The Making of Militants: The State and Islam in Central Asia

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In Central Asia, as in other regions of the world with large Muslim populations, opposition groups are increasingly turning to the ideas of militant Islam in their efforts to challenge authoritarian rule. Activists from Kokand to Kabul have learned that political Islam provides an unusually potent language of opposition. In Central Asia, a wide array of opposition movements—the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, the Islamic Renaissance Party, and Hizb ut-Tahrir—have, with varying degrees of militancy, applied the banner of Islam to their struggle with local authoritarian rule. The March 2004 suicide bombings and gun battles in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in which more than forty people died and dozens were injured are only the most recent reminder that, despite seven decades of Soviet rule, Islam remains a powerful mobilizing force in Central Asia.

That Islamist movements have reemerged in Central Asia in the wake of the Soviet collapse is clear. What is less clear, however, is why tensions between the state and Islam have been significantly more pronounced in some Central Asian regions than in others. Variations in the extent, militancy, and intensity of Islamist movements, much like the many different and markedly varied authoritarian states these movements oppose, are rarely differentiated in the social science literature. Thus, while scholars have helpfully devised theories to explain the recent upsurge in Islamist political mobilization, few of these theories explain why Islamist movements are more pronounced and more militant in some authoritarian states than in others. Seeing these differences in Islamist mobilization to be of both theoretical interest to social science theory and immediate import to state-society conflicts not only in Central Asia but also in the Middle East, North Africa, South Asia, and, more and more, in the Western world, I seek to explain the root causes of variations in political Islam.

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the question of political Islam. Historian Bernard Lewis and political scientist Samuel Huntington, for example, write that the globalization of Western culture has sparked an Islamist backlash. Central Asian political leaders, for their part, have argued that the Islamist opposition has been artificially crafted

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through the meddling of foreign “extremists” from Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, and Pakistan. Rashid Kadyrov, the Uzbek prosecutor general, said of the 29–30 March 2004 Tashkent bombings, for example, “The character and method of this act is not common to our people . . . It was probably exported from abroad.”

Problematically, however, while these clash of civilizations and foreign intervention arguments may capture part of the cause, they nevertheless treat Islamist opposition as an undifferentiated whole. That is, they provide few insights into why some Islamist movements are more militant and why conflict between the state and Islam is greater in some countries than in others. In this essay I directly address this variation. More specifically, I seek to explain why tensions between the state and Islam have proven greater—and considerably more violent—in Uzbekistan than they have in Kyrgyzstan. Through a comparison of Islamist movements in these two countries, I find that international variables, be they the encroachment of foreign cultures or foreign missionaries and foreign financial support, indeed are important to the spread of political Islam in Central Asia. The varying strength of the Islamist movements, however, is a result of decidedly local politics. Political Islam in Central Asia is a response to autocratic rule. And, problematically for the West and its newfound allies among the Central Asian leadership, the more autocratic this rule is, the greater resonance and popular support militant Islamist movements gain.

This article, in sum, provides an explanation for local-level variations in political Islam. To achieve this, I proceed in four steps. In section one I discuss the literature on political Islam and outline the insights this literature holds for the current spread of political Islam in Central Asia. In section two I compare these leading hypotheses to the domestic-level explanation I offer in contrast. In section three, I illustrate how, while the international context is important to social mobilization, the marked variation we see in Central Asian Islamist movements cannot be explained without reference to domestic politics. Comparing the Uzbek and Kirghiz cases, I demonstrate how differences in the degree of autocratic rule shape both the resonance and the militancy of Islamist opposition. Lastly, in section four, I conclude by exploring the implications this finding presents both for Central Asian politics and for broader international relations.

**The Comparative Study of Political Islam**

**Origins and Clashes**

Political Islam, though recent to Central Asia, has long provided a language of mobilization for opponents of autocratic rule in Middle Eastern, North African, and Southeast Asian countries. Political Islam as first conceived in the 1950s was a response to the “nationalist and chauvinistic ideologies that have appeared in modern times.” Mid-twentieth-century Islamists viewed the Middle East’s postcolonial nationalist governments, along with their Western and Soviet backers, as “sterile,” “defeated,” and “degenerate.” Instead of freedom, they argued, postcolonial independence brought servitude. The Middle East’s postcolonial nationalist governments, Islamist writers like Sayyid Qutb believed, introduced a new form of domination, which simply made “some men lords over others.” Qutb, seen as a threat by Egypt’s Nasser government, was hanged in 1966. His ideas, however, particularly his belief that through a return to Koranic law, through “the Islamic way of life . . . all men become free from the servitude of some men to others,” have continued to inspire Islamists throughout the world.

Qutb and his contemporaries pointedly contrasted this Islamic ideal to what they saw as the “humiliation of the common man” at the hands of distinctly Western forms of governance—nationalism, communism, and democracy. For many scholars and Islamists today Qutb’s contrast between Islam and the West remains the wellspring of Islamist opposition. Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation), for example, an Islamist movement active across much of Central Asia, advises its followers: “The
clash of civilisations is an inevitable matter. . . . Make the preparations required for the conflict, since the Capitalist Western civilisation has knocked you down militarily, politically and economically; however they will never defeat you intellectually.”

Hizb ut-Tahrir’s clash of civilizations ideas are mirrored in much of the current Western literature on political Islam. Bernard Lewis, both a scholar of Middle Eastern history and an adviser to the current Bush administration, writes in his 1990 article, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” that political Islam is “perhaps [an] irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both.” Lewis’s thesis, popularized by Harvard political scientist Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations,” has influenced scholars working in Central Asia. Ahmed Rashid, for example, though he does not predict an imminent clash, notes of the divide between East and West: “There is a palpable cultural vacuum at the heart of Central Asia, which cannot be filled by consumerism or imitations of Western culture.”

Curiously, at a time when many in the social sciences and in society more broadly are attempting to leave behind beliefs of primitordial identity, scholars and a wide array of practitioners of political Islam continue to argue that not just nations but entire civilizations are defined by immutable characteristics. According to this view, Islam and the West—Western secularism, Western consumerism, Western democracy—are, by nature, incompatible. Thus, while political Islam itself may be relatively new, spurred by globalization, the growing encroachment of Western culture, and the spread, however imperfect, of Western forms of governance, the deep causes of political Islam are unchanging. Being a Muslim, by nature, demands a rejection of that which is rejected by the Koran and a return to the dar el-Islam, the World of Islam.

Rejecting Fundamentalism

This clash of civilizations hypothesis has not gone unchallenged. Edward Said, for one, equates the clash’s depiction of the West and Islam to a “cartoon-like world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other mercilessly.” Dissenters such as Said argue that not all Muslims view Western society as antagonistic. Moreover, clash critics argue, not all Westerners share the belief, expressed by U.S. undersecretary of defense William Boykin, that the Judeo-Christian world will be triumphant because its God is somehow “bigger.”

Boundaries between religions, polities, and civilizations are blurry and provide at best imperfect explanations of political variation. Indeed, Middle East scholars John Esposito and John Voll remind, lest we forget our own history, that the West’s path to democracy, a journey that is still incomplete, required a wholesale “reconceptualization of premodern traditions.” Moreover, while clash theorists argue that “civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion,” political scientist Paul Corcoran observes of a perhaps not so different Western civilization: “From the perspective of twenty-five hundred years of Western political thinking, almost no one, until very recently, thought democracy to be a very good way of structuring political life.”

Such critiques are instructive, for to preclude the possibility of political reform in Muslim societies, as clash of civilizations theories so often do, is to ignore the Western world’s own troubled and protracted experience with political liberalization. Clash of civilization theories demand we overlook the many empirical realities that challenge what, in actuality, is the blurry divide between the Western and Islamic worlds. Indeed, as Moroccan scholar Abdou Filali-Ansary writes, there are multiple strains within Islamic thought, and to claim Islam can be distilled into an undifferentiated civilization is to “ignore the diversity and the richness that have characterized the history of Muslims.”

Just as Judeo-Christian beliefs are no guarantee of democracy, Islam is not everywhere a predictor of antidemocratic values. Turkish society, though Muslim, is supportive of democracy. And, as survey research reveals, Central Asian Muslims, while they overwhelmingly dislike their current authoritarian leaderships, strongly support democratic reform.

Oddly, while Central Asians do not support their authoritarian leaders, the Western world has not always shared this distaste for these same autocrats. On his February 2004 visit to Tashkent, for example, U.S. defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld thanked the Uzbek leader, Islam Karimov, for his “stalwart support in the war on terror.” This praise came only weeks after Human Rights Watch experts briefed the United Nations on Uzbekistan's “appalling human rights record” and after the State Department itself concluded the Uzbek leadership had made no progress in improving human rights. Indeed, democracy activists in the Middle East and Central and Southeast Asia point to a long history of nondemocratic U.S. intervention: the Central Intelligence Agency’s involvement in Iran’s 1953 coup, steady American relations with Saudi Arabia, U.S. support for Pakistan’s Zia-ul Haq, and America’s acquiescence in the 1992 Algerian military coup. Given this history of intervention, political scientist and Brookings Institute scholar Muqtedar Khan writes, it is understandable that many in the region see the United States as “not opposed to Islam but to democracy and popular government in the Middle East.”

In short, although clash of civilizations hypotheses for the spread of political Islam abound both in the United States and abroad, empirical reality suggests a considerably more complex binary than the simple binaries of the West and Islam. Regardless of whether the question is one of political liberalization or international relations (and clash theories often elide both), there is little evidence that religion is determinative of political outcomes. When geopolitically expedient, the democratic West has sided with illiberal and even fundamentalist regimes in the Middle East and Central and South Asia. Similarly problematic for clash theories, Muslims in the Middle East and Central and South Asia have expressed strong support for democratic reform and equal distaste for autocratic rule. Variation, not uniformity, defines political Islam. Although there are multiple cases of growing militant Islamist movements that seemingly conform to the clash of civilizations hypothesis, there are equal numbers of, if not more, cases in which the West and

20. Clash theorists do address the Turkish case but see it as an example of exceptionalism rather than a harbinger of political reform in other Muslim societies. See, e.g., Bernard Lewis, “Why Turkey Is the Only Muslim Democracy,” Middle East Quarterly, March 1994, www.meforum.org/meq.
22. BBC Monitoring International Reports, “USA’s Rumsfeld Thanks Uzbekistan for ‘Stalwart Support’ in War on Terror,” 24 February 2004, web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?_m=09d8b10b74e5c076e6f85b930c40a315&dDocNum=1&wchp=dGLbVlb-bSkVA&md5=9d74a9d5b777d9558ccff3b5599c17.
26. Ibid., 81.
Islam comfortably meet and where the boundary between the two is imperceptible.

If not a clash of civilizations though, what then explains the recent increase in political Islam in regions like Central Asia and the Middle East? In the remainder of the essay I discuss two alternative theories to the clash of civilizations: (1) the idea that the growth of political Islam is the product of radical intervention on the part of transnational Islamist activists, and (2) the hypothesis that the upsurge in political Islam is a grassroots response to local authoritarian rule. The first hypothesis views political Islam as something that is alien, fomented by radicals from the outside. The second hypothesis—the logic that I argue is driving the growth of Islamism in Central Asia—sees political Islam as indigenous, varied, and instrumental—as a rational and powerful strategy for opposing autocratic rule.

**Foreign Extremists**

Evidence from Chechnya, Afghanistan, Central Asia, and now Iraq confirms that foreign nationals are active in promoting a wide spectrum of Islamist-based mobilization movements. Al Qaeda, to take but one example, has supported militant Islamist movements in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Lebanon, Jordan, Malaysia, Pakistan, and now in Iraq. Thus, it is understandable that leaders the world over publicly denounce the intervention of foreign Islamists in domestic affairs. What is less understandable, however, is the claim these leaders often make—that the spread of political Islam is a direct product of foreign intervention and not a domestic response to local authoritarian rule.

Gauging the extent of foreign Islamic activity in a country is difficult. While many foreign Islamic activists are visible, working openly with neighborhood communities and, much like Christian missionary groups, establishing schools that incorporate religious teaching along with general education, a substantial portion of foreign aid, particularly aid to what state leaders label “radical” Islam, occurs outside of public view. Thus, the measures that we do have of foreign actors promoting Islamist movements are incomplete and, when reported by governments, often biased.

The Kirghiz and Uzbek governments, as well as the leaderships in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, have all claimed that the activities of foreign “extremists” threaten domestic security. Kirghiz president Askar Akaev, addressing a roundtable meeting on Central Asian security at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January 2000, for example, concluded that foreign terrorists training in Afghanistan and their spread of religious extremism to Central Asia “is one of the key factors that may influence stability and security in our region.”29 Also speaking at Davos, the Kazakh prime minister, Kasymzhomart Tokaev, added, “If Islamic radicalism spreads throughout Central Asia, all the peace plans will be endangered.”30 The Tajik president, Emomali Rakhmonov, addressing foreign news agencies prior to his December 2002 trip to Washington, DC, reminded his American hosts that his country has long been on the “frontline” and that “it took the September 11 events for the world to realize the massive terrorist threat coming from the Afghan Taliban regime.”31 In his 2002 New Year’s Eve address to the nation, the Uzbek president, Islam Karimov, warned of a “huge evil—international terrorism, extremism and fanaticism, which has been posing a threat to our peaceful and calm life over the past few years.”32

30. Ibid.
32. “Uzbekistan Keeps Threat of Terrorism from the Door—Leader’s New Year Message,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, 1 January 2003 (from Uzbek Television first channel, 31 December 2002), web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/document?m=a63e45d912f5e677885d4075f05f2efq4&docnum=1&wchp=6GLbVlb-zSkVA&mdy=9abab08e1dd77985cb89e5ezc9a.
These pronouncements, moreover, have been backed by widespread arrests of activists whom Central Asian leaders label “Wahhabis”—adherents to what, in the state press, is depicted as foreign, extremist Islam. In Uzbekistan, an estimated five thousand of the country’s six thousand political prisoners are thought to be sympathizers of the Jordan and United Kingdom–based extremist group Hizb ut-Tahrir. In Tajikistan, 142 Hizb ut-Tahrir sympathizers were arrested over a ten-month span in 2002. In Kyrgyzstan, the State Committee on Religious Affairs estimates that there are two thousand Hizb ut-Tahrir activists in its country.

Although at best a crude measure, these arrests demonstrate that foreign ideas of political Islam have taken hold in Central Asia. What these numbers do not establish, however, is why political Islam has won admirers in Central Asian society. Of course, the intent of these government pronouncements is to link the growth in political Islam with outside intervention. After all, if foreign meddling cannot be blamed, then Central Asian leaders would be forced to confront an alternative causal explanation—the domestic roots of Islamist opposition.

**Variation and the Domestic Roots of Political Islam**

Troubling for clash of civilizations and foreign intervention hypotheses, the local reality of Central Asian political Islam is considerably more complex than either theory would predict. Both the clash of civilizations and foreign intervention arguments are, at their roots, structural explanations for the rise of political Islam. As such, we would expect, all things equal, that these structures would have similar affects across Central Asia. That is, if political Islam were indeed, as Bernard Lewis argues, a response to encroaching Western secularism, we would expect this response to be more or less uniform across Islamic society. Similarly, if political Islam were a product of aid and proselytizing by radical foreign Islamists, we would expect political Islam to be strongest in those areas where foreigners enjoy the most freedoms. Neither of these predictions, however, is borne out by Central Asian reality. The Central Asian rejection of Western culture has been neither uniform nor complete. Neither, moreover, has the resonance of political Islam been most pronounced in those areas where foreign actors have been most free. Just the opposite has proven true; the growth of Islamist movements has been most marked among those post-Soviet Central Asian states whose leaderships have most restricted foreigner intervention.

This does not mean, importantly, that conflicting cultures and foreign intervention have had no causal role on the spread of political Islam in Central Asia. Foreign ideas and proselytizing as well as a real uneasiness with Western consumer culture have indeed contributed to the popularity of Islamist movements in the region. Crucially, however, these structural variables have mediated a more salient and considerably more local reality—the domestic politics of individual Central Asian states. More specifically, I argue, Islamist movements in Central Asia are first and foremost a response to local authoritarian rule: the more authoritarian the state, the more pronounced political Islam will be in society.

The causal link between Islamist opposition and the degree of authoritarian rule might at first glance seem odd. Indeed, would not all opposition, not just Islamist opposition, increase as authoritarian rule increased? Curiously, in Central Asia, this has not been the case. Prodemocracy opposition groups, for example, have been most active in Kyrgyzstan, the least authoritarian of the Central Asian states. At the same time, the Islamist movement in Kyrgyzstan is arguably among the least active of all

33. Wahhabism is the strict form of Sunni Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia. In Central Asia, however, the term Wahhabi is shorthand for any form of religious extremism.


Islamist opposition movements in Central Asia. In Uzbekistan, the exact opposite prevails—democracy-based opposition movements are weak while Islamist opposition movements are strong.

These varying forms of opposition, as I detail in section three, result from the varying natures of Uzbek and Kirghiz authoritarian rule. More specifically, domestic opposition groups adjust their strategies according to the degree of contestation allowed under a given authoritarian regime. In authoritarian states where limited contestation is allowed, where opposition groups can find voice in Parliament or in the press, these opposition groups are more likely to see their interests as best served by lobbying for incremental reform and liberalization within the existing institutional context. In totalitarian states, in contrast, where contestation is not allowed and where the opposition is fully disenfranchised from the political system, opposition movements are more likely to press for revolutionary change.37 More specifically, the Islamist call to revolution will find greater resonance in highly authoritarian regimes that exclude all political competition within state institutions and the press than in states that, even to a limited extent, allow some contestation.38

The transitions literature, to the extent that it does address nondemocratic political outcomes, tends to lump these outcomes into a nondifferentiated residual category of “authoritarianism.”39 As I illustrate here in the case of Central Asia, however, nondemocratic states, like democratic states, vary and these variations have profound consequences. More specifically, I argue that variations in the type of authoritarian rule lead to variations in the nature of domestic political opposition.

Opposition movements gravitate to those strategies that they perceive as most effective. Democratic strategies are viable in authoritarian states that allow some degree of dialogue and contestation. Through dialogue and political contestation opposition movements can nurture the hope that, someday, they too may win power. In states where political contestation is brutally suppressed, however, opposition movements maintain no such hope. Instead, revolutionary change is seen as the only viable strategy for effecting political change. Thus, while the clash of civilizations and the intervention of foreign activists have, perhaps, provided the ideas and ideology of political Islam, the prominence of political Islam is by no means uniform across the region but, rather, varies in response to the local nature of authoritarian rule.40

Contestation and Political Islam in Central Asia

No Central Asian state is democratic. In its annual Freedom in the World Country Ratings, Freedom House has consistently rated all Central Asian states as not free.41 Within this broad category of not free or not democratic, however, significant variation exists in the nature of authoritarian rule and, most important, in the extent of political contestation. For example, the Kirghiz and, more recently, the Tajik leaderships have been careful to allow the opposition some degree of voice, particularly in the national parliaments and in the news media. The Uzbek leadership, in contrast, has effectively barred the domestic opposition from all government offices, from national and local newspapers, and from the electronic media. As I next illustrate, these differing degrees of political contestation

37. By totalitarian states, I mean states in which power is monopolized by a single party and reinforced by absolute control over the media and the military. For more on the totalitarian state, see Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy (New York: Praeger, 1965).


40. Mohammed M. Hafez forwards a similar causalitiy in his compelling study of militant opposition in Algeria and Egypt [Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel: Repression and Resistance in the Islamic World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003)]. In contrast to the opposition groups analyzed in this article, however, Hafez’s study focuses exclusively on Islamic opposition. Thus, although Hafez and I stress similar dynamics of repression and political exclusion, my findings suggest that Islamist opposition—be it moderate or militant—is unlikely in regimes such as Kyrgyzstan that allow some degree of political participation and public voice. Here, demands for electoral reform and political liberalization, rather than Islamist ideology, pattern social mobilization and opposition.

41. For more on the Freedom House scores and Freedom House’s methodology, see www.freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls.
have been central to the rise of political Islam in Uzbekistan and to the comparatively muted Islamist opposition movement in Kyrgyzstan.

**Kyrgyzstan—Contestation, Ethnicity, and Political Islam**

Kyrgyzstan, once the darling of the West and the country that appeared most likely to democratize in Central Asia, has become more rather than less authoritarian over the past decade. Following a brief period of liberalization in the early 1990s in which the Parliament proved a strong counterweight to executive power, Kyrgyzstan’s checks and balances gave way to executive-dominated political control. Today the Kirghiz legislature serves at the pleasure of the president. Indeed, the recently amended Kirghiz Constitution stipulates that the Parliament can be dismissed by the president: “If so decided by a referendum; in the event of three [subsequent] refusals by the [Parliament] to accept a nominee to the office of the Prime Minister; or in the event of another crisis caused by an insurmountable disagreement between the [Parliament] and other branches of state power.”

Significantly, however, the Kirghiz parliament, as well as the Kirghiz press, afford what, for Central Asia, is an admirable degree of political contestation. The Parliament, for example, while its formal powers pale in comparison to those of the president, nevertheless does provide a venue for competition and political dissent. Thus, of the thirty-three members of the 2000–2005 Parliament who expressed a party affiliation, more than one-third of these deputies belonged to the political opposition. These opposition MPs, because they can criticize executive rule from within the formal institutions of state government, enjoy a political efficacy that their colleagues in Uzbekistan do not. Independent Kirghiz media outlets, moreover, ensure that this parliamentary opposition maintains a real voice in the national political debate.

This ability publicly to contest power has led to the Kirghiz opposition’s investment in and its acceptance of existing state institutions. Given this investment, the Kirghiz political opposition has more often than not sought to achieve change from within the existing institutional framework rather than, as in the case of Islamist opposition in Uzbekistan, pressing for wholesale revolution. Granted, publicly challenging executive rule has not been without risk; several Kirghiz oppositionists have been jailed for their activities. Even when behind bars, though, Kirghiz oppositionists are ensured a political influence that would be unimaginable in Uzbekistan.

Parliament deputy Azimbek Beknazarov, to take one example, was imprisoned in January 2002 after repeatedly stating that the Kirghiz president’s decision to cede disputed borders to China was tantamount to treason. The state officially charged Beknazarov with “abuses of power,” dating back to his work in the mid-1990s as a regional prosecutor. Challenging these official charges, both the speaker of the Kirghiz Parliament, Abdygany Erkebaev, and the U.S. Department of State concluded that Beknazarov’s arrest was politically motivated. More telling than the circumstances surrounding Beknazarov’s arrest, however, is the wave of protest it sparked both in the Parliament and in Kirghiz society. At an emergency meeting of parliamentary deputies called to discuss Beknazarov’s imprisonment,

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42. Despite the March 2005 uprisings, which led to the ousting of President Askar Akaev and his replacement with Kurmanbek Bakiev, there is as yet little indication that Kyrgyzstan’s new executive will either promote or tolerate a more active parliament.


45. Kyrgyzstan’s opposition, now that it has won control of the executive branch, appears content to maintain strong presidential powers at the expense of the legislature.


opposition MP Topchubek Turganaliev repeatedly called on President Akaev to resign. Parliamentary deputy Doronbek Sadyrbaev added that if Beknazarov were to remain in jail, all MPs should “leave the country before it is too late.”

Matching the opposition MPs’ indignation in the Parliament building, Beknazarov supporters gathered outside and warned that if the opposition deputy were not freed, they were prepared for “even more decisive action.”

The Bishkek protestors’ warnings proved true. Demonstrations quickly spread from the capital to other regions, and, on 17 March 2002, Kirghiz interior police shot and killed five Beknazarov supporters in the southern Jalalabad oblast. Confronted with growing condemnation for the killings and fearing further protests, the Akaev government released Beknazarov on 19 March. Restored to his seat in Parliament and now the head of a new coalition, the Movement for the Resignation of (President) Akaev, Beknazarov and his colleagues would lead a popular opposition movement that culminated in the March 2005 protests and Akaev’s subsequent resignation.

As the Beknazarov example illustrates, Kirghiz opposition movements can effectively challenge authoritarian rule using the independent media and existing political institutions. Revolutionary, antiestablishment strategies, for example, the strategies of political Islam, are, as a result, of little attraction to mainstream Kirghiz opposition. This is not to say, however, that Islamist movements do not exist in Kyrgyzstan. Indeed, political Islam has made inroads among some portions of Kirghiz society.

The Kirghiz government estimates that five thousand members of the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir Islamist party are active in southern Kyrgyzstan. Like other governments in Central Asia, Russia, and Germany, the Kirghiz government has banned Hizb ut-Tahrir because of the group’s extremist views. Nevertheless, the radical group remains active, and, in 2000, one hundred fifty of its members were temporarily detained. In 2001 this number increased to four hundred. In the first eight months of 2003, the Kirghiz state began investigations into a further 1,650 Islamist “agitators.” The overwhelming majority of these arrests and investigations have been concentrated in the Fergana Valley, among the Uzbek populations of the Jalalabad and Osh.

Of course, incarceration rates alone do not establish that Islamist movements have gained in popularity. The level of Islamist opposition, for example, may have remained constant between 1999 and 2002 while the Kirghiz state simply became more aggressive in its pursuit of perceived agitators. Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamist opposition groups, alas, do not release their member lists. As such, establishing a definitive measure of changes in the Islamist opposition is difficult. Nevertheless, despite these imperfect measures, that Islamist opposition movements have gained more support among Kyrgyzstan’s minority Uzbek population is increasingly clear. Just as cross-state variations in political Islam in Central Asia can be explained by differences in the nature of authoritarianism, so too is within-state variation the product of local differences in autocratic rule. More directly stated, the Akaev regime proved far less welcoming of minority Uzbek political contestation than it has been of ethnic Kirghiz contestation.

Kyrgyzstan’s minority Uzbek’s are disproportionately underrepresented in state institutions. Ethnic Uzbeks held only 5 out of the 2000–2005 Parliament’s 105 seats, and the Uzbek language, unlike Russian, is not an official state language—this despite the fact that Uzbeks, who constitute more than 20 percent of the Kirghiz population, are a larger minority.
than are ethnic Russians. Recent efforts to promote Kirghiz nationalism, moreover, have further exacerbated ethnic Uzbek feelings of exclusion. In October 2002, for example, the Akaev regime sponsored a celebration to commemorate the three thousandth anniversary of the founding of the Silk Road city, Osh. Similarly, in August 2003, President Akaev declared a national holiday to commemorate twenty-two hundred years of “Kirghiz Nationhood.” Both celebrations, Uzbeks protested, championed Kirghiz culture while ignoring what, in reality, is the culturally Uzbek heritage of much of southern Kyrgyzstan.

Survey data, moreover, further document a growing sense of alienation and disenfranchisement among the Uzbek population. As the data on freedom of speech reveal, Kyrgyzstan’s southern Uzbeks, the population that has been most drawn to political Islam, clearly sense that their ability to openly oppose the Kirghiz state has eroded in recent years. In 1999, for example, 80 percent of Uzbeks surveyed reported that they enjoyed freedom of speech. Three years later, this number had dropped to 50 percent.

Given this growing sense of alienation combined with their underrepresentation in the national parliament, that Southern Kyrgyzstan’s Uzbek population is attracted to the antiestablishment ideology of political Islam is understandable. Authoritarian rule is more severe for Kyrgyzstan’s ethnic Uzbeks than it is for the titular population. Accordingly, ethnic Uzbeks, with few opportunities to achieve political change from within existing political institutions, are increasingly drawn to revolutionary groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, to Islamist movements that seek to overthrow the state.

These mixed outcomes—little Islamist opposition among the broader titular population and growing Islamist opposition among minority Uzbeks—illustrate the local logic of political Islam. In Kyrgyzstan the resonance of political Islam varies at the substate level. In regions where meaningful contestation is absent, people turn to revolutionary ideologies. In regions where the opposition can contest politics through existing institutions, revolutionary ideologies find less support. The Kirghiz case demonstrates, in short, that the strength of the Islamist opposition varies inversely with political contestation.

**Uzbekistan—Totalitarian Rule and Militant Islam**

Uzbek state rule approaches what political scientists Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski define as totalitarianism. Uzbekistan’s heavy-handed president, Islam Karimov, maintains monopoly control over which (pro-presidential) parties contest parliamentary elections, the media, large portions of the economy, and, perhaps most notoriously, over a terrorizing police force. Not only are would-be Uzbek oppositionists prevented from contesting national elections, they are routinely jailed, tortured, and forced into exile. Unlike their colleagues in Kyrgyzstan, the Uzbek opposition cannot participate in meaningful political discourse. Prevented from contesting power in Parliament or, for that matter, in any institution of state governance, a growing number of Uzbek oppositionists have turned to nonstate institutions, most notably to the radical Hizb ut-Tahrir party and to the militant Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, in an effort to overthrow Karimov’s dictatorial rule.

In contrast to the spring 2000 Kirghiz parliamentary ballot in which two opposition parties—the Party of Communists and the People’s Party—were able to contest elections, no opposition parties were allowed to participate in Uzbekistan’s December 1999 parliamentary elections. The Kirghiz case demonstrates, in short, that the strength of the Islamist opposition varies inversely with political contestation.


57. I have just begun analyzing these data sets. Surveys were commissioned by the U.S. Department of State and conducted by the polling agency Brif. For more on Brif and its survey methodology, see www.brif.kz.

58. Friedrich and Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship, 21–27.
Moreover, in addition to being excluded from organs of state power, the opposition is also denied a voice in the national media. Describing this absolute state control over the press, the Geneva-based media watchdog, Cimera, writes, “Despite the large number of newspapers and a relatively developed electronic media network, there is not a single independent newspaper, television or radio station that can offer an alternative view to that of official news and analysis.”

It is not only the opposition, however, that is denied a voice in Uzbekistan. Members of nongovernmental organizations and human rights groups are also intimidated and denied legal status. In April 2001, Tashkent police committed Elena Ural'eva, a member of the Human Rights Society of Uzbekistan, to a psychiatric hospital. At the time of her arrest, Ural'eva was organizing protests against the rerouting of a city road through private homes in Tashkent. While Ural'eva was ultimately released, other activists have fared less well. Em'm Usmam, a popular writer and champion of minority Uyghur interests, and Shovruk Ruzimuradov, a human rights proponent, both died while in police custody in 2001.

As the Karimov government’s harsh response to the May 2005 street protests in Andijan illustrates, political contestation tolerated in states like Kyrgyzstan is brutally repressed in highly authoritarian Uzbekistan. Barred from traditional—and as we saw in the Kirghiz case—moderating avenues for political dissent, a growing number of Uzbek oppositionists have turned to militant Islamist movements in the hopes of destabilizing President Karimov’s totalitarian regime. Indeed, the Uzbek government, in contrast to the other Central Asian leaderships, has had to confront frequent armed attacks carried out by Islamists. Uzbek soldiers, for example, have repeatedly clashed with armed militants from the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan seeking to cross the Kirghiz-Uzbek border. Moreover, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, according to the U.S. Department of State, is “believed to have been responsible for five car bombs in Tashkent in February 1999,” which killed sixteen people. More recently, suicide bombers targeted public buildings in Bukhara and Tashkent in March 2004 and the U.S. and Israeli embassies as well as the Uzbek chief prosecutor’s office in July 2004. The Tashkent bombings and subsequent gun battles between militants and government security forces left more than forty people dead.

The Uzbek government has responded severely to these attacks, indiscriminately jailing those whom it suspects of links to Hizb ut-Tahrir and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. The U.S. Department of State estimates that five thousand Islamists were in Uzbek jails in 2002, this compared to four Islamists in Kirghiz jails for the same period. Suicide bombings and comparative incarceration rates, admittedly, are imperfect measures of the strength of political Islam. New research, including what will be a four-year longitudinal survey to be conducted in four Central Asian states, promises to provide a clearer picture of the varying resonance of political Islam in the region. Indeed, exploratory interviews of government elites conducted in preparation for this study demonstrate a much stronger perceived threat of political Islam in Uzbekistan than in Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek leadership, moreover, fearing a growing

59. The two opposition parties that sought to participate—Erk and Berlik—were denied registration by the Uzbek Central Election Committee. See Galima Bukharbayeva, “Uzbeks Vote for New Parliament under Intense Security,” Agence France Press, 5 December 1999, available in LexisNexis.
62. Ibid.
68. This research is part of a four-year study, “The Effect of the Internet on Society: Incorporating Central Asia into the Global Perspective,” National Science Foundation Award no. 0526101. For more on this project, see www.depts.washington.edu/caict/index.shtml. Surveys will be conducted in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan.
69. Author interviews with Kurmanbek Dzykanbaev, chairman of the Association of Local Self-Governance (Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, 16 March 2004), and with Abdulkhaji Abdullaev, vice rector of the Tashkent Islamic University under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan (Tashkent, 20 March 2004).
Islamist opposition movement, has begun, much as its Soviet predecessor did, to directly manage religion. In 1999 the Karimov government opened the Tashkent Islamic University under the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Uzbekistan. In addition to training Uzbekistan’s future imams and conducting attestation exams for current imams, the Tashkent Islamic University prepares and airs nationwide weekly television shows designed to educate the population on “tolerance and religion.”

The government’s call for tolerant Islam is understandable. However, as the recent March 2004 suicide bombings and shootings in Tashkent demonstrate, efforts to shape the dialogue of Islam will likely have little effect as long as the Karimov leadership maintains totalitarian control and prevents all forms of meaningful political contestation. The March bombings were carried out in Tashkent’s Chorsu bazaar, a location in the center of the Uzbek capital that frequently has been the site of distraught women protesting the imprisonment of husbands charged with Islamist extremism. Revealingly, the March suicide bombers were women and the target of their attacks were policemen at the bazaar, not merchants and shoppers. Militant Islam, while deplorable, is not without its causes. The markedly stronger presence of militant Islam in Uzbekistan than in other Central Asian countries is, to a large degree, the product of the Karimov regime’s intolerance of peaceful political contestation.

Conclusions and Implications

Hours after the March 2004 Tashkent bombings, U.S. State Department spokesman Richard Boucher condemned the attacks as a “senseless act of violence” and emphasized the “importance of continued cooperation against those who would stop at nothing to achieve their misguided goals.” If the logic outlined in this essay is correct, however, one must question the extent to which continued cooperation with oppressive regimes like Uzbekistan furthers stability and limits the spread of militant Islam. That is, if as the Kirghiz and Uzbek comparison suggests, political Islam takes root when other, more moderate forms of political contestation are prohibited, then it is possible that the U.S. partnership with the Karimov government might encourage the very threats Washington hopes to prevent. Of course, suspending relations with repressive regimes, while perhaps ethically attractive, may pragmatically be of little benefit. Uzbekistan’s partnership with the United States, unlike its history of oppressive rule, is a recent development, the product of the Clinton administration’s growing strategic concerns in Central Asia in the late 1990s. Thus, just as the Karimov government was harshly authoritarian prior to U.S. engagement, there is little evidence to suggest that the Karimov government would not remain equally authoritarian if Washington were to fully withdraw its support.

Washington’s strong denunciation of the May 2005 Andijan massacre deserves applause, particularly in light of the Bush administration’s tempered criticism of past human rights abuses in Uzbekistan. Significantly, though, America’s divesting itself of all relations with the Karimov regime would be unproductive. Rather, a reorientation of U.S. engagement away from government-to-government military support and toward education programs, humanitarian relief, and media reform would be a welcome policy change. Following 11 September 2001, U.S. aid to Uzbekistan increased fourfold, from $85 million in 2001 to $297 million in 2002. The largest single component of this aid—between one-third to one-half of the total aid, depending on how one interprets the State Department’s figures—was devoted to Uzbek military, security, and law enforcement support. In 2003, as the United States stepped

70. Author interview with Abdulkhai Abdullaev.
74. Out of a total of $297 million, $79 million was directly targeted at security and law enforcement. Uzbekistan received an additional $78 million for what the State Department calls “U.S. Defense Department excess and privately donated humanitarian commodities.” “U.S. Government Assistance to and Cooperative Activities with Eurasia—FY 2002.”
down military operations in Afghanistan, American aid to Uzbekistan dropped to $86 million. Military and security support, however, at more than $30 million, remained the largest component of U.S. assistance.

Military aid, while often directed toward laudable goals such as increased border security and narcotics interdiction, can readily be appropriated for coercive ends. Aid for humanitarian assistance, education support, and media reform, though it too can be captured by ruling elites for questionable, often self-enriching, ends, rarely increases the coercive capacity of autocratic states. As demonstrated by the peaceful revolution in 2004 that brought Mikheil Saakashvili, a Columbia University Law School graduate, to power in Georgia, along with his U.S.-educated Georgian cabinet officials, aid for education programs can, over time, create a reformist domestic opposition capable of overthrowing authoritarian rule. Granted, scholarships to support study at Western universities, along with humanitarian aid and support for media reform, may only marginally better the odds for political liberalization in post-Soviet Central Asia. This long shot, however, is better than aiding those coercive institutions that, I have argued here, give rise to an equally coercive militant Islam.}


76. Ibid.

77. For more on how states can apply military aid to domestic oppression, see Talukder Maniruzzaman, “Arms Transfers, Military Coups and Military Rule in Developing States,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 36 (1992): 733–56.

78. All four members of the new Georgian leadership were supported by the U.S. Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.