1 Dost-Injury Liability
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<sup>2</sup> LASSEIGNE v. AMERICAN LEGION NICHOLSON POST #38 Louisiana Appellate 1990

**Reasonable Volunteer Coaches** 

- <sup>3</sup> P hit by wet baseball practice supervised by coaches
- <sup>4</sup> D immediately examined P, no sign of injury, P alert,
   D ordered P to sit & rest.
- <sup>5</sup> P returned to practice acted normalD told P to inform parents.

Parents did not notice any injury or anything unusual

6 24 hrs. later P head surgery.

P: D did render reasonable aid,

negligent failure to notify parents.

<sup>7</sup> Trial S.J to Ds everything done was reasonable.

Reasonableness clear in light of social utility of conduct i.e. value of volunteer services in youth sports to community.

8 🔲 Wattenbarger

V.

Cincinnati Reds, Inc. Cal.App. 1994)

	Restrict Participation to Avoid Aggravation of Injury
9 🔲	6/90, P, 17, injured arm in "tryout" for D's pro team
10 🔲	Orientation, instructions, asked if any injuries
	pitchers asked when last threw no full participation for injured players
11 🔲	Last drill, simulated game, P pitched to several batters
12 🔲	before, P threw warmup pitches to get arm ready
	3d pitch
	P heard arm "pop," but experienced no pain
13 🔲	
_	but experienced no pain
14	but experienced no pain stepped off mound, informed D, received no response P threw another pitch, experienced severe pain

D: P's injury is type inherent in baseball ergo, no duty of care
ISSUE: Whether D owed legal duty of care to protect P against the type of injury which occurred
<sup>18</sup> No duty of care owed if risk is inherent to game
participants assume inherent risk when voluntarily participating in sport
Arm injury suffered by P risk inherent in sport of baseball
injury direct result of natural strain caused by pitching arm in motion
<sup>20</sup> D may be liable for instructing P, either expressly or as implied by their silence, to throw another pitch
after being informed by P of "pop" in arm
D has duty not to increase risks to participant over & above those inherent in sport
<sup>22</sup> Whether duty to restrict participation of injured player to avoid aggravation of injury
<sup>23</sup> Here, not unforeseeable participant will attempt to push body beyond its capabilities

24	D owed duty of care to protect participatns from aggravating injury during tryout
25 🔲	Halper v. Vayo Illinois Appellate 1991
	Beyond Routine First-Aid?
26 🔲	P knee injury school wrestling practice;
	D Coach manipulated knee,
	had P wrestle collegiate champion.
27 🔲	P: D violated
	written policies, making medical judgment
_	
28 🔲	Failing to contact parents
	Failing to contact rescue squad
	Failing to report injury to school nurse.
29 🔲	D: statute of limitations one yr for claim against public entity
30	Ct: statute applied: under 18yrs may bring suit within 2 yrs. of attaining 18

31 🔲	State law teachers in loco parentis status,
	Not liable for negligence only willful/wanton misconduct.
32	Every athletic and physical education department has supplies and equipment
	Necessary for administering first aid.
33 🔲	Every coach and physical education teacher is called upon to treat minor injuries and ailments.
34	Because of unavailability of doctors at scene of many school athletic injuries
35 🔲	school coaches and trainers expected to provide initial first aid
	for both minor and serious injuries.
36 🔲	This might include wrapping a sprained ankle in an ace bandage
	Or splinting and applying ice to a fracture.
37 🔲	Due to the frequency of athletic injuries
	providing initial treatment

	for such injuries
38 🔲	Is an inherent part of a school athletic or physical education program,
	And it is one that must often be performed by coaches.
39 🔲	Knee injuries are often among the most serious
	And debilitating injuries suffered in athletics.
40	It is readily apparent that great caution should be shown in treating such injuries.
41	Because of substantial risks involved it can be reckless for an individual with no medical training
42	To pull on the leg of a person with a knee injury and attempt to manipulate the knee
43	Assuming no exigency exists which necessitates such treatment.
	These actions go well beyond the provision of routine first aid within the realm of an experienced coach's expertise.
44	P alleges D directed P to wrestle against a far more skilled and experienced wrestler who was a collegiate champion

$_{45}$ Exposing him to a risk of further injury.
After, P did suffer additional injury D still failed to secure proper medical treatment for him
<sup>46</sup> reckless course of conduct If needlessly exposed Halper to the risk of further injury.
<ul> <li><sup>47</sup> Mogabgab</li> <li>v.</li> <li>Orleans Parish School Board</li> </ul>
Louisiana Appellate 1970
Access to Treatment Delayed
<ul> <li><sup>48</sup> P's son died football workout</li> <li>2nd day of practice; "wind sprints"</li> </ul>
49 🔲 displayed fatigue fell down, nauseous
vomited entering bus and enroute to School.
<sup>50</sup> Dlaced on cafeteria floor on blanket appearance pale, tired and exhausted.
<sup>51</sup> Robert placed in shower, 5:50 p.m., placed on blanket,

with blanket over him
given ammonia capsule

<sup>52</sup> Coach; very clammy, pale, breathing heavy, arms massaged

unsuccessful attempt made to give salt water.

<sup>53</sup> First aid book brought into cafeteria

both coaches discussed what was wrong and what should be done.

<sup>54</sup> 7:15 p.m. family physician: unconscious, cool, clammy, actively sweating no pulse,

pupils widely dilated, fixed, not responsive to light

<sup>55</sup> diagnosed condition profound heat exhaustion with shock advanced degree

not necessarily irreversible; hospital diagnosis heat stroke.

<sup>56</sup> P: death resulted from negligence defendants in failing to provide prompt treatment

<sup>57</sup> appeals court found:
 more likely than not,
 Robert would have survived

with reasonably prompt medical attention.

 <sup>58</sup> Heat exhaustion, heat stroke: when person unable to walk condition "pretty severe" medical advice should be sought,

<sup>59</sup> medical treatment instituted before patient's condition reaches irreversible state.

<sup>60</sup> Every effort immediately stop accumulation of heat

putting a blanket over a person with heat exhaustion or heat stroke wrong thing to do

<sup>61</sup> Extremely important patient brought to physician and hospital

quicker treatment to reverse heat stress time is of the essence.

<sup>62</sup> Prompt medical attention would have significantly increased likelihood of survival.

 <sup>63</sup> Appeals court held: negligence of Coaches actively denied Robert access to treatment for some two hours after symptoms appeared" constituted legal cause of Robert's death.

64 Gehling v.

	St. George's University School of Medicine (E.D. N.Y. 1989)
	What Medical Provisions During Road Race?
65 🔲	P's son died following 2.5 mile race in hot, humid weather
66 🔲	Son collapsed after race, moved to shade, ice & wet towels applied
67 🔲	by med students in attempt to cool him down hose & cups of water available at nearby snack bar
68 🔲	G moved to shade, moved to nearby air conditioned office
69 🔲	efforts to cool G continued blue ice packs placed under arms & in groin blood pressure taken, attempted to give oxygen
70 🔲	Someone called ambulance G's level of consciousness continued to wane & fade then became unconscious
71	After 15-20 min. G transferred by ambulance to hospital ride took 15 min., hospital continued ice packs to lower temp

<sup>72</sup> G comatose shortly after collapse 5:30 until death 12:45 a.m.

73 🔲 Some	type of assistance should be provided
for rur	nners at end of race
74 🔲 In sho	ort race in tropical conditions
Stude	nts provided assistance
ice, wa	ater, oxygen at finish line
75 🔲 med s	students with some emergency training
station	ned at finish line
76 🔲 Suffici	ient to satisfy duty of care
not ne	ecessary to have doctor & special emergency provisions
such a	as intravenous capability
in viev	w of short distance of race
	NER FAILS TO REPORT HEAD INJURY SYMPTOMS TO
PHYS	SICIAN
Pinsor	n v. State, (Tenn. App. 1995)
78 🔲 suffici	ent evidence Lyon breached his duty when, contrary to
instruc	ctions of Dr. Smith, Lyon failed to report Pinson's headaches to
physic	cian before allowing Pinson to return to practice.
79 🔲 extren	nely foreseeable that withholding requested information from a
team	physician could result in permanent injury to a football player,
who h	ad collapsed unconscious the previous week
80 🔲 Applel	baum

	V.
	Nemon
	Tex.App.1984
	Whether lifesaving aid & emergency instruction duty
81 🔲	No statute or regulation imposed duty
	such as first aid & emergency instruction
	on day care centers at time of incident
82 🔲	Common law: no duty to render aid
	to one whose initial injury D is not liable
	absent legal relationship
83 🔲	Relationship Day Care Center to Child
	implied agreement to render reasonable assistance
	to imperiled child in Center's custody
84	Restatement 314: landowner first aid to ill or injured invitees
85 🔲	care for them until they can be cared for by others
86 🔲	Knows ,or reason to know, ill or injured
	duty seldom more than taking reasonable steps
	to turn aigk pargan over to physician
	to turn sick person over to physician,

	or those who look after him until medical assistance obtained
87 🔲	Day Care Centers, TX. give first aid when needed
	call physician for critical injury or illness take child to nearest emergency room when necessary
88 🔲	Negligence liability for providing aid which is detrimental
	beyond what individual reasonably can and knows how to do
89 🔲	Take reasonable steps to place injured person in hands of competent physician
90 🔲	Duty to render reasonable assistance,
	but no duty to provide CPR i.e., lifesaving aid which requires special training
91 🔲	State law did not require such medical training or expertise of day care
92 🔲	if wise & valuable, requirement should be imposed by Legislature, not court decree
93 🔲	No duty to assign responsibilities in event of emergency
	or to conduct emergency drills to practice responsibilities

94	Only duty to act reasonably under all circumstances in rendering aid to imperiled child in center's custody
95 🔲	§ 8.01-225. Persons rendering emergency care, obstetrical services exempt from liability
	Virginia "Good Samaritan Statute"
96 🔲	good faith, renders emergency care or assistance, without compensation
	not be liable for any civil damages for acts or omissions resulting from the rendering of such care or assistance.
97 🔲	Operates an automated external defibrillator at the scene of an emergency, trains individuals to be operators of automated external defibrillators, or orders automated external defibrillators,
98 🔲	shall be immune from civil liability for any personal injury that results from any act or omission in the use of an automated external defibrillator in an emergency
99 🔲	where the person performing the defibrillation acts as an ordinary, reasonably prudent person would have acted under the same or similar circumstances,
100 🔲	unless such personal injury results from gross negligence or willful or wanton misconduct of the person rendering such emergency care.
101 🔲	Rotolo v. San Jose Sports and Entertainment, Cal. App. 5/24/2007

102 🔲	parents of teenager who died as a result of sudden cardiac arrest while participating in ice hockey game sued operators of ice hockey facility.
103 🔲	Rotolo claimed SJSE had a legal duty to inform league officials and coaches
	regarding on-site defibrillators
104 🔲	Immunity statutes were not intended to "impose any duty on building owners and managers to acquire AEDs in the first place."
105 🔲	no one's response to emergency unreasonably delayed or adversely influenced by presuming existence of AED on premises
	which, in reality, was not readily available or operational.
106 🔲	mere acquisition of an AED did not justify imposing a legal duty "on a proprietor to take anticipatory action prior to any ongoing or imminent harm to a plaintiff,
107 🔲	giving notice to specific persons that AEDs are on the premises in the event such harm occurs."
108 🔲	SJSE's general legal duty to maintain a reasonably safe facility
	limited to "a duty to respond when athletes such as Nicholas Rotolo suffer from cardiac
	arrest.

<sup>109</sup> sole duty, special relationship of the premises owner towards invitees to provide assistance in the face of a medical emergency,

	was to summon
	emergency services
110 🔲	PROMPT 911 CALL SATISFIED DUTY TO HEART ATTACK VICTIM
	L.A. FITNESS INTERNATIONAL v. MAYER
	Fla.App. April 2008
111 🔲	Expert testified L.A. Fitness violated
	industry's standards of care by failing to have a written emergency
	plan and to employ
	qualified personnel for handling emergencies
112 🔲	standards promulgated by the
	industry's authorities, including the International Health and Racquet
	Sports Club Association
113 🔲	IHRSCA and American College of Sports Medicine directed at
	responding to
	cardiopulomonary emergencies
114 🔲	AEDs were not required by law in 2003 and
	ALDS were not required by law in 2003 and
	L.A. Fitness employees were not required by
	law to perform CPR or to have a written emergency plan.
115 🗖	Destatement of Tarte (Second) \$ 2114 duty of some to reader aid to
115 🔲	Restatement of Torts (Second) § 314A duty of care to render aid to invitee

	after proprietor knows or has reason to know the invitee is ill or injured.
116 🔲	defendant is not required to take any action until he knows or has reason to know that the plaintiff is endangered, or is ill or injured.
117 🔲	not required to take any action beyond that which is reasonable under the circumstances.
118 🔲	In the case of an ill or injured person, he will seldom be required to do more than give such first aid as he reasonably can,
119 🔲	and take reasonable steps to turn sick man over to physician,
	or to those who will look after him and see that medical assistance is obtained.

120 🔲 Although the custom and practice of an industry can help define a standard of care a party must exercise

after it has undertaken a duty,

121 🔲 industry standards do not give rise to an independent legal duty.

 $^{122}\hfill\blacksquare$  business owner satisfies its legal duty to come to the aid of a patron experiencing a medical emergency

	by summoning medical assistance within a reasonable time.
123 🔲	Restatement's obligation to provide "first aid" to business invitees,
	obligation does not encompass the duty to perform skilled treatment, such as CPR.
124 🔲	Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), which requires training, is more than mere "first aid."
125 🔲	No common law or statutory duty that a business have an AED on its premises.
126 🔲	L.A. Fitness, fulfilled its duty of reasonable care in rendering aid to the deceased
	by summoning paramedics within a reasonable time.
127 🔲	L.A. Fitness did not have a legal duty to have CPR-qualified employees on site at all times,
128 🔲	and their employees were under no legal duty to administer CPR to the deceased.
129 🔲	L.A. Fitness had no legal duty to have a defibrillator on the premises for emergency use on the deceased

130 PROMPT 911 CALL FOR HEATH CLUB CARDIAC VICTIM

BROWN v. ATLAS-KONA KAI, INC.

Cal.App. March 2009

- <sup>131</sup> Kona Kai's duty as operator of the health club was simply to call for help...
- <sup>132</sup> We therefore decline to expand Kona Kai's duty beyond that of promptly summoning emergency services.

133 🔲