Authors: S. S. Komorita and David A. Kravitz

Title: Effects of prior experience on coalition bargaining

Source: Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 675-686. 1981.

Theory and research in coalition formation suggest that coalition outcomes may depend on the participantsí prior bargaining experience and on the incentives (rewards) over which they are bargaining. Komoritaís equal excess model predicts that coalition outcomes should vary with both of these variables, and the purpose of this study was to test these predictions. One hundred twenty-six male undergraduates played three-person multivalued games. All groups played four trials of a test game either for points that were later converted to prizes (maximum value of $2), or for money (values of $2, $3, and $4 on each trial). Prior to the test game, triads in different conditions were exposed to a varying number of coalition games. There was no significant effect of incentives on either coalition frequencies or coalition payoffs. Although there was no significant effect of prior experience on coalition frequencies, there was a large and significant effect on coalition payoffs: the greater the experience, the greater the deviation of payoffs from equal splits.Thus, the results of many coalition experiments may be restricted to naÔve bargainers and may not be generalized to experienced, sophisticated bargainers. Implications for the equal excess model and for future research are also discussed.

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