1	FOR FAILED 911 SURF RESCUE
2	Popow v. Town of Stratford
	(Dist. Conn. 2/12/2010)
3	alleged the defendant Town was negligent
	in responding to a fatal "kite-surfing" accident
	off of Long Beach in Stratford, Connecticut.
4	Popow also claimed the Town was negligent
	"took no action to warn kite-surfers to come out of the water
	or to supervise the area during the winter,
5	despite their knowledge
	beach area was being used by kite-surfers year round."
6	Popow also sued the Town's director of parks and recreation (Patusky)
	and a number of Town firefighters

7 la federal district court
"well established" common-law doctrines
"determine the tort liability of municipal employees"
8 Generally, a municipal employee is liable for the misperformance of ministerial acts,
but has a qualified immunity in the performance of governmental acts.
9 Governmental acts
performed wholly for the direct benefit of the public
and are supervisory or discretionary in nature.
10 hallmark of a discretionary act
requires the exercise of judgment.
11 In contrast, ministerial refers to a duty
performed in a prescribed manner without the exercise of judgment or discretion.
12 Municipal officials
immune from liability for negligence arising out of their discretionary acts

- 13 danger that a more expansive exposure to liability would cramp the exercise of official discretion beyond the limits desirable in our society": 14 Discretionary act immunity reflects a value judgment despite injury to a member of the public 15 broader interest having government officers and employees free to exercise judgment and discretion in their official functions. unhampered by fear of second-guessing and retaliatory lawsuits 16 outweighs the benefits to be had from imposing liability for that injury.
- not immune from liability for negligence arising out of their ministerial acts.

18	Court: non-immue "ministerial acts" defined
	"acts to be performed in a prescribed manner
	without the exercise of judgment or discretion."
19	court, such acts are not immune
	"because society has no analogous interest in permitting municipal officers to exercise judgment in the performance of ministerial acts."
20	governmental acts were found to be discretionary
	therefore, immune from any liability for negligence.
21	FACTS OF THE CASE
22	early afternoon hours of January 21, 2006
	few as six, but possibly as many as twenty-five, people kite-surfing in Long Island Sound off of Long Beach in Stratford, Connecticut.
23	January, there were no lifeguards or other rescue personnel on duty at Long Beach.
24	no warning signs in place on the beach

	warning of the hazards of entering the water during the winter
25	nor were there any barricades or other fencing
	limiting the public's access to the beach.
26	3:30 p.m., the weather took a turn for the worse.
	Substantial storm clouds form, and it began to get dark.
27	wind changed directions and began blowing strongly away from shore, creating "squall" like conditions
	almost all of the people kite-surfing returned to shore.
28	decedent, Stoil Popow, arrived at Long Beach at approximately 3:30 p.m.
	when the weather turned for the worse.
29 🔲	certified Kitesurfing Safety Systems instructor,
	present at Long Beach when the decedent arrived.
	kite-surfed with the decedent at least 50 times since 2001

30 described the decedent as a beginner-level kite-surfer

	to take advice from others."
31	decedent had difficulty controlling his kite in the strong winds soon after he entered the water.
	decedent "ditched" his kite, he fell into the water along with it.
32 🔲	decedent was partially submerged in the water but conscious after he fell.
	began to float approximately 300 to 400 feet away from shore while holding his kite
33	decedent made no attempts to swim to shore,
	and instead drifted parallel to the shore
34 🔲	Instructor called 911 from his mobile phone
	witness present at the beach also notified a police officer in the Long Beach parking lot of the decedent's situation
35	initial 911 call was routed to Long Island.
	three additional 911 calls that were routed to Trumbull, Connecticut.

who was "very reckless," "very stubborn," and "unwilling

36	no emergency hard wired telephone in this area of Long Beach.
	In addition, there was no cellular tower in the area.
37	three unsuccessful 911 calls,
	Instructor Guimond directly called the Bridgeport Police Department.
38	informed the dispatcher at the Bridgeport Police Department
	there was a person in the water in the Long Beach area who needed assistance
39	dispatcher advised Guimond
	a boat was being dispatched to the scene.
40	maintained direct visual contact with the decedent
	during his phone calls to the Bridgeport Harbor patrol and relayed his approximate location
41	also contacted the United States Coast Guard.
	did not directly contact the Town of Stratford Fire or Police Department.

42	5:00 p.m., the Stratford Fire Department received a report
	"windsurfer" in distress from Centralized Medical Emergency Dispatch
43	5:02 p.m., the Stratford Fire Department dispatched two fire engines
	and a rescue vehicle towing a fourteen foot long inflatable hard bottom "zodiac" boat
44	5:08 p.m., the two fire engines from the Stratford Fire Department and the rescue vehicle towing the zodiac boat
	arrived at the Birdseye Street boat launch ramp.
45	located approximately four miles from the decedent's last reported location
	in the Housatonic River, which meets with Long Island Sound.
46	zodiac boat experienced engine and motor difficulties
	when it reached the mouth of the Housatanic River.
47	zodiac boat was unable to continue toward the decedent's reported location

48 🔲	firefighters remained on board the boat,
	which they tied to a buoy, for approximately ninety minutes
49 🔲	boat was towed by the United States Coast Guard
	back to the Birdseye Street launch ramp.
50	Bridgeport Harbor Patrol and United States Coast Guard vessels
	arrived in the area where the decedent entered the water
51	approximately twenty to forty-five minutes after he had "ditched" or "flagged" his kite.
	full dusk" or "near dark" when they arrived.
52	advised the Bridgeport Harbor Patrol
	that the decedent was no longer with the kite.
53 🔲	7:00 p.m., approximately two hours after CMED had notified the Stratford Fire Department of the incident,
54	decedent had not been located

or back to the site where it was launched

	despite a search by the Bridgeport Harbor Patrol and the United States Coast Guard.
55	Coast Guard located the decedent's body in Long Island Sound the following day
56	SAFETY SERVICES DISCRETION
57	In response to Popow's allegations of negligence
	firefighter defendants claimed "qualified immunity" in connection with their attempt to rescue the decedent.
58	court noted that "Connecticut courts consider acts performed by firefighters
	when they are in the line of duty
	to be discretionary acts":
59	statutes, regulations, and policies can create ministerial duties,
	when they relate to fire, police, or other public safety services
	most often held to create discretionary duties.

60	the provision of emergency medical services to members of the public
	is a discretionary act.
61	court found that "Stratford Fire Department policy provides that the incident commander
	possesses the sole discretion to engage in a rescue attempt, including whether to launch the zodiac boat."
62	clear that the decision made by the Firefighter Defendants to launch the zodiac boat,
	the procedures utilized in attempting to rescue the decedent, and ultimately the decision to call off their search
63	required the exercise of judgment
	based on an analysis of numerous factors.
64	court concluded that "the actions taken by the Firefighter Defendants on the date in question
	were discretionary" and, therefore, immune from liability.
65	PUBLIC RECREATION DISCRETION
66	Popow alleged that the Town of Stratford and Stratford

	director of parks and recreation, Patricia Patusky,
	were negligent in failing to "post warning signs"
67	warn the decedent and others similarly situated of the hazardous and unsafe conditions
	present at Long Beach and the surrounding waters of Long Island Sound
68	alleged that the Town was negligent by "inviting the public to use Long Beach when there were no lifeguards on duty
	failing to "adequately warn that the lifeguards were not on duty."
69	same legal analysis of the failed rescue attempt which led it to conclude that "qualified immunity"
	against the firefighters
	applied "equally to the Town of Stratford and Patusky
70	court found "[t]he Town of Stratford
	entitled to the same discretionary act immunity that applies to the individual Defendants
71	court, the Connecticut legislature had "codified the tort liability of municipalities"

Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-557n(a)(2)(B)

72	municipalities will not be liable for damages caused by "negligent acts or omissions
	which require the exercise of judgment or discretion as an official function of the authority expressly or impliedly granted by law
73	[M]unicipalities and municipal officials are immune from liability for negligence
	arising out of their discretionary, as opposed to ministerial, acts.
74	Ministerial acts are acts to be performed in a prescribed manner
	without the exercise of judgment or discretion.
75	maintenance of parks is a governmental function
	and is usually subject to municipal immunity for negligence.
76	court found the Town and the parks and recreation director
	would be entitled to qualified immunity

77	Popow's claims would still fail "even if the Town of Stratford and Patusky
	had a duty to warn the decedent of the conditions in Long Island Sound
	by posting signs or erecting barriers."
78	court found Popow had failed "to cite any statute or regulation
	prescribing the posting of signs or warnings, or the stationing of life guards, at public beach areas during the winter months."
79	Court: no evidence "suggesting that the Town or Patusky, as Director of Parks and Recreation
	obligated or expected to post signs and warnings or station lifeguards at public beaches during the winter months."
80	court found "no ordinance, statute, or regulation
	prescribing the provision of a phone service,
	whether hard-wired or cellular, at Long Beach."
81	court concluded that the acts in question were discretionary,
	rather than ministerial.

82	court found the Town of Stratford and Patusky
	entitled to qualified immunity
	as to Popow's claims of negligence for failure to warn and failure to provide phone services.
83	PREMISES LIABILITY
84	Popow alleged the Town and Patusky were negligent
	failing "to post warning signs
	or erect barriers preventing access to Long Beach during the winter."
85	also alleged premises liability based on the Town's negligent failure
	"to have lifeguards on duty or warn that no lifeguards were on duty."
86	also claimed the Town was negligent in failing
	"to install an emergency telephone or a cellular tower" on the premises.
87	court, "[t]he duty owed by a landowner to an entrant onto the land

	is determined by the entrant's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
88 🔲	ascending degree of duty owed by the possessor of land to persons on the land
	based on their entrant status, i.e., trespasser, licensee or invitee
89 🔲	possessor of land has a duty to an invitee
	to reasonably inspect and maintain the premises
	in order to render them reasonably safe
90 🔲	possessor of land must warn an invitee of dangers
	that the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover
91 🔲	duty that a possessor of land owes to a licensee
	does not ordinarily encompass the responsibility to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition
92 🔲	licensee must take the premises as he finds them
93 🔲	possessor of real estate owes no duty to trespassers

	their use.
94	public invitee is a person who is invited to enter or remain on land as a member of the public
	for the purpose for which the land is held open to the public.
95	Popow claimed "the Town of Stratford and Patusky invited the public to use Long Beach for kite-surfing,
	including during the winter months
96	therefore owed the decedent and other kite-surfers a duty of care.
97	no evidence that the defendants "took any actions which could be construed as extending an invitation to the decedent or others
	to kite-surf at Long Beach during the month of January
98	distinction between one who is an invitee
	and one who is merely a licensee
99	whether the visitor has received an invitation, as opposed to permission,

to keep the property in a reasonably safe condition for

	on the land
100	no evidence Town made any improvements
	upon the area of Long Beach where the decedent was kite surfing.
101	"even if the Town of Stratford and Patusky
	owed the decedent a duty of care as an invitee,
102	duty extends only to 'dangers
	the invitee could not reasonably be expected to discover'."
103	decedent was engaged in an inherently dangerous water sport during the month of January
	water temperature was between 38 degrees and 40 degrees
104	risk of engaging in an extreme water sport in such conditions
	was patently obvious to any reasonable person
105	Defendants should not be held liable

from the possessor of the land, to enter the land or remain

for their failure to warn of this risk.

- 106 Court: One who engages in water sports
 assumes the reasonably foreseeable risks inherent in the activity
- 107 Court: City was not required to remind adult swimmers

 of the obvious and commonly known dangers of drowning inherent in swimming
- rule requiring a property owner to post warning signs about the dangers inherent in swimming is unreasonable
- 109 Connecticut, a small state, hundreds of miles of shoreline would be exposed to this unreasonable requirement
- Property owners who have water on their land
 entitled to assume that a reasonable adult would be aware
 of the risk of drowning in a body of water
- highly unreasonable to expect property owners to warn adults
 - of the dangers of engaging in an extreme water sport in the middle of winter during storm-like conditions.

112 CONCLUSION

113 federal district court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants,

effectively dismissing Popow's claims.

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