Copyright 2006 Amanda von Argyriadis

Nationalism, Liberalism, and NationBuilding in Nineteenth Century Germany:
Language, Political Homogeneity and Junker Reformation.

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R. Berdahl, The Politics of the Prussian Nobility: The Development of a Conservative Ideology, 1770-1848, Princeton, 1988 Blackbourn, David, The Long Nineteenth Century, A History of Germany-1780-1918, Oxford, 1998 Sheehan, James, “Liberalism and Society in Germany, 1815-48”, Journal of Modern History, December 1973, Volume 45, no. 4, pp. 583-604

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Although homeland nationalism in Germany emerged only in the last decades of the nineteenth century and crystallised as a significant political force only after the First World War, the incongruence and tension between the conceived order of the nation and the organisational reality of the state; a central precondition for the emergence of homeland nationalism, has deep roots in German history. Its matrix was the distinctive economic, political and cultural geography of Central Europe. Historians such as Blackbourn, Berdahl and Sheehan have offered various arguments in their analyses of both “German” revolution and the emergence of a German national state. Common obstacles found in each of their surveys of German nationalism are that of language, lack of political homogeneity, and Junker reformation. 
The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars, especially the crushing and humiliating defeat of Prussia by the French at Jena in 1806, made a tremendous impression in Germany. That the state must seek to harness the energies of the nation, and the nation to embody itself in a state became the conventional progressive wisdom. How this melding of a nation and a state might be accomplished was a central question of German and intellectual political life for the first two thirds of the nineteenth century. 

Two features of geography are useful here. First, Western Germany lay in the heart of Europe’s urban belt, a legacy of the overland trade routes of the middle ages, extending from the North Sea and the Baltic. In this zone, the density of the cities, ecclesiastical principalities and other small but autonomous political jurisdictions created obstacles to the expansion and consolidation of centralised territorial states; obstacles that were much weaker in the areas west and east of the urban belt, where in consequence, much larger centralised states had earlier emerged.  The resulting long standing fragmentation of political authority meant that ethnolinguistic and political boundaries did not even come close to coinciding in (what would become) Germany. A second distinctive feature of German cultural geography has been the broad zone of ethno-culturally mixed settlement patterns extending eastward from the area of consolidated German settlement; a legacy of the large scale eastward migration of German peasant settlers and colonists that occurred in several great waves in the high middle ages and again the in the early modern era. Together with the fragmentation of political authority in Western Germany, these extensive mixed zones in its eastern borderlands prevented congruence between ethnolinguistic and political boundaries.

Until the second half of the eighteenth century no cultural or political influence was attached to the Volkssprache, or the language of every day life, (as opposed to the Staatesprache, the language of public affairs). As a result, even the most remote congruence between the ethnolinguistic and political units had no particular importance. This changed in the late eighteenth century when the Volkssprache was celebrated, most influentially by Herder, as a matrix of creativity and individuality; as a conception of nation as founded on language, a linguistically embedded culture took root among the flourishing German population.¹ From this time on, the imagined community of the ethnocultural nation was available as a point of orientation, focus of value, source of identity, and locus of allegiance and independent of (and potentially conflicting with) the state. While the centralised bureaucratic language had been German since 1784..² the decision for a German speaking Europe was effected in June, 1815..³ Thus, language was recognised one central precondition for homeland nationalism, as Germany experienced a “reading revolution".⁴ The importance of vernacular print promulgation and circulation for cohesion during this period of German nation building cannot be over emphasised, according to Blackbourne. As much influence as the high art of philosophical writings influenced the affluent and educated classes, politically based literature and propaganda also reached the masses, helping to bond their ideals and strengthen their resolve for both reform and unification. By the 1840’s, liberalism had become fashionable not only for the high ranking officials but also for the middle class and the lower ranks of the Burgertum, according to Sheehan. These independent thinkers spent often spent their free time associating with like minded liberal enthusiasts in cafes, parks and parlours discussing and reading about politics, feeling “boundlessly fortunate being able to participate in the awakening of political life.”⁵

And participate they did, although Blackbourne warns that due to no casual meeting record keeping it is difficult to determine exactly how, except for the government officials whose names were recorded and occupations were noted. Most pre-revolutionary political participation occurred underground in subversive clubs and in clandestine meetings where opinions and ideas could be openly shared. While Prussia readers remained predominantly upper class, the word reaches the rural areas by way of pamphlets, broadsides and the family bible according to Blackbourne, who adds that even this sacred book was used as a source of redress.⁶ Books were printed at speed and volume previously inexperienced in the region. Literary materials were delivered by freshly built railroads and methods of carrying the word increased tenfold as new technological advances in communication were realised. Newspapers included “March song” lyrics and were sung to unpopular figures in moonlight window serenades.⁷ The political discussions that ensued sometimes became riotous and not so clandestine, as university towns everywhere in Germany proved to be locations of disorder. Public disorder thundered in theatres and community halls, while universities were targeted by authorities as loci of resistance as patriotic sentiment developed. A sense of German-ness emerged as state colours of green and white appeared, and as a unified group of peasants and journeymen fought in Baden for “the fruits of one’s labour and a fair wage, hostility to hoarding and usury, emphasis on the just price and the journeyman’s honour.⁸The inclination to organise ran across all class boundaries, fusing previous cleavages and giving agency to Jews and women, two groups which had previously been ignored, if not abused, in the German political process.  Heavily influenced by university trained and legally minded men, the newly elected officials of the Vormarz in both Frankfurt and Berlin were homogenous and represented the voice of the people more directly than ever before. “The movement included men from the full range of German society between the landed nobility and the unpropertied masses".⁹ More directly, this homogeneity was specifically located in the minds of the people who participated in politics; their desire for a unified codified German state and a promising future in modernity.

Influence imposed by the German state, however, would prove to be dodgy territory. While some state mandated measures were resisted, those that enabled economic growth were desired; creating both a dichotomy in philosophy and practical, organisational cleavages amongst the ranks. As Blackbourne states, “There was a significant minority committed to modernisation in all its facets and a larger, rather more diversified group who viewed social and economic developments with a mixture of confidence and fear".¹⁰Regional differences continued to divide the nation as some saw urban life as the seat of growth and modernity, while many opined that rural life by nature restricted the mind and economic opportunity. There were conflicting ideas, however, and the notion of the city as the root of all evil prevailed in German literature, and consequently rapid change associated with city life was largely feared. Fear that the dissolution of guilds would create rural havoc, for example, was widespread among those who knew no other method of tradesmanship. This feeling of anxiety flowed into political thought, as many moved to support agricultural systems and agrarian life in an effort to keep the German snell train of industry and modernity from flying off the track.

Pivotal to this conservation of agrarian life was Junker reformation, or the resolution of the feudal landholding arrangements that had previously been rule of law. The Civil Code of 1811 made many concessions benefiting nobles while attempting to keep the peace among the peasants, as church officials and nobles retained corporate privileges. Fearing the outcome of the French Revolution, and having witnessed the effects on the French Ancien Regime, Junkers and patrimonial land holders took concessions in order to literally keep their heads.  According to Blackbourne, the emancipation of peasants looked more in the end like “an emancipation of the Junker nobility.¹¹But because their authority was recognised by public law, noble estate owners carried out their responsibilities with quasi-official status.¹²Berdahl argues that nobles had seen themselves as the head of the household in a familial, paternalistic relationship with their subjects. As Berdahl explains repeatedly, Junkers employed both physical and symbolic means in order to obtain their goal of absolute control. The concept of the Stande, or delineated social position, was seen in many symbolic ways, including the absence of a chair between classes at formal dinners, illuminating the position between the arbiters of monarchical rule and the commoners they dominated. The Stande thus “….provided the framework for deference and authority.”¹³In what seems like incredibly private, intrusive and domineering relationships, the peasant was seen by the Junker as “a creature of the senses, his entire being shaped by his physical labour".¹⁴The peasant was considered to be cunning and indolent, yet childlike, and in need of constant supervision, thereby justifying Junker domination, according to Berdahl.  Reminiscent of the slave and master relationship in early nineteenth century America, in Prussian Junker/peasant relationships,“…there was both deference and conflict—outward deference towards authority and an inward secret war of peasants against masters".¹⁵

As reformations took place from above, many privileges of birth or estate were dissolved and professional competence was the measure of achievement and notoriety from 1806. Armed forces were strengthened as more nobles, many with fewer land management responsibilities entered service. Moreover, the pre-capitalist method of feudal domination by Junkers was lost when a capitalist market emerged creating independent means of wealth accumulation for the peasantry and the burgeoning middle class. Despite the security of Junker domination, peasants were eager to earn their own wage and be free from the burden of the Junker and his frequent mistreatment.  As economic misfortunes occurred due to poor crop production and overpopulation in agricultural districts, Junkers were frequently forced to sell their estates to Burghers and commoners who were then lifted in their stand in order to keep nobles at the top.¹⁶Thus, landed Prussians emerged from the reform period with renewed vigour, both in the provinces and in the local districts; they dominated provincial and district assemblies and changed the face of the developing state.

Just as the Plague had rearranged socio-economic standing in the fourteenth century, crop crises and concessions in German bureaucracy forged new wealth and status for previously barred citizens. The agricultural crisis in the 1820s provided opportunity for more change as large numbers of noble estates passed into the hands of commoners.¹⁷

The depression deprived the new landowning commoners of the fiscal income needed to improve and maintain the property, and they lost many of their holdings. Forced to find other means of gainful employment, the now landless peasants found day labour for support. Bitter and dissatisfied with their stand, their rage increased with the additional agricultural failures of the 1840s. The military demand for grain and the taking of stock and supplies by the army had depleted the peasantry beyond tolerance. Trade had been interrupted by the Napoleonic wars, and crops had to be diversified in order to make ends meet. Credit extensions and poor fiscal planning damaged noble wealth in general, pressing them to the wall in company with the peasantry. Yet somehow, as Berdahl explains throughout his book, Prussian nobility was able to hold fast to a good deal of their position much longer than any other state precisely because they were willing to make concessions and had patient trust that traditionalist patterns of governance would resurface in their favour and breed conservative nationalism.

Nations and nation states are defined by multi faceted factors including language, culture, mores, and physical boundaries. The land mass and people we now know as modern Germany went through many changes in the nineteenth century to form a dynamic nation of diverse citizens and viewpoints, setting in motion the principles and foundations to twentieth century history, and more precisely, the First and Second World Wars and the collapse of the Berlin Wall. As all three authors have demonstrated, cultures and social factors are heavily weighted in consideration of the building of nation states. It is not simply a case of national boundaries, borders, battles or skirmishes. Nations are not built on a centralised government alone. Historians and public policy enthusiasts are, and should be, persistently investigating the factors and forces that create nations in an effort to better understand international governance and interact with nations in a way that will garner peace and harmony for us all.

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Amanda von Argyriadis is a second year PhD student at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. She holds a BSFS in Foreign Service from Georgetown University and an MA in Early Modern European history from George Mason University. Her current work reflects a blend of studies, with a major in American cultural history and a minor in European cultural history. Both areas of study are based in the Twentieth century, with an emphasis on immigration topics.