could commit the sexual molestations. Because of his position as an official and equipment manager with the Little League, Simmerman was able to persuade the two youths to accompany him to the equipment shed for the pretextual reason of retrieving equipment. M.V. and J.V. accompanied Simmerman because it was logical for the youths to assume that Simmerman, as the equipment manager, would need to retrieve equipment because a baseball game was in progress. In fact, M.V. stated that he was able to get away from Simmerman while he was being molested because a coach knocked on the door of the equipment shed and asked for some baseballs. R. 980. Moreover, Simmerman, as a Little League official and equipment manager, was authorized by the Little League to be at the baseball field during games and practices. Because some of Simmerman's acts were authorized, we believe that the determination of whether the Little League was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the sexual molestations was a question of fact for the jury.
Substantial Evidence and Reasonable Inferences Supports the Jury's Verdicts
Because we have determined that the question of whether the Little League was liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the wrongful acts committed by Simmerman was a question of fact for the jury, we must now determine whether substantial evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's verdicts.
After reviewing the record, we believe that the jury's verdicts are supported by substantial evidence and reasonable inferences. M.V. testified by deposition that on one occasion when he was trying on uniforms in the equipment shed, Simmerman pulled down his underwear and viewed his genitalia as Simmerman was assisting him in taking off a pair of baseball pants. Simmerman admitted pulling down M.V.'s underwear when he was helping M.V. take off his pants. Furthermore, M.V. testified at trial that after Simmerman came into the equipment shed and told him and other youths to take their clothes off and put uniforms on, Simmerman pulled out the waistband of his baseball pants and his underwear and looked at his genitalia. J.V. testified in his deposition that on several occasions when Simmerman was fitting him with baseball pants, Simmerman looked at his genitalia.
Furthermore, M.V. testified by deposition and at trial that in the spring of 1992, he was watching J.V.'s baseball game when Simmerman approached him, dressed as a Little League official, and asked him to accompany Simmerman to the equipment shed to retrieve some equipment. M.V. further testified that Simmerman molested him in the equipment shed. In addition, J.V. testified by deposition and at trial that in the spring of 1992, he was watching M.V.'s baseball game when Simmerman approached him, dressed as a Little League official, and asked him to accompany Simmerman to the equipment shed. Simmerman admitted sexually molesting M.V. and J.V. in the equipment room.
The fact that this case involves the viewing of youth's genitalia for personal gratification and sexual molestations is not per se determinative of the scope of the employment question.
The Indiana Supreme Court has stated that "[a] blanket rule holding all sexual attacks outside the scope of employment as a matter of law because they satisfy the perpetrators' personal desires would draw an unprincipled distinction between such assaults and other types of crimes which employees may commit in response to other motivations, such as anger or financial pressure." The scope of employment question "does not turn on the type of act committed or on the perpetrator's emotional baggage accompanying the attack." Instead, the appropriate focus must be on how the employment relates to the context in which the wrongful act arose.
After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that Simmerman's acts of viewing J.V. and M.V.'s genitalia for his sexual gratification and the sexual molestations were so divorced in time, place, and purpose from his employment that the Little League was entitled to judgment on the evidence. Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence and reasonable inferences supports the jury's verdicts in favor of the Vaughans.
Jury Instruction
The Little League also contends that the trial court erred in tendering the imputed knowledge instruction to the jury. We disagree.
The Little League is entitled to have the jury correctly instructed on an essential rule of law. Jury instructions are within the discretion of the trial court and will only be reversed on a showing of abuse of that discretion. The purpose of an instruction is to inform the jury of the law applicable to the facts without misleading the jury and to enable it to comprehend the case clearly and arrive at a just, fair, and correct verdict. Where the verdict would not have differed had the jury been properly instructed, any error in the giving of instructions is harmless.
In the present case, the Vaughans submitted to the trial court Proposed Final Instruction number 6, which provides that:
Knowledge of any agent or employee of Southport Little League is knowledge of Southport Little League itself, regardless of whether the agent or employee shared his knowledge with anyone else. The Southport Little League is charged with the knowledge of that which its agents and employees by ordinary care could have known where the agent has received sufficient information to awaken inquiry.
The Little League submitted a written objection to the Vaughan's Proposed Final Instruction number 6 on the basis that the instruction was overly broad, arguing that the "instruction attempts to impute the knowledge of any employee to his principal." Subsequently, the trial court tendered Final Instruction number 32 to the jury, which provides that:
Knowledge of any agent or employee of Southport Little League during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority is knowledge of Southport Little League itself, regardless of whether the agent or employee shared his knowledge with anyone else. The Southport Little League is charged with the knowledge of that which its agents and employees by ordinary care should have known where the agent has received sufficient information to awaken inquiry.
Thereafter, the Little League orally objected to Final Instruction number 32 on the basis that "it would be confusing to the jury in that they could find that the knowledge of Simmerman could be imputed or constructed knowledge on behalf of [the Little League]" and that "an intentional or criminal act cannot be imputed through constructive knowledge or otherwise to the entity for which the agent might have been employed or volunteered."
The Little League also objected to Final Instruction number 32 on the basis that "there is no evidence that an agent or employee within the course of his employment or within the scope of his authority had knowledge regarding Simmerman's alleged acts or admitted acts of molestation and therefore the instruction was not supported by evidence in this case."
Imputed Knowledge Instruction
We note initially that imputed knowledge is a tenet of agency law, and is based upon an underlying legal fiction of agency-the identity of principal and agent when the agent is engaged in the principal's business. Under this rule, the law imputes the agent's knowledge to the principal, even if the principal does not actually know what the agent knows. The doctrine of imputed knowledge came about as a means of extending liability. The Restatement (Second) of Agency has addressed the doctrine of imputed knowledge, providing in pertinent part that:
a. A principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent in a transaction in which the agent secretly is acting adversely to the principal and entirely for his own or another's purposes, except as stated in Subsection 2.
b. The principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent who acts adversely to the principal:
(a) if the failure of the agent to act upon or to reveal the information results in a violation of a contractual or relational duty of the principal to a person harmed thereby; Restatement (Second) of Agency § 282 (1957).
Essentially, the doctrine of imputed knowledge is a rule of public policy based upon the precept that when a principal acts through an agent, a third party dealing with agent is entitled to rely upon the agent's knowledge, which binds the principal. The rule of imputed knowledge is typically applied so that the risks of an agent's infidelity or lack of diligence falls upon one who delegates authority to that agent, rather than upon innocent third parties.
This court has long recognized that a principal is charged with the knowledge of that which his agent by ordinary care could have known where the agent has received sufficient information to awaken inquiry...
In the present case, the Little League objected to the trial court tendering the imputed knowledge instruction to the jury without a limiting instruction accompanying it specifically advising the jury that the knowledge of Simmerman could not be imputed to the Little League.
This court has recently stated that when an agent commits an independent tort for his own benefit, but still in the scope of employment, some knowledge or reason to know of the agent's conduct is required before liability attaches to the principal. Mid-Continental Paper Converters, Inc. v. Brady, Ware, & Schoenfeld Inc.,, 715 N.E.2d 906, 910 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).
We believe that the trial court properly instructed the jury on imputed knowledge. The Vaughan's presented substantial evidence at trial that employees and agents of the Little League gained knowledge about Simmerman, a Little League official, which should have raised a "red flag" to the Little League that Simmerman was or was capable of committing the wrongful acts.
Specifically, the Little League's groundskeeper testified that he observed Simmerman inappropriately hugging a child to whom he was not related near the concession stand located on Little League property. In addition, a former president of the Little League, Richard Booher, testified at trial that he had received complaints from mothers of youths playing Little League baseball that they knew what size pants their boys wore and did not believe that Simmerman needed to personally fit their child with baseball pants.
Moreover, Ken Roosa, a member of the Little League organization, testified that he observed Simmerman on several occasions cruising and sitting in a parked car in Garfield Park, an area known for its homosexual activity and that he also observed Simmerman spending an unusual amount of time with a youth not related to him. In addition, Ed Bullock, a former president of the Little League, testified at trial that the Little League received information on programs from the district office of the Little League on how to protect youths from child molesters, but no action was taken by the Little League.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court properly denied the Little League's summary judgment motion and motion for judgment on the evidence. In addition, we hold that the trial court properly instructed the jury on imputed knowledge. Accordingly, the jury verdict is affirmed.