ECE297:11 - Lecture 2

Types of Cryptosystems

Implementation of Security Services

Secret-key vs. public-key ciphers

Secret-key (Symmetric) Cryptosystems



Key Distribution Problem



N - Users ⇨ $\frac{N \cdot (N-1)}{2}$ Keys

Users	Keys
100	5,000
1000	500,000

Digital Signature Problem

Both corresponding sides have the same information and are able to generate a signature

There is a possibility of the
- **receiver falsifying the message**
- **sender denying that he/she sent the message**

Public Key (Asymmetric) Cryptosystems

Public key of Bob - K_B

Private key of Bob - k_B



Classification of cryptosystems Terminology

secret-key	*public key*
symmetric	*asymmetric*
symmetric-key	
classical	
conventional	

One-way function



EXAMPLE:

$f: Y=f(X) = A^X \bmod P$

where P and A are constants, P is a large prime,
A is an integer smaller than P

Number of bits of P	Average number of multiplications necessary to compute	
	f	**f^{-1}**
1000	1500	10^{30}

Trap-door one-way function

Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman
"*New directions in cryptography*," 1976

PUBLIC KEY



PRIVATE KEY





Implementation of Security Services

Non-repudiation



Hash function



Hash functions

Basic requirements

1. Public description, NO key
2. Compression

   arbitrary length input → fixed length output
3. Ease of computation

Hash functions

Security requirements

It is computationally infeasible

	Given	To Find
1. Preimage resistance	***h(m)***	***m***
2. 2nd preimage resistance	***m*** and ***h(m)***	***m'*** ≠ ***m***, such that ***h(m') = h(m)***
3. Collision resistance		***m'*** ≠ ***m***, such that ***h(m') = h(m)***

Brute force attack against One-Way Hash Function

Given *y*



i=1..2^n

2^n messages with the contents required by the forger

Creating multiple versions of the required message

I {state / confirm} {thereby / -} that I {borrowed / received}

{$10,000 / ten thousand dollars} from {Mr. / Dr.} {Kris / Krzysztof}

Gaj on {June 4, / 06 / 04} 2002. This {money / sum of money}

{should / is required to} be {returned / given back} to {Mr. / Dr.} Gaj

by the {end / middle} of {June / July} .

Brute force attack against Collision Resistant Hash Function

Yuval



Message required by the forger

I {state / confirm} {thereby / -} that I {borrowed / received}

{$10,000 / ten thousand dollars} from {Mr. / Dr.} {Kris / Krzysztof}

Gaj on {June 4, / 06 / 04} 2002. This {money / sum of money}

{should / is required to} be {returned / given back} to {Mr. / Dr.} Gaj

by the {end / middle} of {June / July} .

Message acceptable for the signer

I {state / confirm} {thereby / -} that on {June 4, / 06 / 04} 2001

I {borrowed / received} from {Mr. / Dr.} {Kris / Krzysztof} a {book / manuscript}

on {fast / efficient} {implementations / realizations} of {ciphers / cryptosystems} .

This {text / book} {should / is required to} be {returned / given back}

to {Mr. / Dr.} Gaj by the {end / middle} of {November / December} .

Birthday paradox

How many students there must be in a class for there be a greater than 50% chance that

1. *one of the students shares the teacher's birthday (day and month)?*
2. *any two of the students share the same birthday (day and month)?*

Birthday paradox

How many students there must be in a class for there be a greater than 50% chance that

1. *one of the students shares the teacher's birthday (day and month)?*

~ 366/2 = 188

2. *any two of the students share the same birthday (day and month)?*

$$\sim\sqrt{366} \approx 19$$

Authentication



MAC - Message Autentication Codes (keyed hash functions)



MAC functions

Basic requirements

1. Public description, SECRET key parameter
2. Compression

   arbitrary length input → fixed length output
3. Ease of computation

MAC functions

Security requirements

Given zero or more pairs

m_i, MAC(m_i) $\quad i = 1..k$

it is computationally impossible to find any new pair

m', MAC(m')

Such that

$m' \neq m_i \quad i = 1..k$

CBC-MAC (Cipher Block Chaining MAC)



Relations among security services



Non-repudiation



Authentication



Hybrid Systems

Features required from today's ciphers



Features of secret-key ciphers



Features of public-key ciphers



Ciphering and Deciphering Speed

on average
for implementations based on the same technology

	software	**hardware**
$\frac{\text{DES deciphering speed}}{\text{RSA deciphering speed}}$	≈ 100	≈ 1000

Basic operations of secret key ciphers - S-box

Software **Hardware**

S-box *n* x *m*



Substitution

C

```
WORD S[1<<n]=
{ 0x23, 0x34, 0x56
  . . . . . .
}
```

ASM

```
S   DW  23H, 34H,
        56H
        …..
```

ROM



direct logic

Basic operations of secret key ciphers - P-box

Software **Hardware**

P-box *n* x *n*



Permutation

C

sequence of instructions
<<, |, &

ASM

sequence of instructions
ROL, OR, AND



order of wires

RSA as a trap-door one-way function



$n = p \cdot q$ p, q - large prime numbers

$e \cdot d \equiv 1 \mod ((p-1)(q-1))$

RSA keys

PUBLIC KEY **PRIVATE KEY**

{ *e, n* } **{ *d, p, q* }**

$n = p \cdot q$ p, q - large prime numbers

$e \cdot d \equiv 1 \mod ((p\text{-}1)(q\text{-}1))$

Basic Operations of the Public Key Cryptosystem RSA

Encryption



Decryption



Hybrid Systems

Alice **Bob**

Bob's public key **session key** *random* **Bob's private key**

Encrypted session key | Encrypted message | Encrypted session key | Encrypted message

RSA public key DES session key

Hybrid Systems - Sender's Side (2)



Hybrid Systems - Receiver's Side (2)



Block vs. stream ciphers

Block vs. stream ciphers



$C_i = f_K(M_i)$

Every block of ciphertext is a function of only **one** corresponding **block** of plaintext

$c_i = f_K(m_i, m_{i-1}, \ldots, m_2, m_1)$

Every block of ciphertext is a function of the **current and all proceeding blocks** of plaintext

Typical stream cipher



Evaluating the security of secret-key ciphers

Classification of attacks (1)

Ciphertext-only attack

Given:

ciphertext 

Looked for:

plaintext 

or key

Example:

Frequency analysis of letters in the ciphertext
(effective only for most simple historical ciphers)

Classification of attacks (2)

Known plaintext attack

Given:

ciphertext 

guessed fragment of the plaintext 

Looked for:

remaining plaintext 

or key

Example:

exhaustive key search
(brute-force) attack



Classification of attacks (3)

Chosen plaintext attack

Given:

Capability to encipher
an arbitrarily chosen
fragment of the plaintext



Looked for:

key

Example:

Differential cryptanalysis



Classification of attacks (4)

Chosen ciphertext attack

Given:

Capability to decipher an arbitrarily chosen fragment of the ciphertext



Looked for:

key