





ECE297:11 Lecture 4


Towards modern ciphers: SP networks & DES

SP Networks





LUCIFER- external look



History of DES

**NBS public request for a standard
cryptographic algorithm
May 15, 1973, August 27, 1974**

The algorithm must be:

- secure
- public
 - completely specified
 - easy to understand
 - available to all users
- economic and efficient in hardware
- able to be validated
- exportable

DES - chronicle of events

**1973 - NBS issues a public request for proposals for
a standard cryptographic algorithm**



**1975 - first publication of the IBM's algorithm
and request for comments**


**1976 - NBS organizes two workshops to evaluate
the algorithm**

**1977 - official publication as
FIPS PUB 46: Data Encryption Standard**

**1983, 1987, 1993 - recertification of the algorithm
for another five years**



1993 - software implementations allowed to be validated






Specification of DES

DES - external look




Feistel Structure


Encryption



Decryption




L_{n+1}, R_{n+1}





L_n, R_n


Feistel Structure

Encryption





Decryption







Implementing DES




Flow Diagram of the Encryption/Decryption Unit of DES




Typical Flow Diagram of a Secret-Key Block Cipher




Basic iterative architecture




Basic architecture: Timing




Structure of a single round



DES: Basic Architecture Encryption/Decryption Unit



DES: Basic Architecture Key scheduling



Breaking DES

Theoretical design of the specialized machine to break DES

Project: Michael Wiener, Entrust Technologies, **1993, 1997**

Method: **exhaustive key search attack**

Basic component: specialized integrated circuit in CMOS technology, 75 MHz

Checks: **200 mln keys per second**

Costs: **\$10**


| Total cost | Estimated time |
|------------|-------------------|
| \$ 1 mln | 35 minutes |
| \$ 100.000 | 6 hours |

Deep Crack

Electronic Frontier Foundation, 1998


Total cost: \$220,000

Average time of search:
4.5 days/key



1800 ASIC chips, 40 MHz clock

| Deep Crack <i>Parameters</i> | |
|--|----------------------|
| Number of ASIC chips | 1800 |
| Clock frequency | 40 MHz |
| Number of clock cycles per key | 16 |
| Number of search units per ASIC | 24 |
| Search speed | 90 bln keys/s |
| Average time to recover the key | 4.5 days |



Minimum length of the key for symmetric ciphers

I. Panel of experts, January 1996

*M. Blaze, W. Diffie, R. Rivest, B. Schneier, T. Shimomura,
E. Thompson, M. Wiener*

Report:

“Minimal Key Lengths for Symmetric Ciphers
to Provide Adequate Commercial Security”

II. National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, May 1996

Report:


“Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information Society”

Minimum key length for symmetric-key ciphers

| Intruder | Budget | Tools | Time | | Secure key length |
|-----------------------------|----------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|-------------------|
| | | | 40 bits | 56 bits | |
| Hacker | tiny | PC | 1 week | infeasible | 45 |
| Small business | \$400 | FPGA | 5 hrs | 38 years | 50 |
| | \$10,000 | FPGA | 12 min | 18 months | 55 |
| Corporate department | \$300 K | FPGA | 24 sec | 19 days | 60 |
| | | ASIC | 18 sec | 3 hrs | |
| Big company | \$10 M | FPGA | 7 sec | 13 hrs | 70 |
| | | ASIC | 5 ms | 6 min | |
| Intelligence agency | \$300 M | ASIC | 0.2 ms | 12 sec | 75 |

Secure key length today and in 20 years

key length



Secure key length - discussion

- increasing key length in a newly developed cipher costs NOTHING
- increasing effective key length, assuming the use of an existing cipher has a limited influence on the efficiency of implementation (DESX, Triple DES)


It is economical to use THE SAME secure key length FOR ALL applications

The primary barriers blocking the use of symmetric ciphers with a secure key length have been of the political nature (e.g., export policy of USA)


Extensions of DES

Triple DES *Diffie, Hellman, 1977*

EEE mode



EDE mode



Triple DES

Advantages:


- secure key length (112 or 168 bits)
- increased compared to DES resistance to linear and differential cryptanalysis
- possibility of utilizing existing implementations of DES

Disadvantages:

- relatively slow, especially in software

DESX

Rivest, 1988



KEY = (K, K_a)
120 bits

$K_b = \text{hash function}(K, K_a)$