THE ECONOMICS OF THE GEITHNER PLANS

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
Background

Collapsing bubbles make us less trustworthy
 Why? Net worth falls
 Net Worth = Assets - Liabilities

Assets: What you own (stocks, bonds, homes) Liabilities: What you owe (loans, mortgages)

With high net worth, everyone wants to lend to you
 Liquidity: There when you don't need it.

Less net worth \rightarrow Less trust \rightarrow Less credit




(See why banks are reluctant to lend and refi?)

Source: Federal Reserve flow of funds accounts

Yet banks are still lending (a little) more—for now

Total Credit at all U.S. Commercial Banks Weekly Data, Annual Growth



Source: St. Louis Fed

Fixing the Financial System: Secretary Geithner's twin plans

Plan 1: Overpay for assets

- Toxic/Legacy assets, Securitized student/consumer/auto loans
- Popular, if you're getting bought out: Good TV coverage
- Will this redistribution yield big positive spillovers?

Plan 2: Create a new regulatory structure

- Give FDIC/Fed/Treasury power to impose "speed bankruptcy"
- Give FDIC/Fed/Treasury power to guarantee private-sector debts on short notice
- Give FDIC and Treasury power to lend aggressively to weak firms
- Will this power be used judiciously (Art. III) or politically (I and II)?

Plan 1: Overpay for risky assets

- BIG Caveat: "Overpay" means "pay more than the private sector will pay right now"
 - If private sector is too pessimistic>>Taxpayers benefit
 - If private sector is correctly pessimistic>>Funds lose \$

Doing Plan 1, Part 1: PPIP

From a proponent, Brad DeLong:

Clinton Treasury DAS, Berkeley professor, student of Larry Summers, blogger of some fame: delong.typepad.com

- Q: What is the Geithner Plan?
- A: The Geithner Plan is a trillion-dollar operation by which the U.S. acts as the world's largest hedge fund investor....
- Q: Where does the trillion dollars come from?
- A: \$150 billion comes from TARP (equity)
 \$820 billion from the FDIC (debt)
 \$30 billion from the hedge fund and pension fund managers who...run the program.

How PPIP could work (version 1 of 2)

- Market is now irrationally pessimistic about value of mortgage-backed securities
- 2. Highly-leveraged PPIP pays about the right price
 - 1. Perhaps because PPIP leverage just balances out market irrationality?
- 3. Banks sell toxic/legacy MBS, bank net worth rises
- 4. Healthy banks make healthy loans, get healthy levels of depositors and bond investors, things get better
- Someday, market wises up, wants to pay lots for toxic MBS
- 6. Taxpayers profit

How PPIP could work (version 2 of 2)

- Market is now correctly pessimistic about value of mortgage-backed securities
- 2. Highly-leveraged PPIP overpays for MBS
 - 1. Because private-sector investors don't worry about the downside: It's (almost) a call option.
- 3. Banks sell toxic/legacy MBS, bank net worth rises
- 4. Healthy banks make healthy loans, get healthy levels of depositors and bond investors, things get better
- 5. Because of better economy, toxic/legacy MBS **become** a better investment
- 6. Taxpayers profit

What v.1 and v.2 have in common

- The government holds \$1 trillion of risky assets for years and years, so private banks don't have to.
- Private sector banks can focus on:
 - Searching for new customers
 - Checking credit worthiness of "normal" business opportunities
 - Building good relations with borrowers and lenders
- Treasury's implicit advice:

Banks should "stick to their knitting." (based on Bernanke's research)

What else they have in common

97% "non-recourse" federal funding for investors Heads I win 50¢, tails I lose 3¢

- Prediction: Private investors will flip the coin a lot of times.
- They could overpay a lot--killing taxpayer upside.

But: Could be worth it for taxpayers as **citizens**, not **investors** -Higher GDP

-Lower unemployment and welfare payments. Current Administration TARP assumption: We lose 1/3 in long run. -Would you take that deal?

What about the other FSP lending program?

□ The reverse of PPIP:

Buy the safest consumer, student, and auto loans

- Possible reasons:
 - 1. "Jump Start" securitization again (a weak metaphor)
 - Prevent private sector from holding these ultra-safe assets to nudge other investors to take "normal" levels of risk
- Funding: 1 Treasury dollar = 9 Federal Reserve dollars

Hard for Fed to unwind when economy picks up?

Plan 2: Regulatory Reform

Goal: Create an FDIC for non-bank banks.

Example: WaMu went from troubled to safe in 24 hours

- Big WaMu losers: Bondholders
 - Shareholders already lost their shirts
 - FDIC didn't spent a dime
- Q: Why no 24-hour turnaround for AIG? Or Lehman?
 - A: FDIC "speed bankruptcy" exists for banks, but not them.
 - Judicial bankruptcy: Supposedly slow
 - But Lehman sold in days
 - Derivatives contracts a huge legal problem in bankruptcy (Zingales)
 - But despite doomsayers, Lehman didn't set off swap crisis
 - Big spike in risk/Plummet in markets:
 - Day of Paulson testimony (9/23), not day of Lehman failure (John Taylor, Getting Off Track)

Corporate finance in 1 lesson

Recall: Net worth = Assets - Liabilities = Own - Owe *If net worth >> 0, you're popular*

Bankrupt = Net worth < 0

Two ways out of bankruptcy:

- 1. Government provides assets (TARP), gets flexible shares.
- Government declares some (bond) liabilities null and void: Usually converts them to flexible common shares (the normal thing). A consolation prize with upside.

Analogy: Your weak bank converts your deposits into bank shares.

Citi: Most likely to speed-bankrupted?



Epilogue: Even if we fix the banks...

